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ABSTRACT
The United States government has spent more than $125 billion since 2001 to
prepare the nation for bioterrorism. This dissertation examines the emergence of
bioterrorism as a credible threat in the contemporary moment, considering how the
preparedness practices of the security state constitute new biopolitical formations. To
explore how changing ways of knowing disease and risk are reshaping communities, this
multi-sited study investigates the material outcomes of biosecurity in people’s lives. It
shows how complex histories of disease and terror are remade in the modern age to bring
about new spaces and forms of biological citizenship.
Through interview, observation and detailed historical research, this research
considers three sites where bioterrorism is reshaping public life. At Montana’s Rocky
Mountain Laboratory, the community protest of the first high-security Biosafety Level-4
facility built in the 21st century exemplifies how public fear of microbes reshapes
laboratory spaces and constructs environmental geographies around new conceptions of
life, risk, and disease. The creation and implementation of new biopreparedness programs
at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta show how the alliance of

viii
public health practices with the nation’s security complex brings a new level of
militarism to everyday practices of health and wellness. Finally, a case study of
bioterrorism simulation exercises in New Mexico considers how the public rehearsal of
terrorism events creates a perpetual state of emergency as governments and citizens
publicly perform their responses to a crisis.
By studying the technoscientific extensions of war in the modern age, this
research questions how the care-giving acts of governance have been militarized and how
enlisting the bioscience industry in the “War on Terror” is changing societal norms of
knowing life, death, nature, and disease, grounded in these re-articulations of life itself.
The emerging spaces and economies of terrorism preparedness exemplify how the fusion
of new genomic biologies with national security practices brings material change to the
spaces where people live and work. This research aims to convince scholars as well as
policymakers and activists that the ways in which bioterrorism has been produced have
consequences in how people live.
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Introduction
“Bioterrorism Seen as Top Threat” headlined a February 23, 2007, report from
United Press International. More than one-third of the 10,000 respondents to the UPIZogby International poll ranked the fear of biological attack as the number one health risk
facing Americans, exceeding the fear of Avian Flu or AIDS by more than 10 percentage
points.1 Though more than 600,000 people have died of AIDS in the United States, only
five people have died in bioterrorist acts in modern US history.2 In spite of the rarity of
biological attacks, everything from government spending to prime-time television drama
frames bioterrorism as one of the greatest threats to American life and society,
demanding action in the present to resolve a catastrophe located in an imagined future.
Biosecurity, the movement to protect the nation from such biological threats, has become
a multibillion dollar industry in the 21st century. In 2005, the federal budget for
biodefense was eighteen times greater than in 2001, and the total biosecurity expenditures
since 2001 have now exceeded $125 billion. This outpouring of funds is fundamentally
reshaping American communities.3
This dissertation examines the emergence of bioterrorism as a national security
concern, asking how bioterrorism has become a credible threat in the modern age and
what outcomes biosecurity practices have in the lives of citizens. With the synchronous
rise of a new kind of biology and a new brand of terrorism, the practices of science,
media and government have been deeply imbued with fear. Bioterrorism has been made
intelligible through the fusion of the genomic life sciences and the “War on Terror.” This
research seeks to understand how the bioterrorist threat attains form and tenacity in
modern life and what new spaces, societies, and forms of citizenship are made possible
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through biosecurity practices. How do political histories of disease coalesce with modern
bioscience practices to create an understanding of bioterrorism cohesive enough to
mobilize against bioterrorist threats? What new forms of biological citizenship and
collective life are constituted through the bioterrorism preparedness practices of the
national security state? Careful attention to the practices that define bioterrorism and its
social relations reveals emerging systems of governance predicated upon the production
of vulnerable bodies and exposing unseen life forms and communal webs of contagion.
How, then, does the national security state claim authority in terms of biology to care for
its citizens and mitigate biological risk, and what is at stake in people’s lives through
national mobilization against unknown biological threats? Indeed, whether there exists a
biothreat or not, bioterrorism preparedness practices are changing how people relate to
the state; perhaps the elusiveness of the bioterrorist threat is precisely what makes it a
potent tool of governing.
Bioterrorism is a crisis without an event. To our knowledge, no terrorist has laced
L.A.’s water with salmonella or dusted Detroit with anthrax powder. No single time or
place marks the origins of the bioterror crisis. Rather, countless daily acts by scientists,
politicians and citizens sustain the idea of a bioterror threat. This dissertation studies how
individual lives and communities are changing in relation to this threat, while attending to
the national discourses and economies which bind distant times and places under the
banner of biosecurity. Complex histories of disease and violence are remade in the
contemporary moment to give form and tenacity to the bioterror threat. The geographic
sites described herein are places where people work today to know, act, or react to the
specter of bioterrorism. How does their work participate in the ongoing work of nation-
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building, particularly through the articulation of biological risk and performance of
preparedness? Thus, this research endeavor strives to produce a deeper understanding of
how people incorporate new conceptions of life, biology, and risk into their ways of
knowing their world and living in it.
When citizens invest in “national security” with their labor, taxes, and votes, it is
critical to question military-type actions that give authority over life itself to the state.
Biosecurity is molding modern life, producing a future in which biological warfare seems
certain. This research sees the bioterror crisis, not as an inevitable product of the genomic
age, but as a produced event which performs a particular function within a modern
politic. The objective of this dissertation is to delineate what work bioterrorism does in
order to better understand its function within the neoliberal state. In other words, how
does the movement to secure the national body bind citizenship to new biological
knowledge of life, body, and disease?
Germination of a Crisis
Bioterrorism is a particular class of terrorism in which living organisms are
modified from their naturally-occurring state in order to inflict harm on a population and
bring about fear. The fear of biology—the betrayal of nature—has a complex history,
crescendoing through the blending of deadly microbes and sophisticated technology.
Advances in science and technology have expanded the arsenal of the terrorist, opening
the possibility that anyone from Islamic extremist to adolescent science geek might be
building bioweapons in the basement. Even the spectacular images of the World Trade
Center collapse in 2001 fell short of framing the real fears of the new millennium. In
nearly perfect theatrical timing, the opening scene of airplanes, skyscrapers, fires, and
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explosions transitioned to the subtle and silent threat of white powder passed through the
US postal system. The anthrax scare located the drama in the lives of anyone who opened
mail or inhaled air. President Bush called this the “second wave of terrorism,” a rhetoric
marking bioterror as the threat of the future and enabling swift government action to be
directed towards establishing a biosecurity plan.4
Biological weapons are the ultimate living weapon. Germs can wipe out entire
populations, and historically they have, with no assistance from technology. Fear of
pandemics is not new to the modern era, but human relations to disease have transformed
over the past century, culminating with the mechanisms for genetic alteration and
biological weapons. Tools of science, such as vaccines and antibiotics, have fallen short
of the promise to eradicate disease from the planet. The AIDS crisis of the 1980s
rekindled fears of emerging infectious diseases, and the inability of the science
community to rapidly identify the biological agent startled and outraged citizens. In the
new millennium, cases of SARS and Swine Flu brought the fear of disease into the age of
globalization, stirring public concern that transportation networks would rapidly spread
the diseases of the third world into sanitized first-world nations. Even the eradication of
naturally-occurring smallpox in the 1970s has reproduced vulnerability in terms of
people’s ability to harness the destructive power of disease. Before the United Nations
declared smallpox to be dead, vials of frozen virus were quietly stashed in UN-sanctioned
freezers, and now the suspicion that rogue governments also harbor smallpox raises fears
that the germ will be used to prey upon a population no longer vaccinated and once again
susceptible to the smallpox virus. Further, laboratory research has raised concern that
smallpox could be artificially recreated from its DNA sequence or spliced with other
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genes to create a smallpox “Superbug.”5 The fear of smallpox is no longer the fear of
how an organism can destroy human life, but how scientists and politicians can bend a
germ to their bidding. Thus, the germ is imbued in new ways with a politics of life and
death.
Transforming a germ into a tool of terror pushes the bounds of scientific
knowledge, but for now the possibilities of biological warfare remain far greater in
imagination than in lived experience. Only two significant acts of bioterrorism have been
recorded in modern US history. Anthrax killed five people in 2001, and sickened at least
17 others. In 1984, a religious cult in Oregon gave 750 people stomachaches by
sprinkling salad bars with salmonella brewed in a secret, underground laboratory. No one
died from those tainted greens, but incidents such as these have clearly captured the
popular imagination. Because microbes are invisible to the human eye and the war they
wage does not take down buildings or leave similar material effects, dramatizations of
disease events render the outcomes visible and therefore knowable in more emotional and
moving ways. From their couches, Americans view bioterrorist attacks on primetime
television dramas, like Alias and 24, and feature films like Steven Seagal’s The Patriot.
Such programs remake history around the idea of bioterrorism, compensating, in part, for
the absence of attack by providing believable enactments of bioterror scenarios.
These fictional presentations have material effects in producing the cultural milieu
for fear and science. Further, the imagined outcomes of bioterrorist events presented in
fiction, like the elaborate acts of simulation and rehearsal, point to sites of “weakness” or
vulnerability in preparedness systems, providing impetus for political response. Most
famously, journalist Judith Miller recounts President Clinton receiving a copy of novelist
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Richard Preston’s The Cobra Event, which he reportedly stayed up all night reading and
then ordered copies as required texts for his cabinet. Not long after, Clinton assembled
the country’s first bioterrorism taskforce and made the first large-scale funding
allocations dedicated specifically to bioterrorism preparedness. Notably, this allocation
preceded the attacks of 9/11 and the following months when bioterror assumed the form
of anthrax, exemplifying how material change follows engagement with the science
fiction of disease.6
In the 1990s, popular novels like The Hot Zone and epics like The Coming Plague
kept concern over pandemics within the popular imagination and produced a terrain upon
which the terrorist concerns of the new millennium could be mapped.7 Bioscientists
continue to speculate on the terrorist uses of microbes and the likelihood of bioterror
attack, authoring their own books and essays or supplying information to journalists
reporting on bioterror topics.8 This practice aligns expertise on microbes with authority
on political systems of terror and human social behavior. In other words, knowing the
potential of a germ to act in predictable ways as learned through scientific methods
becomes accepted basis for identifying the possibilities of bioterrorist attack, whether that
knowledge is input into a computerized simulation, a newspaper column, or a Hollywood
film. The consultation of science experts on smallpox or Ebola rationalizes the mere
knowledge of such organisms as the motivation for social action. The case of
bioterrorism exemplifies how the science complex fuels powerful social movements,
naturalizing political acts by producing a material world which must at all times be
managed and controlled.
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Certainly, the global science complex has produced abundant knowledge of
microbes, knowledge which changes daily alongside the mechanisms for studying the
nature of life itself. The rise of the new life sciences is producing potent and abundant
sources for the production of new systems of governance, predicated upon a widespread
cultural fear of nature. The mobile, malleable, and mutable microbe proffers innumerable
calculations of risk to citizens’ life and health. In this landscape of microbes, people are
perpetually vulnerable to unseen and unspecified threats and therefore turn to the state to
mitigate harm. The belief that nature can be contained and controlled through acts of
governance sustains the bioterror crisis and rationalizes the many individual acts which
comprise security in the broadest and most personal sense. The policing of social
interactions, such as handshaking, for the sake of national security, exemplifies the reach
of these governing bodies in the name of citizens’ collective health.
Biosecurity naturalize the fears which have long underlain the national security
state, for microbes contain the potential for awful destruction to human life when
manipulated by modern technologies. Moreover, because germs are life forms with their
volition the threat is never fixed, creating an endless state of vulnerability which sustains
ongoing and unending acts of social control. The biological nature of the threat also taps
into the apparatuses of public health and medicine, expanding these systems for the sake
of the crisis and in the name of dual-use efficiency. The outcomes mirror the security
practices of the Cold War, with the objective to ensure continued social life following a
catastrophic nuclear event, only this time troubled by the simultaneous endurance of
microbial life alongside humans.
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In many ways, the current anxiety over biological attack recalls the climate of fear
created around nuclear weapons following World War II. Through propaganda and
policy, the United States built a civil defense program around the desire for a preemptive
response to protect citizens from a perceived future risk.9 Rather than fighting an enemy
in combat, military strategy involved building infrastructure and implementing programs
to anticipate an attack and increase human survival in the homeland. The national
security programs of the 1950s and 1960s called for individual communities to rehearse
their evacuation plans, and these drills were followed by public discussion of who would
have died had the attack been “real.” Participating in these exercises, down to the basic
duck and cover drills rehearsed by school children, was a patriotic duty, a part of public
life during the nuclear age. Joseph Masco calls the reenactment a “formidable public
ritual—a core act of governance, technoscientific practice, and democratic participation
… a civic obligation to collectively imagine, and at times theatrically enact through ‘civil
defense,’ the physical destruction of the nation-state.”10 Not only did these scenarios
imagine a post-nuclear world, but they imagined the specific practices people would have
to undertake to survive and just how the state would emerge from the apocalypse. Public
rehearsal of the disaster response continues in the 21st century as a state-building strategy
and public performance of citizenship. Less focused on infrastructure than nuclear
defense, bioterrorism preparedness uniquely attunes to the individual body through
vaccine production, antibiotic distribution, and social vulnerability.
While the Cold War had a clear enemy in the Soviet Union and the weapon was
presumably nuclear, in the bioterrorism crisis neither the enemy nor the weapon is so
readily identified. Before citizens can act against bioterrorism, the uncertain bioterror
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threat must be made certain in the present moment.11 Biosecurity demands new spaces
and places where risk is knowable and bioterrorism can be managed and mitigated. The
influx of capital to control risk fractures old systems of science and governance,
reconstituting them in ways that work for the crisis and sustain the belief that human
intervention can deter the event. As during the Cold War, discussions over preparedness
are the figurehead for broader discussion about the powers of science over human lives.12
In this dissertation, I will explore how debates and discourses about bioterrorism
preparedness stand in for broader deliberations of the role of biological and technological
science in people’s lives. As people make sense of their genomic selves, they reevaluate
the risks to their life and health, along with the expectations of government to protect
those qualities, offering access to citizens’ bodies at levels heretofore unexplored.
Bio+Citizens
The “bio” prefix has been liberally tacked on to a range of political terms, from
“bioterror” to “biodefense,” uniting agencies and interests under the banner of life,
biology, and the human body. Similar prefacing in critical theory with terms like
“biopolitics” and “biopower” draws attention to the ways knowing and controlling life
itself sustains systems of power and citizenship. Scientific explanations of life play into
contemporary fears, building a crisis from which science also offers protection and
salvation. Thus, the political response to bioterrorism is not limited to counter-terrorism
measures, but extends to scientific research, public health systems, community response
plans, and personal preparedness, all aimed to strengthen individual and national bodies
against bio-threats.
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As bioterrorism lingers in the public imagination, studies of the methods and
motivations of national biosecurity are taking shape, producing a substantial
multidisciplinary scholarship. What began with a few timely studies of the 2001 anthrax
attacks has expanded as government advisors, journalists, and scientists attempt to assess
the possibilities and likelihood of bioterrorist attack.13 Significantly, this dissertation
project does not aim to determine whether bioterrorism is likely, but investigates the
social impacts of bioterrorism, regardless of whether there exists an actual threat. The
chapters that follow illuminate how bioterrorism can be understood in diverse contexts
emerging from wide-ranging histories and socialities. The world is changing because of
bioterrorism, and this dissertation makes a wide sweep in an attempt to capture the
breadth of those impacts, while seeking the commonalities which produce common ways
of thinking about the biological risks of the modern age.
Along this vein, Hartmann, Subramaniam, and Zerner collected multidisciplinary
works to argue that since there is no single explanation of how fear is produced, multiple
methodologies must be employed to interrogate specific biofears.14 Lakoff and Collier’s
anthology similarly considers the range of science, government, and health practices that
articulate biosecurity in the modern age.15 These studies of bioterror resonate with a
collection of cultural studies of disease, such as Priscilla Wald’s study of the contagion
narrative, or Nicholas King’s global study of disease in a worldwide system of capital.16
Such works situate the issue of bioterrorism in a broader discussion of life, science, and
governmentality, but do not specifically question the direct impacts of bioterrorism in the
lives of citizens.17 Through its localized approach, the present research contributes to
existing literatures by delineating the material outcomes of bioterrorism in people’s lives.
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By talking to people and recording their narratives, this dissertation aims to give voice to
biological subjects, understanding how bioterrorism is framed by individuals in a world
of incalculable risk.
Anthropologists have raised compelling questions concerning the emergence of
national biosecurity. Some situate the issue in the study of risk and fear, including
Collier, Lakoff, and Rabinow who question the assumption that it is the nation’s
responsibility to mitigate harm.18 Relegating fear into a future condition creates a state of
risk, bringing fears into the realm of human intervention.19 This places the "burden of
survival" upon individuals and institutions working within and against the state and its
agencies.20 Lakoff selects the term “preparedness” to define behaviors that ascertain
future threats and intervene in the present moment, proposing that people tolerate state
interventions upon their bodies because they generally agree that some future risk
demands present action on the part of the state.21 This dissertation builds upon this idea
by attending particularly to the social systems that produce common ways of knowing
bioterror threats, as well as the practices that assuage the state’s responsibility and shift
the burden of preparedness to the individual body.22 This government cares for its
citizens by demanding that they police their present risky behaviors in anticipation of a
future event. What is at stake in a crisis which can be synchronously addressed by
building new laboratories and incident command centers and by running television ads
with Muppets reminding children to wash their hands? How do vaccine stockpile
programs simultaneously resonate on the most basic biological level of injecting foreign
substances into human flesh, and the logistical level of efficiently moving objects, such
as vaccines and medical materials, through time and space? These biopolitical notions of
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care emerge through the bioterror crisis and challenge current notions of biological
citizenship.
Though many scholars investigate the work of the modern security state as it
arises from the Cold War and neoliberal politics, this project is guided by the particular
question of how life and death are governed when the gap between biology and the
political life of citizens grows indistinct.23 The contestation over human biological rights
defines biological citizenship, for while all citizens may claim the right to life, the
demand for social welfare based on science and medicine correlates that claim with the
scientific and military complexes that act "against" the threat of bioterrorism. By
producing threats that are living, contagious, and unpredictable, the contemporary
biosciences enable a conceptualization of both microbial and human life forms as a
national security risk. The genomic body is part of a global economy and has been
“thrown into a chaotic and unpredictable molecular world filled with emergent yet
unspecifiable risks.”24 At the same time, the relatively recent acknowledgement of
humans as vectors of disease continues to increase the values of biological risk through
social behaviors which spread germs. Studies of bioterrorism must seriously consider
how Foucault’s biopolitics, so thoroughly grounded in the corporeal, are impacted by
new conceptualizations of human life. Paul Rabinow predicted that genetics would
radically transform people’s identities; Nikolas Rose writes of how molecular
understandings of the body have altered social systems embodied in human biology.25
Following these authors, this research will show how institutions produce vulnerable
bodies in this climate of risk, where new knowledge of the body brings new knowledge
of harm to the body.
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With other scholars of science and culture, I seek ways of understanding the
complex scales of the modern age. King contends that framing a biological discourse at
the molecular level reduces the practices of intervention to a similar scale, justifying a
variety of large- and small-scale responses to a health crisis.26 Braun calls for an infusion
of geopolitics into contemporary studies of biopolitics, broadening discussion from an
internal and bounded biology (managed individually, for instance, in the realm of
medicine) to a larger consideration of the places and powers of governance.27
Bioterrorism demands the consideration of biopolitics on precisely these two scales: the
intimately microbial and the broadly geopolitical.
Bioterrorism diverges from other classes of terrorism through its direct attack on
the human body: no buildings fall in a bioterrorist attack and no bullet holes are left
behind. This scene of life destroying life raises complex questions about biology,
technology and disease in modern society, demanding a reconsideration of biopolitics on
the scale of the micro and the global. Interdisciplinary science studies scholars are
pushing beyond Foucauldian biopolitics to consider how the new genomics are
"embedded throughout the social fabric at the micro-level by a variety of biopolitical
practices."28 This dissertation deals with confounded biopolitics in which one life form is
managed to control another, for the lives affected here are not just human, but are viruses,
bacteria and insects. By producing threats that are living, contagious, and unpredictable,
the contemporary biosciences enable a conceptualization of national security as both
biological and individual. Furthermore, the biological revolution has so thoroughly
revived interest in the politics of life that scholars have failed to account for the role of
death in political life.29 Bioterrorists use new knowledge of life to bring about fear, and
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while this act is biopolitical, one must not forget that the ultimate fear is one of death. 30
Bio+Risk
Closely entwined with conceptions of risk lies a theorization of the nature of fear
itself. As Joanna Bourke writes, “Fear has a physiology, albeit a contested one.”31 Fear is
neither inevitable nor universal, but is an apparatus for shaping society, and thus
intensely political.32 Relegating fear into a future condition creates a state of risk, a
transformation that brings fears into a realm of human intervention.33 However, this
transference also necessitates that humans take responsibility in the present for a future
event. In the case of bioterrorism, the production of fear and risk provides critical
justification for acts which claim to minimize the threat.
Notions of risk are rooted in the temporality of political life, calculations of the
past and imaginations of the future. Anthony Giddens wrote, “It is a society increasingly
preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of risk.”34
Both Giddens and Ulrich Beck saw a crisis in the rise of modernity, which creates “a gulf
between the world of quantifiable risk in which we think and act, and the world of nonquantifiable insecurities that we are creating.”35 Events like Chernobyl and Bhopal, Beck
argues, have effects that are global, invisible, and not temporally bound, creating a crisis
in which modern society cannot manage the very risks it creates. As technologies
advance, human power seems to extend into reaches unimagined just years ago, and
society becomes increasingly aware of its potential for self-annihilation. In the case of
bioterrorism, not only do technologies spread the gulf, but the autonomy of microbial life
forms pushes into the world of the unquantified and therefore unknowable through
accepted scientific mechanisms.
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The belief that humans are agents in bringing about harm characterizes the
concept of risk. Niklas Luhmann contrasted risk to danger, claiming that the latter
expresses harm from an external force (such as a natural disaster) while risk comes about
because of people’s actions.36 In response to Luhmann and Ian Hacking, Collier, Lakoff,
and Rabinow ask whether human responsibility for mitigating harm is also inherent to the
definition of risk.37 In his studies of national biosecurity, Lakoff sees the genesis of the
US preparedness policy in the Cold War, when combined economic, political, and
military efforts sought to keep the country continuously ready for Soviet attack. 38 The
history of the Cold War suggests that people tolerate acts of social control because they
perceive that preparedness can only be achieved by acts of governance. By attending to
the social systems that produce common ways of thinking about bioterrorism, this
research particularly questions whether producing consensus in regards to a future risk
creates the potential for militarization without a threat and brings harm to citizens in the
present moment.39
Being alive does not simply give access to the rights of citizenship, for social
systems of power are predicated upon conceptions of life itself. In the modern age,
scientific advances produce new knowledge of life and remake the possibilities for
biological citizenship. Critical science studies counter the claim that science contains
privileged access to life by pointing to systems of power operating within the science
industry, and the inherent capitalist acts of labor in science itself, exposing the effects of
the scientist's tools upon the material landscape.40 Science takes place within a political
context in which it is both subject and object of power relations. As Adriana Petryna
writes, “The processes of making scientific knowledge are inextricable from the forms of
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power those processes legitimate and even provide solutions for.”41 In the crisis of
bioterrorism, the desire for knowledge demands that scientists simultaneously produce
both evidence of and solutions for the crisis. Thus, science practice sustains security
practice, and vice versa. Further, Hugh Gusterson contends that as “anticipatory
knowledge” of the future is created through the calculation of the past, scientists build
models of the future which offer the public particular scenarios which are often
scientifically ambiguous and tainted by the persuasive acts of proponents and opponents
of new technologies.42 To better understand the material outcomes of these social
imaginings, I examine preparedness exercises as bridges between science and security
practice, as well as bridges between past behaviors and imagined futures.
Discourse proves itself by material effects: when lived experience aligns with the
words of political speeches or the images of television programming, the meanings are
confirmed. The shared meanings of bioterrorism cannot be divorced from the material
base of cultural forms.43 There is a critical distinction between the belief that media
reflect the social milieu, and the claim that media work to build a particular type of
society. This research argues that the bioterror crisis could not exist without mass
communication forms. Global communication networks allow the timely sharing of
scientific knowledge; computer modeling systems act out scenarios that substitute for an
event in emergency planning; and popular fiction sustains the fear of bioterrorism which
maintains a high demand for counterterrorism measures. Lipschutz and Turcotte explain
the political economy of discourse as “the production of truth claims in ways that help to
generate specified outcomes and develop the material base.”44 They argue that the
discourse of bioterrorism creates demand for biosecurity, which then gives evidence for
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the need for counterterrorism services. This research recognizes specific practices that
sustain an economy of bioterror by always increasing the demand for products and
services, staking their own success upon the fact that no one will ever know how many
attacks were diverted by preparedness measures.
Bioterrorism is not an inevitable outcome of the genomic age, but it functions
within a social system to produce particular types of citizens. This research questions
why certain ways of being have come about in this time and place, while others have not.
Modern science participates in a risk society in which social fears are abundant and
people turn to institutions to mitigate harm. This creates a type of biological citizenship,
in which individuals depend upon science and the state to protect their bodies, whether
through the arrangement of physical space, such as border controls, or the production of
new technologies, such as stronger and more effective vaccines. How do people use their
bodies to claim rights and act politically for them? How are those claims grounded in
definitions of life and risk emerging during the bioterrorism crisis? Through these acts,
people produce a bioterror threat, defining the parameters of risk and affirming the threat
even as they seek to eliminate it. What do citizens stand to gain through this new biology,
and how might the perpetuation of the bioterror crisis bring benefits that outweigh the
risks? This dissertation was conceived of as a way to access subjects in order to discover
how people use their personal biology to claim rights of citizenship. By attending to the
daily acts of citizens dealing with social and political change, I seek a better
understanding of how biological citizens are empowered through new conceptions of life.
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Bio+Terror
This research is concerned with questions of citizenship, particularly what it
means to be a biological citizen under the bioterror crisis. The breadth of the bioterror
crisis demands a research design that acknowledges that biosecurity is produced locally,
nationally and globally, within expansive systems of science and capital. Every day,
modern subjects perform political, scientific, and discursive acts that constitute
biosociality at the local level. Through close attention to daily practice and the research
techniques of observation, interview, historical and textual analysis, this research shows
how policymaking practices of science and government manifest in the informal spaces
where people negotiate and legitimate state practice. This research details “the elements
that unsettle and entangle people’s lives,” with the further goal of “maintaining a
prospective sense of the contingencies of human existence, such that its forms find a
place within the discipline of observation.”45 Bioterrorism takes form as citizens
rearrange their lives in response to social fears. Furthermore, the biosecurity state brings
together science, the market, and government in new ways, producing new institutions
and spaces where citizen-making takes place. By attending to how these practices emerge
and find legitimacy within the public, this dissertation recognizes how citizens make
sense of the possibilities presented to them within subtle and changing systems of power.
The cultural forces of bioterrorism produce subjects who are as diverse and farreaching as global networks allow, and the challenge of this research is to identify the
meaningful connections that give bioterrorism form and tenacity in people’s lives. A
multitude of myths, images, events, and lifestyles—not always dependent upon whom
one knows and where one lives—cohere around modern subjects, and global systems
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heighten the “presence-availability” of ideas to form and fix diverse subjects.46 In other
words, biological citizens in the 21st century live in a world where they can access a
range of meanings through global markets and bring a wider array of experiences into the
process of subject making. The blurring of boundaries between local subjects and global
systems demands a reconceptualization of ethnographic projects to account for the
multiplicity that arises when a range of agents in diverse places and contexts have access
to subjects.47 An “ethnography of global connection” asks how a site exists within a
global system of exchange, where macro-interdependencies in market, media and science
are evident in complexly entwined micro worlds, such as a small disease laboratory
which is shaped by new cultural formations of fear and contagion along with a political
War on Terror.48 The goal of this research is to identify how biological citizens produce
the macro-systems of security through their daily practices. In turn, I look for “zones of
awkward engagement” where the instability of the bioterror encounter facilitates deeper
understanding of modern modes of governance and possibilities of citizenship.49
Following Tsing, Fortun, Petryna, Rajan, Moore, and others, I use ethnographic methods
to expose points of connection and entanglement that have brought about the bioterror
crisis in the modern age, with the intent to understand how bioterrorism rearranges the
possibilities for political subjects.50
This dissertation does not undertake the in-depth cultural history of a single place
which traditionally characterizes ethnographic projects. Shorter site visits and movement
between places limited the duration of contact with subjects, resulting in fewer face-toface relations with a community or observations of long-term politics and practices. The
multi-sited approach sacrifices regional specialization in hopes of gaining broader
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understandings of the global forces which shape citizens’ lives. This research is not a
history of a particular place, but a study of how bioterrorism finds form and stability
within society. Juxtaposing multiple geographies and histories shows how bioterrorism
works across time and space to bring about correlated outcomes and consensus among
populations. This dissertation presents complex narratives which might not be seen
through a lens focused on a single community and aims to show how they emerge from
pervasive understandings of life, risk, and nature which characterize the contemporary
crisis. Because I propose that particular ways of connecting science and terror in the
modern age have produced the phenomenon of bioterrorism, I followed a research
method which could probe for connectivity by following the movement of knowledge
through society.
The multi-sited study of places and people retains ethnography’s systematic
attention to the practices of science and society, while increasing the method’s ability to
deal with the rhizomatic networks that complicate social relations in a global society.
Sarah Franklin proposes that the multi-sited approach facilitates the study of how
“technoscientific artifacts make sense in a kind of cultural hyperstack,” where the scale
and velocity of global powers rapidly move ideas across borders.51 Kaushik Rajan argues
that the world is made in the image of the American market and that the ethnographer’s
traditional objective to “correct” hegemonic and universalizing social theories by drawing
attention to sites on the fringe falls short of describing precisely what those hegemonic
forces are and the role they play in cultural formation.52 Such ideologies can only be
understood as they are used in subject making, and interview and observation still offer a
means to understand how individuals produce the narratives that dominate the modern
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globalized market. This research assumes that biosecurity practices have emerged
precisely because science is rapidly producing new knowledge which, when engulfed by
global markets and consumed by citizens, reorders the world. This research attempts to
study the artifacts of the modern era as knowledge-producing mechanisms which have
emerged from the cultural conflation of the War on Terror, genomic science,
communications technologies, and emerging infectious diseases. I study the work of
individuals—scientists, citizens, presidents, emergency planners, activists, journalists—
which gives bioterrorism prominence among the many messages of science, technology,
health, risk, and fear that global citizens encounter on a daily basis. That the attempt to
recognize the rapid saturation of knowledge in the modern world is an ambitious task
does not lesson its import and the value of scholarly inquiry.
While traditional notions of fieldwork demand isolated, place-based study, new
methodologies argue for a reconsideration of “the field” in a time when the local
production of subjects may have as much to do with an individual on the opposite side of
the globe as with the person next door.53 In this study, the field is constituted by places
across North America where bioterrorism has risen as a dominant narrative. These sites
include nonphysical sites where meanings of bioterrorism are stabilized through
discursive practices. Some sites studied in this project seem apparent, such as the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), but there are also sites of contradiction, like a
high-tech research facility in a remote Montana town. I also incorporate the analysis of
policy documents and media campaigns to expose the connections forged by the flow of
meaning from places of production to places where information becomes practice.
Notably, any one of these research sites could be the subject of a lengthy, in-depth
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ethnography. I do not assert a thorough knowledge of all the practices of the CDC or
Department of Homeland Security. What I hope this dissertation shows, however, is that
certain practices and beliefs are common to all sites, giving evidence to larger claims
about the social impacts of bioterrorism.
Overview of the Dissertation
In this dissertation, I aim to demonstrate how, even in the absence of an event,
certain practices make bioterrorism intelligible as a threat and bring about particular
forms of governance and biological citizenship, thereby creating a crisis of war and
science for the 21st century. Bioterrorism is a potent tool for reconstituting the modern
security state, which stakes a great deal in the production of the crisis. The emergence of
bioterrorism as a cultural fear is only possible through the advancement of a new biology
which alters the very ways people know life and death, as well as the threats to their
personal and national security. Moreover, through bioterror, the politics of national
security and advances in the biosciences meld into a unified and powerful cultural
identity. By surveying sites where bioterrorism manifests in people’s lives, I aim to
understand the material outcomes of biosecurity practices, giving evidence to the claim
that the bioterror crisis was not an ephemeral tool of a particular administration, but
rather is the creation of a deep and far-reaching political apparatus grounded in particular
ideas of nature and citizenship.
At the core of this crisis are the microbes themselves. The case studies presented
here show how people make sense of the risk that microbes present as they move or
might move through the landscape. Whether conceptualized as an enemy to be battled, a
threat to be contained, or a circulation to be controlled, the relations between humans and
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microbes are negotiated through a range of daily practices which are the subject of this
inquiry. Next, the dissertation considers how new ways of knowing microbial risk plays
out in individual lives, particularly through the production of new spaces where risk can
be mitigated. These cases raise the question of how the government cares for its citizens
by mitigating the fears presented by new and dangerous microbes, and the particular
consequences of this type of care upon citizens’ lives.
War and science, two great pillars of modernism, remake each other through
bioterrorism. The dissertation begins by examining theorizations of life, disease, and risk
as they are negotiated in the modern age. In the first chapter, I argue that bioterrorism is
known today through the blending of specific histories of disease and violence with
modern biological science. When people talk about bioterrorism, in order to create a
cohesive understanding of bioterrorism and its risks, they draw upon particular
conceptions of life, science, war, and security, produced over time. The crisis depends
upon the infusion of science into political conflict and vice versa. The cultural history of
smallpox explored in this chapter considers how one of the deadliest diseases in human
history was targeted by science and politics to bring about eradication. I show how this
“battle” against disease raged internationally in the language and images of warfare,
infusing the work of public health with the discourse of war. Despite eradication of the
disease itself, the contemporary milieu continues to draw upon the risk of smallpox in
order to sustain political ideas of terrorism risk. Thus, the power of the disease narrative
surrounding smallpox creates a potent tool for national security actions, even in the
absence of the naturally-occurring virus. By studying the cultural production of smallpox,
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this chapter aims to illuminate how the particular histories of homeland security and
genomic science give meaning to the contemporary crisis.
The remainder of the dissertation considers three case studies of communities
preparing for bioterrorism, considering the findings of ethnographic fieldwork in
Hamilton, Montana, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the New
Mexico borderlands. Chapter two takes place in Hamilton, site of the Rocky Mountain
National Laboratories (RML), a division of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The
first part of the RML case study considers how the physical presence of a first-class
disease laboratory in rural Montana came about because of a particular need for public
health control in the area and has continued as a boon to a changing local economy. The
cultural history of Rocky Mountain spotted fever shows how public health action in the
field transformed into a laboratory study of disease. This section considers the situation
of a laboratory within a community of citizens, questioning how the risk of contagion
posed by the physical presence of germs has been mitigated by constructing laboratories
in particular ways. This chapter particularly considers the emergence of the contemporary
biolab from a contested relationship between citizens, scientists, and disease, showing
that the laboratory was made in particular ways to mitigate citizens’ fear of disease, and
posing the question of whether laboratories can be spaces where nature is subdued and
contained, and technologies can eliminate human fallibility.
The contestation over the laboratory space introduced in the beginning of chapter
two is further explored in a second section, which shows the continued shaping of
laboratory spaces by citizen protest. In 2002, RML announced it would build a highsecurity, biosafety-level 4 laboratory in Hamilton, igniting a six-year protest which would
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culminate in a formal lawsuit against the lab. Citizens debated issues of safety, disease,
science, and risk, positioned against the claim that laboratory expansion would bring vital
economic growth. In this debate, they defined new forms of citizenship, claiming
particular rights to security and disease protection along with transparency in the
practices of science. In the post-9/11 security society, RML had to prove anew that
bringing microbes into a contained environment for study would not endanger people
who lived outside the laboratory walls. Chapter Two asks how, in this new security
culture, laboratories prove to be “secure” spaces where threatening microbes are
contained. How do scientists communicate microbial risks, particularly regarding how
technologies that isolate the lab from the community mitigate risk? Further, how do
citizens negotiate the risk of pathogens in a culture of biological innovation, bioterrorism,
and emerging infectious disease? Through a close read of policy documents, this chapter
shows explores the modes of contestation available to citizens, and how cultural fears and
their antidotes are expressed in the mechanisms of government. By studying how RML
worked to alleviate local anxieties through public meetings, Environmental Impact
Statements, and the settlement of a lawsuit with community activists, this ethnography
shows how science and government assume the responsibility to arrange physical spaces
and produce new technologies which will protect individual bodies from harm.
Laboratories look different in the 21st century, a material outcome of the bioterrorism
crisis.
The nation’s premier public health laboratory, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention is also remaking itself under the bioterror crisis, building new buildings and
developing new programs in order to produce a population which exists in a perpetual
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state of readiness. Chapter Three considers CDC practices of surveillance, scientific
study of disease, and public health communication to show how the bioterrorism crisis
brings the everyday social interactions which produce contagion into the domain of
national security. I argue that the work of the CDC to produce the nation as a collection
of vulnerable bodies which can be secured against microbial threats by individual
practices, such as hand washing and social distancing, consolidates authority over public
health at the federal level and has consequences in sustaining a risk society in which
people turn to the state to mitigate disease threats. Through its work, the CDC sustains
the security state by producing bodies that are always vulnerable to some biological
threat and creating constant demand for new knowledge of the hazards that threaten
citizens’ lives. Modern science fully participates in a risk society, in which social fears
are abundant and people turn to large institutions to mitigate harm. As they turn to the
state to protect their bodies from disease threats, citizens ratify the constant surveillance
and watchfulness of the healthy population which characterizes the modern security state.
The danger of militarization without a threat arises when the work of preparing
the national body falls upon the same groups that stand to benefit from the continued
existence of the threat. CDC depends upon the perception of disease risk to justify its
labor and receive its federal allocations. The following chapters return to local
communities to explore how national funding for bioterrorism preparedness is used
locally, particularly to rehearse a response to terrorism events. Chapter Four travels
through the borderlands of New Mexico, exploring the continued militarization of this
state with a complex nuclear history. Here, the constant rehearsal of terrorism events, in
combination with the ongoing work to secure the nation’s border, creates a perpetual state
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of emergency. By capitalizing upon the influx of security funding, communities are
building a local security economy, dependent upon the perception of risk. This economy
is reshaping the borderlands, and its effects upon citizens’ lives are as real as the impacts
of the nuclear bomb in the same region during the Cold War.
Finally, the concluding chapter proposes that the daily practices of bioterrorism
preparedness are producing a security community in which citizens are bound together by
common biological risk, access to care during times of crisis, and the ability and authority
to provide care in an emergency. Through the study of national-level exercise programs
and city-wide preparedness planning in Albuquerque, New Mexico, this chapter asks how
communities are materially and ideologically organized around the idea of mitigating
biological risk. The dual acts of planning for bioterrorism events and simulating
bioterrorist attacks prescribe a distinct role for government in caring for a population, and
not just during times of crisis. Publicly rehearsing the care practices of government
through bioterror simulation confounds the specter of war with life-giving acts of health
care. All of the acts of governance described in this dissertation, from the eradication of
smallpox to the regulation of biolabs to bioterrorism preparedness programs, are
implemented in the name of caring for citizens’ lives. In this work, I aim to show how
these practices developed in anticipation of a bioterrorism crisis are changing people’s
lives in the present moment, in the absence of a bioterrorist event. Will the fusion of
biology and terror endure the contemporary moment? If the knot can be loosened, what
alternative futures might arise?
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Why Bioterror?
This following study represents a grounded, humanized approach to the study of
national biosecurity, telling the story of biosecurity through the narratives of citizens and
showing how bioterrorism touches down in people’s lives in meaningful ways. As a
counter to popular, flag-waving books about bioterrorism, I aim to show that bioterrorism
is already changing people’s lives, whether or not the bioterror threat is real. Policy
actions impact communities, industrial growth sways economies, and science research
changes our very notions of life itself. These outcomes have material impacts in the lives
of modern citizens.
The contemporary moment has been shaped by the rise of a genomic biology and
the rise of a war on terror. Reports on these social phenomena fill our newspapers daily,
becoming grounds for everything from race relations to global warming. Though these
movements seem to emerge separately, they are deeply infused. The political events of
our day center on war, and modern science is at the core of contemporary warfare.
Bioterrorism exemplifies the ways the new biology coalesces with fear to transform
social relations. Science does not just produce knowledge, but through specific practices
such as genetic engineering or DNA mapping, science has created new definitions of life
and new understandings of the self, and in this production science has created fear.
The belief that the world and its inhabitants are in grave peril has grown with the
emergence of a new biology in the 20th and 21st centuries. The attempt of the biological
sciences to account for threats to human life has led to campaigns against CFCs and the
ban of DDT, as well as products like antibacterial hand sanitizers and smallpox vaccines.
Fear of the new biology is transforming social relationships. It seems likely that fear—
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fear of microorganisms, fear of global warming, fear of foreign dictators—will continue
to be a motivating factor in contemporary politics. Fear and science have brought a wide
range of potential threats before the public, but not all these threats find credibility within
the dominant paradigm. The claim that social institutions can dictate which threats are
taken seriously and which aren’t draws attention to the systems that ultimately inform
people of what they should fear. Together, fear and science have a particularly powerful
social impact, yet the relationship between science and fear has been largely unexplored.
The bioterrorism crisis presents a compelling case for examining how science
shapes public policy and with what outcomes in the lives of citizens. Biosecurity is a
defining political agenda of our day, and also a phenomenon that has entered the public
imagination in ways that generate public support for the allocation of resources to protect
the nation. The question of who benefits from these resources and who does not shows
the inequities of an unbalanced political agenda shaped by a single threat. Bioterrorism is
changing social relationships spatially, economically, and politically. It is a powerful idea
in modern American society, demanding scholarly attention beyond that which it has
received. This research is designed to account for the far-reaching effects of bioterrorism,
but also to show how the complex blending of science, media, and politics shapes social
relationships in an age of globalization.
Ultimately, the blending of fear and science has the potential to shape a
worldview in which fear is subdued and life is protected through interminable scientific
progress. Because economies are built and governments are elected around these security
agendas, much is at stake in the rise of a particular social fear. When dominant social
groups and institutions benefit from the existence of a particular threat, there is little
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motivation to minimize or discredit that threat. In due course, the acts done to prevent
harm may themselves harm the nation or its citizens; the danger is militarization without
a legitimate threat. Citizens and policymakers will continue to be bombarded with
messages about various threats to human life and security in the 21st century; studying
how science sustains fear offers a means to make sense of those threats and separate the
significant from the imagined.
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Chapter 1
Smallpox Citizens in a Time of Terror
Disease has long been the deadliest enemy of mankind. Infectious diseases make
no distinctions among people and recognize no borders. We have fought the
causes and consequences of disease throughout history and must continue to do so
with every available means. All civilized nations reject as intolerable the use of
disease and biological weapons as instruments of war and terror.
--“Strengthening the International Regime against Biological Weapons,”
Statement by President George W. Bush 1

In February 2002, President George W. Bush announced $6 billion of federal
spending for bioterrorism defense. This largest single bioterrorism allocation in US
history triggered an allocation of resources which would grow ever more expansive
during the next decade as the fear of biological attack gripped the political systems which
oversee the care of populations. Following the terrorist attacks of September and October
2001, President Bush declared war on disease, calling it “the deadliest enemy of
mankind,” a ruthless killer that does not discriminate between people and nations. He
claimed that “we”—perhaps the United States, perhaps “all civilized nations,” or perhaps
all “mankind”—“have fought the causes and consequences of disease throughout history
and must continue to do so with every available means.” 2 To garner public support for
the redistribution of resources, the president situated the new framework of bioterrorism
within the long cultural history of disease, accessing ancient value systems and remaking
them to sustain a new governmentality. The deliberate fusion of the War on Terror with
the practices and motivations of disease prevention enables the narratives of
vulnerability, fear, and the right to bare life to be harnessed in support of the security
state. In this dissertation I argue that the modern age has been characterized by the
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creation of a War on Terror and the rise of a new genomic biology, two movements
which seem to emerge separately, but which are deeply entwined. The national security
state operates through the continual production of risk; the dynamic and volatile qualities
of nature, reinvigorated in the new millennium by biotechnologies and microscales of
life, provide a potent source for subjects to rethink the requirements of government in a
world of unspecified risk. What histories, ideologies, and motivations are reworked in the
contemporary moment to rationalize the largest biosecurity allocation in the nation’s
history? The management of disease on the scale of the nation as well as the intimate
locus of the body has characterized the relationship of states and citizens over time. The
current crisis draws upon these cultural formations to rationalize certain acts of
governance which are increasingly militant and corporeal, even as they target the
nonspecific threat of terror and biology.
When he announced the bioterrorism preparedness expenditures, President Bush
claimed, “History has called us into action.” Because there are no significant bioterrorist
events in US history, excepting perhaps the anthrax attacks which were just four months
past at the time of the speech, the president is must draw upon broader stories of disease,
contagion, and military might to craft the call to action.3 The specificity is insignificant in
the context of the speech, for the experience of a bioterrorist event is less important than
the experience of the political institutions which will be constituted in order to mitigate
risk. For example, the president proposes that domestic surveillance technologies,
traditionally reserved for times of war, be turned upon the homeland: “During the Korean
War, we created what was called an Epidemic Intelligence Service to help defend
America if any of our Cold War enemies tried to use bio-weapons against us. Now we
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need to adapt the EIS to a new era and to a new mission.” The use of wartime
technologies is rationalized because they will provide additional public health service,
funding “new test protocols and new treatments… (which will) deliver great new
advances in the treatment of many other diseases… (and) provide some incredible cures
to diseases that many years ago (people) never thought would be cured.”4 A positive
public health outcome is a laudable side-effect of the government’s adaptation of military
surveillance policies to watch over its citizens. The cultural histories of war and disease
normalize these new technologies, disguising questions of privacy and liberty which
might arise when examining state surveillance as quotidian practice.
These histories of biology and terror matter because they are at the forefront of
the many narratives available to citizens in the task of estimating future threats. Citizens,
too, are trying to make sense of the bioterror crisis, drawing from a range of personal and
collective experiences to assess their vulnerability to biological threats. Sheila Jasanoff
defines the human effort to calculate risk as “our paradoxical attempts to cope with the
irrational in rational terms.”5 She argues that people rely upon their experiences of the
past to extrapolate our known misfortunes into the future. More than simply imaginations
of the future, “risk is a disciplined projection of archived historical memory onto the
blank screen of the future.”6 In exploring the historical memories which sustain the
bioterror crisis, I propose that imaginings of nature—in this case, the nature of disease—
present powerful narratives for the establishment of risk. The intimate location of disease
within the human body, the collective experience of vulnerability, the communal qualities
of contagion, and the powerful potential of integrating nature with technology create a
compelling backstory for bioterror. Further, as I aim to show in this chapter, the disease

34
control practices used concurrently with the rise of the national security state during the
Cold War have created a story of nationalism that has invested the microbe with global
politics, transforming disease into an object of governance. How is nature made into the
preeminent threat of the modern age? How have changing understandings of life itself
been used to change the institutions, economies, and socialities of American life, creating
spaces and worldviews ready for the emergence of the bioterrorist threat?
The particular ways in which bioterrorism is produced as a national security threat
have outcomes in creating the institutions of the modern age. In the absence of a major
historical bioterror event, stories of disease and civil defense converge to explain the
crisis to the public. In turn, the narratives which enable bioterrorism to take root in the
cultural imagination are ongoing stories of life and risk, malleable in the hands of
government. Thus, new technologies can be integrated into longstanding world views to
sustain existing narratives even while opening possibilities for new configurations of the
social order. An organism like smallpox contains a priori meanings of vulnerability and
contagion, while still being open to new understandings produced by laboratory science
or new forms of globalization. By considering how an organism like smallpox is imbued
with the politics of life and death, this chapter explicates the cultural referents that give
bioterrorism tenacity in the contemporary moment. In these cultural configurations, the
literal existence of the threat subsumes in importance beneath the reality of past events as
they are imagined in a biological future.
A Mutant Virus
“A virus that kills every one of its victims” describes the lead of a 2001 New
Scientist article. Under the headline “Killer Virus,” reporter Rachel Nowak discloses how
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two Australian scientists “accidentally created” a lethal mousepox virus and were plotting
to publish their findings in an academic journal. “How do you stop terrorists taking
legitimate research and adapting it for their own nefarious purposes?” she asks. In answer
to the question, the article quotes D.A. Henderson of the Center for Civilian Biodefense
Studies: “I can’t for the life of me figure out how we are going to deal with this.”7 Nowak
avoids the full irony of Henderson’s statement by using his current title; formerly
Henderson led the World Health Organization’s Global Smallpox Eradication Campaign,
the public health crusade that wiped the 20th century’s most deadly virus from the face of
the earth. Thirty years later, the disease threat had changed so fundamentally that this
authoritative spokesperson for disease elimination couldn’t imagine how to retain human
control. Media outlets took flight with the fantasy of scientists concocting deadly
superbugs through the emerging practices of genetic engineering. 8 The frenzy
surrounding an obscure laboratory incident in 2001—prior to the anthrax attacks in the
United States—reveals the emerging climate of fear surrounding the genetic modification
of germs for bioweapons. The fundamental limitations of disease as a “naturally”
occurring entity had been challenged when humans increased the virulence of a virus in
the laboratory. The very terms of vulnerability had to be recalculated in light of this new
biological threat. Examining the events surrounding the incident shows the particular role
of the science industry in defining risk, and the managerial controls which regulate the
flows of information in the name of national security.
The day after Nowak published her exposé in the magazine, and a month before
he published his findings in an academic journal, scientist Ron Jackson heard a television
news reporter claiming Jackson had “re-created smallpox” and built the “ultimate
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weapon” in his laboratory. Though he had noted the implications of his virus research
early on, Jackson marveled at the ominous twist the media spun on his research.9 Jackson
is essentially a well-equipped exterminator at the Pest Animal Control Cooperative
Research Center in Canberra, Australia, using laboratory science for pest control in the
island’s ecosystem.10 When six dead mice propelled him into the media spotlight,
Jackson was exploring a theory that he could create “contagious sterility” by injecting a
common virus with the proteins from the female mouse’s unfertilized eggs, causing the
mouse’s immune system to kill her own eggs.11 Jackson and his partner from Australian
National University, Ian Ramshaw, spliced a mousepox virus with an Interleukin-4 gene
to boost the virility of a sterilizing virus/gene-protein so it would immobilize the hearty
immune system of selectively bred “Black 6” mice. They injected the test virus into ten
Black 6 mice and after six days, one of the Black 6 was not only sterile, but dead; two
days later, three more died. Eventually, all ten mice would die from the injection,
evidence that the IL-4 gene dramatically increased the virulence of the virus.
Jackson and Ramshaw had been working with the strain of the poxviruses which
causes mousepox, which like its smallpox cousin is highly contagious but can be limited
by a vaccine.12 In the next research phase, they first immunized the mice to the mousepox
virus, then injected them with the same combination of virus+protein+IL-4. Despite
immunization, six of the ten mice still died from the injection. This was the result that,
according to one reporter, “fundamentally altered the world’s terror equation.”13 Jackson
and Ramshaw had found a way around the first line of pox-defense: vaccination. The
experiment undermined the cultural belief that cheap and highly effective vaccines could
secure bodies from contagious disease, producing a new state of life in which scientists
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can engineer viruses that can overthrow vaccines and infect vulnerable bodies. Now, the
scientists had dead mice and a dilemma: should they publish their results, sending this
secret of virulence into the public domain?
The strategy employed by these scientists and their affiliated laboratory in
handling these findings exemplifies the ethical debate in the science community
regarding the dual-use potential of new biotechnologies, and whether scientists should
publish results which might provide a blueprint for building bioweapons. Jackson and
Ramshaw consulted their peers and instigated an inquiry which eventually reached the
Australian Department of Defence.14 All organizations said to publish, and believing that
open discussion of the topic would best serve the public, the scientists submitted a
manuscript to the Journal of Virology. They made no reference to weapons potential in
the article, and none of the scientists who reviewed the article commented on the warfare
implications. A month before the journal article was printed, Nowak’s “Killer Virus”
article defined new terms for the debate.15
In the weeks that followed, then later that year when white powder flooded the
postal system in the United States, the media perpetuated a story of bumbling scientists
who slipped up in the lab, produced a deadly disease, and then fearfully withheld their
data because of its implications. “Everyone was overwhelmed,” Jackson recalled,
“Normally science is a one-day issue…. (The media attention) went on for so long that
the organization I worked with just wanted rid of it.”16 The Australian mousepox
experiments might have caught the media fancy for a number of reasons, including a
waxing public interest in bioterrorism. However, transgenic microbe research had been
ongoing for nearly three decades, and the suggestion that IL-4 could be used to make a
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virus stronger had been circulating in science publications for about five years. This
research had a critical difference from all these former experiments: mousepox. The virus
is part of a family of poxviruses which co-evolve with their hosts to attain a level of
virulence which works most effectively upon the host species—cowpox, camelpox,
monkeypox, sheeppox, swinepox, and so on.17 While mousepox is harmless to humans,
its cousin Variola evolved with humans to become one of the most deadly viruses in
human history. Jackson’s experiment raised alarm, not because it killed mice so well, but
because the virus with which he worked recalled generations of death and horror among
human populations. When the work of this scientist was viewed through the lens of the
cultural history of smallpox, it seemed less productive, for though the virus no longer
exists in nature it still carries potent meanings of vulnerability and human conquest over
disease. Cotemporary anxieties about bioterror cannot be separated from such
circulations of meaning that comprise the experience of disease in wide-ranging cultural,
economic, and political contexts.18
A Deadly Virus
Smallpox was always present, filling the churchyard with corpses, tormenting
with constant fear all whom it had not yet stricken, leaving on those whose lives it
spared the hideous traces of its power, turning the babe into a changeling at which
the mother shuddered, and making the eyes and cheeks of the betrothed maiden
objects of horror to the lover.
--Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay,
The History of England from the Accession of James II, 180019
Better known as smallpox, Variola major killed 300-500 million people in the
20th century alone. Named for the obvious rash and pockmarks displaying on carrier’s
bodies (“small” in size when compared to the larger pox of syphilis), smallpox has been
responsible for much of the suffering, blindness, scarring, and death in human history.20
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Smallpox is only moderately contagious, requiring close contact with an infected body to
spread to a new host, but is fatal to 30 percent of people who contract the disease. Flulike symptoms emerge within two weeks of exposure to the virus, and then lesions appear
in the mouth, starting small, then growing and rupturing, spewing the virus into the body
through the saliva. After this surge of infection, the characteristic rash develops,
beginning the final phase, descriptively named either “ordinary,” “flat,” “modified,” or
“hemorrhagic.” If the body recovers from the attack, it will bear the scars of the disease
for life, and pockmarks on a person’s face mark those who have hosted Variola major
and survived.21
The corporeal experience of smallpox evokes strong feelings of disgust, as the
body is inhabited and overwhelmed by a foreign entity, one which cannot be avoided or
expelled. Jessica Stern categorizes bioterror as a “dread risk” because its assessment of
the future hinges upon visceral experiences of infection which evoke horror, both through
their physiological effect and their invisible, arbitrary, unpredictable modes of
dispersion.22 As one of the most fearsome human enemies of all time, smallpox produces
just such a history of fear and horror. Furthermore, the worldwide campaign to eradicate
smallpox and the integration of smallpox prevention into the public health economy have
produced a modern knowledge of smallpox in terms of social control and the
management of collective life. As contemporary science practice revives these narratives
with a new sense of uncertainty, the primal experiences of disgust rise again, shedding
the illusion of control and containment produced in the 20th century in favor of a
transgenic mutation of smallpox which escapes the calculus of control.
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Perhaps no history reveals how disease debilitates vulnerable bodies as
dramatically as the blight of smallpox on the American continents during European
occupation. Cortez conquered the Aztec empire in the 1520s because the Tenochtitlan
warriors contracted smallpox from Spanish corpses. Scholars estimate that, along with
measles and flu, smallpox killed up to 95% of the native populations who carried no
genetic resistance to the disease.23 From 1520 into the 1800s, the disease spread
throughout the continents, leaving behind defeated empires—Aztec, Incan, Cherokee,
Eskimo, and others—where people decimated by disease could not defend their
homeland. Native vulnerability to European diseases was read by some as an unfortunate
consequence of cohabitation, but to others it embodied divine will. As one general wrote,
“Providence designed the extermination of the Indians and that it would be a good thing
to introduce the small-pox among them!”—an opinion he claimed reflected that of “most
white people living in the interior of the country.”24 Vulnerability to disease equated to
weakness and the devaluing of human life, ascribing power to the population which better
resisted the ravages of disease.
In this biologically situated power dynamic, smallpox could be manipulated more
directly for social control. The legend of British soldiers passing blankets infested with
smallpox to native tribes in the Ohio Valley during the French and Indian War is often
cited as an early use of biological weapons. Though historians question whether a
deliberate strategy of biological infection was ever used successfully as an act of war, for
smallpox was already sweeping through native populations, the British likely made the
attempt. In 1763, when the Delawares laid siege on Fort Pitt for more than a month,
British General Jeffrey Amherst suggested, "Could it not be contrived to send the small
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pox among the disaffected tribes of Indians? We must on this occasion use every
stratagem in our power to reduce them."25 Colonel Henry Bouquet offered to “try to
inoculate the bastards with some blankets that may fall into their hands, and take care not
to get the disease myself.26 Notably, the flight of people from nearby communities to Fort
Pitt for refuge had created cramped quarters and facilitated the spread of disease. The
officer in command of the fort wrote, "We are so crowded in the fort that I fear
disease…; the smallpox is among us."27 In times of despair brought by the combination
of war and disease, the refugees sought a measure of justice by inoculating the enemy
with the very disease that was crippling them.
While taking advantage of a truce to pass an infected blanket to an enemy seems a
reprehensible and inhumane act, the frequent retelling of this incident in the narratives of
bioterrorism history indicates that the circumstances resonate with contemporary notions
biowarfare. The bioweapon was an act of desperation, undertaken by a group under siege.
They saw a weakness in their enemy and exploited it. When policymakers describe the
United States as vulnerable to bioterrorist attack, they too presume that terrorists in
oppressive situations with no other weapons will see vulnerability in the nation’s
inevitable susceptibility to disease. The narrative of the smallpox blankets circulates into
the cultural history of bioterrorism with two additional effects: first, it associates
bioterrorism with the colonizing of America and the succession of native tribes by
European governments, providing longevity to the bioterror crisis while entrenching it in
notions of nationalist identity. Second, it relies upon the rudimentary form of a blanket as
a weapon, suggesting that biological warfare does not require privileged science or
technology to construct systems of delivery, but is accessible to primitive people.
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A Hopeful Vaccine
The worldwide spread of smallpox exemplified that disease does not act upon all
populations equally, creating the potential for disease to target vulnerable populations
while others remain immune. This expression of power would not truly be effective,
however, until those genetic variations which provided immunity by happenstance could
be reproduced and deliberately distributed to populations. Vaccination would shift the
dynamics of disease, bringing immunity into political calculation by creating a
commodity which would circulate unequally throughout the population producing
hierarchies of health.
Society has long organized to protect citizens from pathogens, using mechanisms
ranging from domestic remedies targeting individual bodies to militant quarantines
organizing populations. In Asia, people inhaled or swallowed powdered smallpox scabs
to produce a degree of immunity. European pursuit of “variolation” was based upon
reports from Turkey where people were inoculated by rubbing the liquid from a smallpox
pustule over a scratch made on the arm with a needle.28 Milkmaids and farmers who
worked closely with their cattle claimed immunity to the smallpox virus, a bit of folk lore
that led an apprentice physician, Edward Jenner to develop the first truly effective
prevention of smallpox. Jenner performed an ethically-questionable experiment in which
he injected his gardener’s son with liquid taken from a cowpox blister on a milkmaid’s
hand, then, a few weeks later, variolated him with smallpox. The 8-year-old developed a
cowpox lesion, but never contracted smallpox. The boy, it seemed, was immune. Jenner
continued his research with cowpox, injecting children throughout his neighborhood and
eventually publishing his limited, but conclusive, evidence in a self-financed pamphlet,
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An Inquiry into the Causes and Effects of the Variolae Vaccinae, a Disease Discovered in
Some of the Western Counties of England Particularly Gloucestershire, and Known by
the Name of “Cowpox” (1798).29 That Jenner was allowed, even encouraged, to
experiment on his neighbor’s children, intentionally exposing them to a deadly virus,
testifies to the blight that smallpox was on the population. If children were likely to
contract smallpox anyways, why not expose them while they were healthy and stood a
better chance of survival?30 Jenner named the disease showing up on dairy farms
“Variolae vaccinae,” meaning pox of the cow, and called his inoculation process
“vaccination.”31 Though Jenner’s work was received with skepticism by his peers, and
has more recently been criticized as unscientific or even unnecessary, within ten years the
technique had spread throughout Europe, Asia, and the Americas, and because of its
lower fatality rate, vaccination quickly replaced variolation as the preferred immunization
for smallpox. 32
Within three years of Jenner’s publication, 100,000 people had been vaccinated in
Britain, but problems with distribution surfaced quickly. 33 The smallpox vaccine
continues to be unique among vaccines in its use of a live virus. Consequently, the
vaccine has to be extracted from an active rash and has limited viability in storage. For
the first half of the 19th century, the vaccine was passed from one vaccinated individual to
the next, occasionally boosted by an injection of fresh pox straight from the cow. Around
1840, a technique for producing large amounts of vaccine in cows became popular, to the
extent that doctors brought infected calves into their offices and scraped the live vaccine
right off the animal’s flanks.
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Human bodies, however, enabled the global distribution of the smallpox vaccine.
After receiving the vaccine in Geneva in 1800, King Charles IV of Spain sent his
personal physician, Dr. Francis Xavier de Balmis on an expedition to take the vaccine to
Spanish America. Dr. Balmis brought 22 orphan boys on the voyage, vaccinating two
boys every ten days during the Atlantic voyage.34 Where bodies had once served solely as
vectors of disease, human and animal bodies now carried the vaccine, offering the cure
through the transmittal of live virus in living flesh, but requiring the deliberate
transportation of infected bodies through time and space. Only when vaccines were
separated from bodies could the practices of immunity work within the economy,
distancing vaccination from its origins in nature and transforming it into a tool for
governing citizens in the security state.
In the early 1800s, attempts to sell the smallpox vaccine for profit in the United
States proved unviable, because the vaccine came from a living virus and could be
harvested from anyone expressing the characteristic rash. All a physician needed to
provide the vaccine was a body recently vaccinated or an infected cow, along with the
knowledge of how to transfer hosts. The government became involved in the vaccination
project in 1813, when Dr. James Smith was appointed Federal Vaccine Agent and
charged with “the preservation of the genuine vaccine matter for the use of others.”35 An
incident involving the mislabeling of smallpox scabs as vaccine which resulted in the
death of ten individuals, however, brought scrutiny to the government’s involvement in
vaccine distribution. North Carolina Congressman Hutchins G. Burton began a campaign
to repeal the 1913 act establishing the National Vaccine Agency, calling the agency "a
mere nuisance, of the most dangerous kind," which brought about "suffering, under the
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authority of our laws, hundreds to be slaughtered with indifference." Burton attacked the
agency as a monopoly where the government was enabling one man "to accumulate
wealth, by levying contributions from all parts of the union."36 When a smallpox
epidemic struck Baltimore, Smith’s hometown, a local periodical claimed, “The act of
congress to encourage vaccination, has rather, in our opinion, tended to encourage small
pox, by making a matter of individual profit out of what had better been left to the
general care of medical gentlemen,” and later, “There is something wrong or rotten in this
business."37 The controversy eventually brought about the repeal of the 1913 act and the
dissolution of a federal authority over vaccination, effectively returning the responsibility
for vaccination to medical professionals and individual citizens. More than a century
would pass before government again asserted authority over the mass vaccination of
citizens through programs aimed at eradicating smallpox worldwide.
Such exclamations surrounding medical interventions in biological immunity
illustrate how conceptions of nature, government, and even God circulate through public
discourse of disease. Ed Cohen contends that these collusions categorize medical
interventions as an example of Latour’s “hybrid networks,” the material formations
which bind nonhuman nature and human culture in such a way as to render invisible their
very connectivity.38 Indeed, as physicians stopped scraping scabs off living bodies to
inoculate patients sitting in the room with the cow, the natural sources of immunity
became disguised, allowing the medical protocols which prevent disease to assume a
cultural position in opposition to the natural sources of disease. Further, through the
hybridity of immunity, vaccination locates both “nature” and “culture” within the human
body, bringing the cultural forms of science production into the vulnerable body in order
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to further isolate it from the natural environment with its inherent natural threats.39 This
hybridity confounds the origins of biological threat as well as the mechanisms for
overcoming it, for the threat is both intimately individual and vastly global, and the
antidotes can be accessed by managing both bodies and environments.
Cohen’s study of immunity asks how people came to believe that our bodies
separate us from other humans and the world around us rather than binding us to our
environments and each other. He proposes that “only with the advent of biological
immunity does a monadic modern body fully achieve its scientific and defensive
apotheosis.”40 The atomized body requires new scientific explanations of the self, not as a
contiguous whole with the environment, but as an assemblage of many parts which can
be acted upon independently with great effect upon the whole. “After the advent of
immunity-as-defense, bioscience affirms that living entails a ceaseless problem of
boundary maintenance.”41 Maintaining the sense that our bodies are separate and distinct
from the world which sustains our very life opens the opportunity to locate threats to life
within the world upon which we materially depend for our existence. Indeed, while the
essence of human social living which brings bodies into proximity with each other
produces risk through the transmission of disease, the politics of disease eradication
reveal that the organization of immune bodies can bring about a “herd” effect to
manipulate the circulation of disease within society. Thus, the separation of bodies from
material lifeworlds enables the policing of bodies through political systems for the
survival of the population over the individual.
A Global Campaign
But, now when…the human frame, when once it has felt the influence of the
genuine cow-pox in the way that has been described, is never afterwards at any
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period of its existence assailable by the smallpox, may I not with perfect
confidence congratulate my country and society at large on their beholding, in the
mild form of the cow-pox, an antidote that is capable of extirpating from the earth
a disease which is every hour devouring its victims; a disease that has ever been
considered as the severest scourge of the human race!
--Edward Jenner, An Inquiry into the Causes and Effects of the Variolae Vaccinae,
a Disease Discovered in Some of the Western Counties of England
Particularly Gloucestershire, and Known by the Name of “Cowpox”42
In the closing lines of his vaccination proclamation, Jenner forecasted that the
science of vaccination might be used to eradicate smallpox. Access to the vaccine rapidly
reduced the abundance of smallpox across the globe, and mandatory vaccination
programs eliminated the disease in most countries by the mid-twentieth century.
However, the scourge persisted, and in the early 1950s, at least 50 million cases of
smallpox still occurred every year, motivating the World Health Organization’s
Intensified Smallpox Eradication Program. The WHO campaign has been lauded as a
lesson in global disease control and an example of innovative thinking, cooperation, and
goodwill coming together to alleviate worldwide suffering without regard to borders or
politics. Disparagers claim smallpox was already on its way out and the campaign was
simply a means to turn a biological process of natural selection into a means of social
control. Regardless, the WHO campaign mobilized people to act against disease, using
science and technology to destroy the viable habitat of a microscopic enemy. Throughout
the campaign smallpox was reproduced as an enemy to be fought, controlled, and
eliminated, establishing the rites of a modern war against disease, producing the
weapons, strategies, tools and attitudes that would ensure victory, and testing
mechanisms which reemerge in the current struggle against bioterror and emerging
infectious disease.
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In 1958, under pressure from the Soviet Union, the World Health Assembly
adopted a resolution calling for mass vaccination to produce herd immunity within the
majority of the population, thereby inhibiting the spread of the disease.43 The plan to
vaccinate millions of people in endemic countries held much appeal from the perspective
of governance: many countries had infrastructures in place for vaccinating, increasing the
number of vaccinations would provide an economic boost, and it was a clear show of
government engagement in a public health situation. Interest in the program waned,
however, as mass vaccination proved to be expensive and time consuming. The WHO
passed several other resolutions over the next decade, but the next one that stuck was
another Soviet-sponsored proposal more than ten years later. World Health Assembly
Resolution 20.15 differs from previous smallpox bills in that it lays out an economic
rationale for smallpox eradication. Pointing to the billions of dollars spent in developed
countries to keep their population immune and their borders secure, the resolution
endorses eradication, not on moral grounds, but by presenting a strong economic
incentive to countries where smallpox was already extinct.44. If it were to be successful,
the campaign would require access to the bodies of millions of people living in more than
40 countries, many of whom were also tormented by poverty, civil war, and a range of
other health concerns.
Reports of the campaign borrow generously from the dictionary of war,
describing the public health task as if planning a military invasion and producing a corpus
of combat terminology which framed the campaign as an act of war. Director D.A.
Henderson emphasized out that “WHO had no authority, other than that of moral suasion,
to compel any country,” rationalizing acts of public health as moral imperatives which
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exceeded any political constraints.45 Those enlisted with the charge to eliminate the
disease certainly felt like they were going to war—and losing the battle.46 Volunteers,
government support, and vaccines had been attained, but the plan to vaccinate every body
did not produce lasting results. A new strategy was evolving, one to target and break the
chain of transmission. As one WHO official recalled,
It was on a hot, blistering June afternoon in 1973 that the ‘war plan’ that
eventually spelt victory over smallpox in India was set in motion. Till then, the
relentless war against an enemy that knew no mercy had not been going on too
well. If anything, it had become a general’s nightmare. Though there was no
dearth of ‘troops’ or ‘ammunition’, the problem was to get them to the right place
at the right time. Naturally, the casualties were heavy—over 16,000 reported dead
and more than five times this number maimed and disabled.47
The new “war plan,” involved a ring approach, in which outbreaks were detected in a
particular area, then a ring of resistance was created around the infected locale by
quarantining and vaccinating the surrounding areas. In the words of Dr. Basu, the Indian
National Smallpox Eradication Programme Officer, “We decided then that instead of
expending our resources against the entire enemy forces simultaneously, we would
concentrate on their strongholds.”48 The restructured program recruited “officers” and
“advance teams” who were put through “highly intensified training courses to qualify …
as experts” in detecting smallpox.49 These teams conducted “reconnaissance trips” to
identify “enemy” areas.50 When an outbreak was reported, the team would “blitz” the
area with “vaccination devices and vaccine—the guns and bullets of the campaign.”51
Reports from the field such as these suggest that both WHO officials and local workers
felt like they were at war. Significantly, the campaigners themselves had been immunized
against smallpox, so while the virus could “wage war” on other people’s bodies it could
not infect the public health “soldiers.” In reality, the WHO campaign was a strategy to
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access bodies and control populations, for the physical battle with smallpox was waged
inside people’s bodies as the vaccine stimulated their immune systems to produce
antibodies.
For more than a decade, the world was at war with smallpox. In this state of
exception, acts of surveillance, secrecy, and civic duty shaped the daily experience of
disease. Detecting and isolating infected populations before the disease broke out widely
was the key to stopping the spread of smallpox. Containment by vaccination required that
populations be trained to report the disease to authorities. Thus, citizens had to be
persuaded to act upon a moral imperative, often violating relationships of trust and
privacy associated with the sick and dying on behalf of some “greater good.” Jitendra
Tuli reports going into classrooms to explain the campaign to children, then asking them
to report any diseases at home to their teachers. 52 In later years, officials offered a reward
to individuals reporting cases of smallpox. The monetary incentive turned up hundreds of
false leads in these poverty-stricken countries, but successfully cultivated a climate in
which people would expose their neighbor’s disease.
Self-reporting and voluntary vaccination were encouraged in posters and
pamphlets—and even hand-scrawled messages painted on the backs of busses or slung
over elephants. “Join the fight,” encourages one poster, as if recruiting troops for battle.
The poster shows three Africans in various modes of traditional attire facing off with a
personified smallpox monster. Marked with an identifying “SP” on its chest, the monster
has distinct human features: arms, legs, fingers, toes, eyes, and hair. Its skin is black with
white pockmarks, imitating the way smallpox marks the skin, and it holds a spiked club.
Visually, the virus is rendered human, or at least human-like, but even larger than the
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people pictured on the poster. The individuals facing the monster wield bows and arrows,
one of which has been driven into the “heart” of the disease, squarely between the S and
P. The poster depicts an attack on a foreign body, people casting weapons away from
their own bodies and killing a monster with projectile points. In reality, bows and arrows
won’t stop smallpox, and the only way to join the fight is to project a sharp object on
one’s own body and “be vaccinated today.”
Other posters published between 1968 and 1977 depict the vaccination itself, a
direct act upon a human body. In early posters, the injection gun is clearly displayed,
poised to shoot a vaccine into the victim’s arm. Sometimes the person holding the gun is
identified as a medical professional, wearing a stethoscope or a red cross; sometimes the
gun is held by a uniformed officer, identified by a hat or badge. Typically, the vaccinegiver is a man, and the recipient is a woman, often a woman with a small child. The
message is consistent: “be vaccinated.” These posters depict the individual, physiological
approach of the smallpox eradication program, for smallpox was ultimately eliminated by
one-on-one meetings between healthy people and officials bearing vaccine. These
depictions of the public health encounter establish a power structure in which the
unvaccinated individual is under the control of the person administering the vaccine,
underlining the vulnerable state of the unvaccinated body. The recipients are women and
children wearing some form of “native” attire; the vaccinators are men wearing uniforms.
Furthermore, the vaccinator holds a gun to the exposed flesh of the individual,
underscoring the authority of one over the other. Though written as an invitation to be
vaccinated, the poster affirms a larger system of social control enacted through the
vaccination program.

52

Figure 1.1 Boys in West Africa line up for vaccination beneath a poster showing the use
of jet guns. Image courtesy of the Public Health Image Library, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (#1987)
Containment of the disease required broader community participation along with
individual submission. Quarantine has long been used to contain disease, but must often
be enforced through military-level control, for the rituals of death that function within a
society may work to spread a contagious disease. During the WHO campaign, field
officers reported traveling to the site of an outbreak only to find scores of people
traveling back to their hometowns after coming to pay their respects to the dead and
dying, carrying the virus from a relation’s deathbed to their own homes.53 In India, the
spring outbreak of smallpox was welcomed as the annual tribunal of the goddess Shitala
Mata, by which she would decide who was strong enough to live. Religious beliefs
regarding animals, including the cow, drew skepticism of the medicine rumored to have
bovine origins.54 In reality, much of the smallpox campaign took place in communities
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with little exposure to modern medicine, and a needle with a promise was understandably
a hard sell. The vaccine does have risks and complications, including death, and produces
an open wound that must be properly cared for in order to be effective. Furthermore,
divine factors could just as easily explain positive outcomes to citizens who had never
experienced vaccination or witnessed its effects. Without the systems of legitimation in
place which had helped medicine ascend to its authoritative place in political decisionmaking in the world at large, these practices had to be sold to communities on the basis of
the body itself. Thus, the field officers had to develop techniques of persuasion: “Often,
before uneducated villagers would agree to submit, the vaccinators would have to jab
themselves in front of the entire community, to prove that there was nothing harmful.” 55
As with the posters, the act of “submitting” one’s body to vaccination is demonstrated by
the WHO representatives, this time by reenacting the rite upon oneself. In theorizing the
medical responses to epidemics, Cohen claims, “When theories about epidemics
simultaneously involve scientific, medical, political, and religious concerns, they locate
medicine at the interstices of these domains and thereby invest its privileged subjectobject, the human body, with their overdetermined values.”56 The propaganda promoting
smallpox vaccination exemplifies the pull upon wide-ranging cultural values to push
particular bodily acts. Thus, when the medical establishment fails to elicit behaviors from
individuals on the basis of bodily health, the broader political entity still has tools to bring
about a social response to meet the necessities of governance. Medical practices are
thereby integrated with other mechanisms of security by binding them to concerns of
scarcity and community.57

54
Containment also depended upon identifying and marking the source of infection
and the immune population. Because both the smallpox disease and vaccine leave visible
scars, WHO officials read marks upon human bodies to distinguish the “at risk”
population. There are no invisible carriers of smallpox: people who are infected wear the
symptoms on their bodies. People who are immune can prove their immunity by showing
scars on their arms (from the vaccine) or the scars left on their bodies from the disease
itself.58 In later years of the campaign, officials traveled from house to house in search of
the unvaccinated and infected.59 On these visits, they would mark each house with a
number, logging the names of people living in that house, and then vaccinating everyone
living within a quarter mile of an infected house, moving outward in concentric rings
until they got ahead of the disease (Figure 2). Eventually, as in ancient Egypt, the Angel
of Death would pass over the marked homes where immunization was shielding the
bodies within from disease.60

Figure 1.2 Paint marking a home where a person with smallpox lives. Image courtesy of
the Public Health Image Library, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (#7524)
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As the blight of smallpox began to fade, WHO officials combed the planet for
signs of any outbreak. Tentatively at first, then more emphatically, they began to suggest
the disease had been contained. In 1977, a man in Somalia became the last person to
catch contagious smallpox from the body of another human being. His antibodies fought
off the virus, and without another vulnerable body to infect, the disease succumbed. For
two more years, a commission of scientists waited and watched, searching for signs of
one more outbreak, before submitting a report to the WHO providing evidence of …
nothing. They found no mark of vital Variola upon the world’s population. The chain of
contagion had been ruptured and the 10,000-year-old virus no longer passed freely from
host to host.
WHO president Dr. Abdul Rahman Al-Awadi signed the death certificate for
smallpox on May 8, 1980, declaring “solemnly that the world and its peoples have won
freedom from smallpox, which was the most devastating disease sweeping in epidemic
form through many countries since earliest time.”61 Not only were people’s bodies freed
from the disease, but the global economy was freed from the burden of smallpox. The
WHO declared that the total cost of the campaign was $112 million, and predicted a
worldwide savings of $1 billion annually through the eradication of smallpox.62 The
fieldworkers were recognized as the “heroes who conquered smallpox.” At a celebratory
parade in Sierra Leone, “the vaccination team members wore their field uniforms and
displayed their jet injector guns for the public to see.”63 Such displays helped people to
commemorate a victory which was largely invisible, the elimination of a threat to which
much of the population had been immune for generations. In the end, perhaps the most
significant outcome of the WHO campaign was not the elimination of a disease, but the
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worldwide expression of human control over a contagious disease. The metaphors of war,
persisting to the very end in Al-Awadi’s statement that people had “won freedom from
smallpox,” established disease as an oppressive enemy which could and should be battled
with all the weapons of modern medicine and communications. Even its final victory
shout, “Smallpox is Dead,” reaffirmed that the war had been against a living enemy and
that success was to be marked, not in healthy bodies, but in the obliteration of the
smallpox virus. Such approbation further ratified the practices of the campaign, justifying
the body-checks, quarantines, and martial law as necessary displays of force in order to
protect the public’s health. Smallpox eradication was a celebration of science knowledge,
the authority of developed nations in the third world, and the subjugation of individual
bodies to achieve political and economical goals.
Foucault proposes the history of smallpox eradication as an example of how the
apparatus of security becomes acceptable in the minds of populations. He theorizes that
vaccination made it possible to think about disease in terms of probabilities, which in turn
developed notions of case, risk, danger, and crisis. In turn, diseases are no longer bound
to particular geographies, but are assessed by the distribution of cases within a population
at a particular moment in time and space.64 Indeed, disease reorders the geopolitics of the
world, for it moves by the associations of bodies, defying borders at the same time as it
“provokes their fervent reaffirmation.”65 Furthermore, vaccination changes the categories
of people from “sick” and “not sick,” into shades of those who are likely to become sick,
creating populations which account for all people in terms of “normal” morbidity. By
these assessments deviant health situations can be assessed by acceptable limits rather by
the rule of law, “revealing a level of the necessary and sufficient action of those who
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govern.” 66 With these new calculations of health and risk, the materiality of microbes is
no longer prerequisite to health risk, laying the groundwork for a bioterror crisis
predicated upon massively vulnerable populations.
Smallpox is Un-dead
The eradication of naturally-occurring smallpox produced a new category of
disease vulnerability, in which viruses did not move freely within the population but were
controlled exclusively by technology. Though the world was celebrating the “death” of
smallpox, Variola major was still very much alive, held hostage in two freezers in the
United States and the Soviet Union. WHO’s post-eradication program called for all
countries to send their laboratory stocks of the various strains of the smallpox virus to
two repositories, “to assure biosafety and security.”67 Scientists would have a ten-year
window to study the virus through WHO-approved research projects, then all remaining
live virus was to be destroyed. Beginning in 1993, a series of resolutions passed by the
World Health Assembly delayed the destruction of the stockpiles. New science
technologies offered endless mechanisms for studying the virus and attaining new disease
knowledge, rationalizing repeated delays.68 The reluctance to destroy a germ—even the
most deadly germ to present itself in human history—exposes a belief that scientific
study will ultimately produce benefits that outweigh even the most substantial risks.
WHO continues to deliberate the scale of risk and benefit associated with the smallpox
stockpiles.69
The possibility that smallpox lives on in places unknown to WHO officials also
shapes the contemporary assessment of the bioterror threat. WHO acknowledged this
possibility in a 2007 resolution “recognizing that unknown stocks of live variola virus
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might exist, and that the deliberate or accidental release of any smallpox viruses would be
a catastrophic event for the global community.”70 Some estimate that up to 17 countries
are harboring live virus.71 Policymakers are no longer willing to make stockpilemanagement decisions based on the assumption that smallpox is securely contained in
two freezers. Plus, scientific advances in the last two decades raise the possibility that
smallpox will live forever through its DNA. In 2002, scientists at a New York university
successfully created a polio virus from 70-letter bits of its DNA sequence. While the
smallpox virus is much more complex (185,000 letters to polio’s 7,000) their project
shows the potential for artificially constructing viruses.72 Much of the smallpox DNA
sequence has become publicly available, as pieces have been doled out to research
institutions involved in developing vaccines and antidotes. In 2006, a Guardian reporter
ordered a smallpox sequence over the Internet, using a fake company, a cell phone, and a
residential address.73 Others worry that the virus might be captured in glaciers or
cemeteries, set to reemerge in nature as global temperatures climb. In 2003, a librarian in
New Mexico discovered smallpox scabs in an envelope inside a library book. Though the
material contained no living virus, the genetic technologies of the 21st century might
allow the production of live virus from raw matter. To public knowledge, smallpox does
not exist in the material form of a live virus, but the disease continues to take shape by
the imagined potential to emerge and infect a newly vulnerable population. The threat of
disease can now be understood both in its unpredictable and uncontainable “nature,” but
also by the expanding ability of humans to harness the power of “nature” and control it to
odious effects, infusing the cultural history of disease with new potency from the
revolution of the life sciences.
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Because smallpox does still exist, even under rigorously controlled circumstances,
the disease continues to define the terms of vulnerability in the modern age. Because
vaccination is the only known prevention of smallpox infection, unvaccinated bodies are
perceived to be vulnerable. After the Smallpox Eradication Programme, medical
professionals were discouraged (and at times, prohibited) from vaccinating individuals
against smallpox, on the grounds that the personal risks associated with the vaccine posed
a greater threat than the disease. An entire generation—in some countries two or three
generations—has not been vaccinated against smallpox, and even those who bear the scar
of the vaccine have lowered immunity today. The power of smallpox to shape current
biosecurity practices draws upon the cultural understanding of smallpox as a brutal,
deadly disease as well as the political production of a population made vulnerable,
ironically, through the elimination of the threat.
Vaccinating for War
When disease began to play upon the theater of war, the biological formations of
soldiers changed. Noting the potential for the weaponization of smallpox, General
George Washington ordered that his troops take measures to protect themselves against
the disease during the Revolutionary War. 74 Fifteen months after the September 11
terrorist attacks on the United States, President George W. Bush announced a plan to
vaccinate one million military and public health personnel against smallpox. Hours
before vaccinations began at Walter Reed Army Hospital, the President delivered an
incongruous speech describing a world where smallpox did not exist and posed minimal
threat to citizens, but still posed enough of a threat to justify taking action upon the
bodies of half a million soldiers:
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In 1980, the World Health Organization declared that smallpox had been
completely eradicated, and since then, there has not been a single natural case of
the disease anywhere in the world. We know, however, that the smallpox virus
still exists in laboratories, and we believe that regimes hostile to the United States
may possess this dangerous virus. To protect our citizens in the aftermath of
September the 11th, we are evaluating old threats in a new light. Our Government
has no information that a smallpox attack is imminent. Yet it is prudent to prepare
for the possibility that terrorists (who) kill indiscriminately would use diseases as
a weapon.75
In this speech the known presence of smallpox in two laboratories (one of which is
controlled by the American CDC), combined with a belief in the possibility of terrorist
use, is grounds for reviving discussions of an “old threat.” Smallpox is not permitted to
fade from the public health equation, for the cultural scars of such a deadly disease offer
a potent rationale for national security policy. The memory of a disease with no cure,
which kills 30% of its victims, still produces enough fear to rationalize government
intervention.
Bush’s vaccination plan reproduced forms of social control used in the smallpox
eradication campaign in the 1960s, targeting military and public health workers, then
emergency responders. Mass vaccination was declared unnecessary, for the vaccination
program was a military action “for the greater public good” and because “military
missions must go on even if a smallpox outbreak occurs (and) vaccination is a wise
course for preparedness and may serve as a deterrent.”76 By vaccinating soldiers, the
government was prioritizing the vitality of the military, but also producing immunized
soldiers to deter enemies’ use of smallpox as a weapon. Soldiers impervious to disease
were an asset of war. 77
Vaccination, however, carries a risk. When smallpox presented a 30% chance of
dying, this risk seemed small, but in an age when the chances of contracting a “natural”

61
or non-intentional smallpox virus are close to none, risks of 2 deaths in a million
vaccinations are considerable. Like the WHO fieldworkers who stabbed themselves with
the needles to exemplify the safety of the vaccine, President Bush claimed he, too would
be vaccinated: “As Commander in Chief, I do not believe I can ask others to accept this
risk unless I am willing to do the same. Therefore I will receive the vaccine along with
our military.”78 He then described that his family and staff would not be vaccinated,
exemplifying the appropriate response for ordinary citizens.79 In all phases, the
government retained control of the smallpox vaccine. Tommy Thompson, Secretary of
Health and Human Services, explained that doctors would not be allowed to stock the
vaccine: “It will not be in your doctor’s office. We will not give it up out of our custody.
It will not be willy-nilly handed out to doctors across America. We will retain custody of
the vaccine.”80 Control of the remedy was critical to retaining the state’s authority over
disease.
In the end, not even phase one of the vaccination plan, the inoculation of one
million bodies, was completed. Health care workers were skeptical of the risk, and only
38,000 volunteered for vaccination. Two individuals died of heart failure after receiving
the vaccine. As public interest waned, some argued that the directive had already done its
work, drumming up support for the war in Iraq.81 Attention shifted from vaccination to
stockpile stewardship and distribution plans. Within a year of the terrorist attacks in
2001, the United States had purchased enough vaccine to inoculate every American
citizen. The timely distribution of the vaccine following an outbreak would be as
effective as and less risky than mass vaccination. With stores of vaccine stashed away,
the security apparatus could turn attention to the disciplining of bodies during a health
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emergency. In so doing, bioterrorism preparedness programs drew explicitly from the
archives of Cold War memory which produced vulnerable bodies in order to create
subjects of the national security state.
A Cold War on Terror
“‘Your body is under constant attack!’ Give your immune system the support it
needs. Order Now!” Dr. Ken Alibek’s Immune System Support System offers an
“Advanced Natural Health Formula” in capsule form, infusing the body with a regimen
of vitamins, minerals, antioxidants and probiotics designed to boost immunity. Dr.
Alibek’s website, www.drkenalibek.com, suggests that “$1.34 a day is a small price to
pay to support your immune system,” assigning a value to immune health, and a bargain
deal at that. Borrowing language from the security industry, the site describes the
immune system as “your body’s personal surveillance and security system (which)
recognizes foreign substances that are constantly attacking your body and it helps defend
against them.” Moving through an environment of foreign bacteria, viruses, and a
polyvalence of pathogens places the human body is a perpetual state of war; stewards of
personal health, it is presumed, will respond by bolstering personal preparedness and
making the body continuously ready to battle biological threats.
In an intriguing metaphor for medical perspectives on immunity, Polly Matzinger
describes popular conceptions of the human body as imitative of the political devices of
civil defense: “For half a century we have studied … models in which immunity is
controlled by the adaptive immune system, an army of lymphocytes patrolling the body
for any kind of foreign invader. Recently there has been a shift to include the cells and
molecules of the innate immune system, an army of cells and molecules patrolling the
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body for a subset of foreign invaders that are ancient enemies… Perhaps it is time to stop
running a cold war with our environment.”82 Indeed, the conception of a body under
attack from outside and within characterizes the physiological subject of the national
security state. If the ultimate biological threat is not yet located in the contiguous
environment, then the duty of the present biological subject is to access the vulnerabilities
already contained within the body and its physical surroundings, working always to
mitigate risk. The languages of war when set upon the human body disarticulate persons
from nature, sustaining the condition of modernity described by Latour through which
separating the natural world from the cultural world seems to guarantee that humans can
act freely for their own destiny.83 In the emerging culture of biological insecurity, a body
constantly under attack operates as a microcosm of the nation-state which is threatened
by countless, unspecified threats in every aspect of collective life.
Dr. Ken Alibek, salesperson of healthy immune systems, is a self-described
“biological and medical expert,” “internationally recognized for his groundbreaking
research on the human immune system,” “consultant to the U.S. government,”
contributor “to world peace” and “a U.S. citizen.” 84 While Dr. Alibek’s credentials as a
natural healer may be questionable, the former head of the Soviet Union’s “Biopreparat”
biological weapons program gained notoriety by exposing the Soviets’ secret bioweapons
development which continued after international treaties were signed in the 1970s.
Between 1998 and 2005, Alibek testified before Congress at least ten times, presenting
stirring, first-hand accounts of the Soviet Union’s plans to genetically engineer pathogens
under projects ominously titled “BONFIRE” and “PODLESHIK,” painting a vivid
depiction of a foreign threat.85
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Alibek’s willingness to talk about Soviet weapons development provided a useful
tool for the United States government in establishing bioterrorism as a credible threat in
the 21st century. By confirming that it is possible to hide a large-scale bioweapons
program, Alibek opened a broad field of nations and groups to be identified as potential
threats to the United States. Alibek, however, defected from the empire known a
generation ago as the greatest threat to American safety, health, and way of life, and
every accented word he spoke stirred cultural memories of the Cold War and the looming
Soviet threat. As a figurehead of the Soviet Union and an authority on microbial
weaponization, Alibek bridged two worlds to bring Cold War ideologies to bear on the
contemporary the bioterror crisis. Both Alibek’s magic immune pills and his Soviet
secrets resonated in the contemporary moment because the national security practices
taking hold during the bioterror crisis were reinvigorated forms of Cold War governance.
By reconfiguring the fears of the previous century in light of the revolutions in the life
sciences, the War on Terror similarly works to produce a society which will emerge
intact from a catastrophic biological event. Accordingly, the bioterror crisis of the present
moment is predicated upon principles of preparedness, survival, and sacrifice emerging
from the cultural formation of the Cold War. To understand how these ideologies
coalesce with cultural histories of disease, it is useful to investigate conceptions of life
and state grounded in the politics of the late twentieth century.
The Cold War was about “the state,” but that state cannot be taken as a given.
The “state of being” during the Cold War penetrated deeper than the institutions and
provisions which delimited the political state, and while acts of governance may have
brought about a particular type of security state, they also produced new experiences of
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collective life. The production of the state is simultaneously and insistently the recreation of its citizens. As Judith Butler suggests, discord between the state and the
individual is an inevitable outcome of that very relationship:
The state then makes us out of sorts, to be sure, if not destitute and enraged.
Which is why it makes sense to see that at the core of this ‘state’—that signifies
both juridical and dispositional dimensions of life—is a certain tension produced
between modes of being or mental states, temporary or provisional constellations
of mind of one kind or another, and juridical and military complexes that govern
how and where we may move, associate, work, and speak. If the state is what
‘binds,’ it is also clearly what can and does unbind.86
The Cold War burst with these tensions: How could citizens know the extent of the
nuclear threat? What were the responsibilities of the government and individuals in
protecting life? When should citizens surrender civil liberties for the sake of national
security? Solidifying a national identity in a time when the United States was expanding
its interests abroad produced further tensions within a liberal, democratic system of
governance. The era might be understood by the ways people negotiated tensions
between the nation-state and individual states of being in the presence of nuclear
weapons; it was about how people realize mass death at home and abroad.87 The state
performed its work of binding and unbinding in part by producing common threats and
governing people’s behaviors in the face of those threats. While hazards certainly existed
long before the Cold War, David Campbell suggests that danger was being totalized
abroad and individualized at home, inscribing danger itself into the very identity of the
state and its citizens.88
The Cold War grew out of the materiality of the nuclear bomb. Nuclear weapons
remade the world around the possibility of instantaneous mass death, and in so doing
changed the nature of life itself. Joseph Masco proposes that the nuclear project of the
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Cold War naturalized health as incipient death, bringing the possibilities for abrupt
termination of life into formations of healthy citizenship. He shows how the Cold War
chiseled away at the amalgamation of public health and national security which had
sustained the development of the modern state prior to 1945. Security and health “became
contradictory ideas” during the nuclear era, “which both underscored the reality of radical
technological change and invalidated the state’s ability to regulate society at the level of
health and happiness.”89 In building and detonating nuclear weapons, the government
was creating a landscape which was inherently unhealthy to its citizens. Unable to build
the nuclear industry while caring for its citizens, the government instead worked to
naturalize nuclearism as threat for which citizens themselves were responsible. Alleviated
of the burden of protecting individual health, the state could focus on survival as the
preeminent goal of citizenship. Through wide-ranging practices of emotional
management, the Cold War state established “logics of survival and sacrifice” by which
individual desires and responses were subsumed beneath the preeminent goal of
preserving collective life beyond nuclear catastrophe.90 The forms of citizenship made
available during this era characterize daily life by individual acts which work against the
potential for unprecedented forms of mass death.
The totalizing yet individualizing threat of disease provides a potent conception of
risk alongside nuclear death, for disease has immediate effects upon the human body, but
is still largely understood in terms of mass devastation within populations, as in the case
of smallpox. While the nuclear threat has not disappeared in the new millennium,
remaking disease through genomic science along with the potential for microbes to be
weaponized has produced new biological threats as vital security risks. The
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consolidation of executive power, militarization of civilian life, and expansion of the
science industry instigated to counter nuclear threats during the Cold War have expanded
in the contemporary moment to an all-hazards preparedness strategy sustained in part by
the producing of a living, changing, mutating, and growing biological threat.
Surviving the Cold War State
Consolidation of Executive Power. War plays an important role in the formation of state
identity, but the great wars of the 20th century were waged in Europe and Asia, leaving
the United States to find other ways to establish its place in the post-war era. The country
had emerged from WWII as a powerful nation-state, ready to develop its interests abroad.
To wage war overseas, the U.S. had greatly expanded its systems of governance in order
to support U.S. troops and other interests far beyond its borders. Unable to reign in these
bureaucracies, the state used these agencies to protect the expanding interests of the
country, but the country was troubled in the post-war period by a lingering anti-statist
attitude.91 Without a war to sustain the power of the central-state, the country seemed
ready to revert to the decentralized policies so vital to American capitalism. In order to
satisfy the new state’s ever-present need for war, the U.S. produced an “imaginary
war.”92 The preemptive war was fought daily through a range of practices which, if
successful, would eliminate the conflict itself. By building national security programs, the
state extended its influence into the lives of its citizens and drew support for its broader
post-war strategies. Every detail of that war had to be imagined in order to ensure that
appropriate measures were being taken in the present to keep it from coming about. In a
perpetual state of war, the particulars of the government’s national security policy were
more easily construed as plausible and rational.
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To meet the post-war administrations’ policy goals and mobilize the Cold War
movement, the state had to remake its image and consolidate the power of the executive
without breaking the ground rules of democracy, and also expand its power into the
public and private lives of its citizens, while still upholding the democratic social order so
valued in American society. Furthermore, the state had to convince its citizens to accept
the ratcheted expansion of government as an innocuous consequence of practices done on
behalf of the public good.93 In guarding the private interests of citizens, the new politic
allowed citizens to have whatever interests they democratically chose and the state would
invest itself in protecting them. Foucault proposes that in a liberal state, liberty precludes
security, for as a form of governance, national security protects liberties.94 Bentham adds
that prosperity breeds security, the desire to protect one’s interests. Security, then, is a
form of governance that comprises the future.95 Ever watchful, the security state is
concerned with possible and plausible events.96
In the wake of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, worldwide nuclear war
seemed a possible, if not completely plausible, event. The appearance of a weapon that
could destroy life on an unprecedented, unimaginable scale changed cultural
understandings of death. Nuclear war was a risk, not only to bodies and life, but to the
balance of power that preserved life. In his thesis Risk Society, Ulrich Beck proposes that
risk has been produced by modern societies, a necessary side effect of wealth and
technology.97 Risk works with material objects, in this case a bomb, to order the world
and render it governable. For Beck, risk is uniform and calculable, and therefore under
the care of a “risk society” designed to identify, calculate, and mitigate the risk.
Certainly, this was much of the work of the Cold War regarding the risks of nuclearism.
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Beck’s thesis, however, hinges upon the idea that risk exists beyond society’s ability to
calculate it, for the ultimate products of modernization are catastrophic events with no
limits, such as the nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl. Though they contain the potential for
mass death and social disruption, the effects of biological weapons may better be
compared to the impacts of infectious disease, characterized by contagion, mutation, and
adaptation, which bring material effects which are incalculable and seemingly without
limits.98
Mitchell Dean contends that Beck’s society is in reality a “post-risk-calculation
society” in which there can be no security for society cannot calculate, and therefore
cannot plan for the worst imaginable disaster.99 He proposes instead an understanding of
risk as a way of presenting events in order to make them governable. For generations,
science has been generating mechanisms to govern personal health, as evidenced by the
development of a smallpox vaccine which facilitated the campaign to mitigate the risk of
smallpox worldwide. Through science, the risk can be tempered, even contained at the
individual level, particularly when partnered with political strategy, such as ring
vaccination was used to fight smallpox. This type of risk is less-universal, grounded
spatially and temporally by its attachment to objects located in a social context which can
be dealt with through a range of strategies, both public, private, institutional, and
governmental. As practices in the present moment work to mitigate future loss, the threat
is technologized.100 Security, then, is not about securing society, but securing the
mechanisms that govern that society.
The national security state operates under the presumption that, given the
necessary authority, resources, and access, risk can be controlled, thereby validating the
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expansion of the state as a way to acquire the means to mitigate risk. Centralizing
government power upon the executive is one way to fix the mechanisms of state security.
Described as the “new normative reality” of the era, this consolidation of power
resonated with the nuclear experience.101 The “Red Button” perspective of a nuclear
launch imagined an executive who could decide the fate of millions by merely flipping a
switch. Living in a state where one person held such power demanded that citizens invest
a good deal of trust in their President in particular. The national security program may not
have belonged exclusively to the president, but throughout the Cold War, the executive
branch retained extensive authority over risk control. Civil defense operated at the federal
level, at first with the Federal Civil Defense Agency and later through the Office of Civil
Defense. These agencies developed the nation’s security plan, controlled its distribution,
and coordinated all state and local activities. In a nation built through deliberate efforts to
distribute executive powers to individual states, civil defense gave federal agencies
startling access to the lives of citizens. Many events of the new era, from the Patriot Act
to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, exemplify the continued
bestowal of executive power under the national security state and the changing
mechanisms of governance in the United States.

Militarization of Civilian Life. The first formal articulation of U.S. “national security”
came in legislation passed in 1947, establishing the National Security Resources Board.
The NSRB proposed to keep the country in a perpetual state of readiness and, therefore, a
war with no end. “We have adopted the concept of continuous mobilization planning—to
assure continual adjustment to changes in strategy, tactics, and the weapons of
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warfare.”102 Interestingly, in laying out their mission statement, the NSRB vacillates
between the self-referring term “we” and a broader “we” seeming to encompass the
citizenship at large: “… war may come suddenly and may be launched through mass
assaults on our strategic, industrial, and population centers with weapons of mass
destruction. We can look forward to no respite; and there may be no one else to hold the
line while we prepare.”103 Even in its infancy, national civil defense policy was forming
around the presumption of citizen participation and citizen responsibility. In the
democratic state, when power consolidated around the executive, people would retain
agency in their own defense, for “states are certain loci of power, but the state is not all
that there is of power.”104 To bring citizens into the civil defense project meant training
them to participate actively in securing the nation, and particularly to act according to
prescribed rules during times of crisis.
In The Imaginary War, Guy Oakes proposes that the Cold War strategy to protect
American interests through “containment by deterrence” proved to be increasingly
expensive, unprincipled, and dangerous in the nuclear age. Matching the Soviet nuclear
threat required a particular economic and political environment, but Oakes argues that the
public also had to be morally persuaded. Threatening nuclear war in order to assure world
peace might actually lead to nuclear war, affecting Americans and Soviets alike. “If the
price of freedom proved to be nuclear war, would Americans be willing to pay? The
answer to this question depended on whether Americans believed that even if deterrence
failed, the consequences would still be tolerable.”105 The federal civil defense programs
were designed to bring about precisely this suasion. The goal was to convince the public
that they could survive the nuclear attack, rebuild, and return to their everyday lives.
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Part of the Cold War project was producing the future as if it had already
happened.106 The future had to be a place where people still lived lives resembling the
familiar lives of the present. Unable to change the future, people had to rearrange their
present lives into a state more consistent with the post-nuclear life. Preparedness is thus a
rationality that brings future peril into a space where it can be acted upon in the
present.107 Lakoff proposes that preparedness is concerned with creating the
infrastructure that sustains the systems of social order, more than building the public
health, assessing the vulnerability of the population at large, rather than personal
weakness. Total preparedness might be achieved when the structures of the present so
closely align with the structures of a crisis state that people are essentially living in the
crisis in the present. Thus, as the practices of nuclear or biological crisis become the
practices of everyday life, the “distinction between crisis and normality” collapses.108 The
Cold War might therefore be understood as a time when the public accepted living with
crisis as the normal way of being.
In this nuclear future, survival had less to do with bodies than with infrastructure.
Rather than saving people, successful civil defense produced a situation where people
would save themselves. The psychological project of the Cold War required teaching
people that they had to accept the risk of nuclear war in order to assure the country’s
economic and social security.109 Side effects of radiation were still largely unknown, and
while some loss of life was presumed, the goal of civil defense was to ensure the
continuation of society. If survival did not relate to bodies, it was separated from
radiation and the bomb itself, and could be better handled in the present. “Survival was
not an occurrence, something that would or would not happen, but an artifact, something
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to be organized and produced by intelligent endeavor.”110 This endeavor entailed the
organization of America into a nuclear society.
After two decades of sending their soldiers abroad, Americans were invited to
become a civilian militia in their homeland. As the country seeped into a continual state
of war, the civic accepted the “quasi-militarization of civilian life.”111 Under direction
from the Commander in Chief, people dug bomb shelters, stockpiled food, and ran drills
at home and work, performing the rituals of troops preparing for battle. The home
became the front line, a civic garrison. From the perspective of the state, the public was
vulnerable through its own fear. Nuclear bombs were not the enemy; panic was the
enemy.112 Civil defense strove to produce fear which would incite action, but still allow
people to function.113 The national security campaign encouraged the rehearsal of nuclear
fear through films, drills, advertisements, education, and consumer purchasing. These
rituals promised nuclear survival, staving of mass panic, while keeping the threat everpresent in the public mind.
Notably, the practices of civil defense could be performed at home by any citizen
(though, if one takes the characters in defense films, advertisements, and pamphlets as
example, presumably a white, middle-class citizen). The state called in a cadre of experts
to address the particular challenges of the nuclear age. The nuclear problem was a
technological problem, and therefore subject to a “scientific fix.” Colin Gray suggests
that the appeal to science resonated with the “American engineering spirit.” 114 While part
of the scientific endeavor entailed the production of deterrence through bigger, better, and
more efficient nuclear weapons, the civil defense strategy sought confirmation from
science regarding a range of domestic issues. What textiles would best protect against
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nuclear blast? Should I build my home from sticks or bricks? Will the bomb reach me if I
flee the city? Scientific modeling could provide answers to these questions, allowing the
state to more efficiently organize its defense policies and effectively garner public
support. Models could also imagine the range, impact, and duration of a nuclear blast,
producing risk by connecting a future event to a predicted outcome. As the science
industry grew, it became yet another expansion of state power, particularly as the state
attempted to contain the knowledge produced by science in the interest of national
security. The perception management practices of the era helped the state curtail the
wide-ranging cultural understandings of nuclear threat and produce a singular strategy of
defense. The increased role of science in risk management instigated broader discussions
of the power of science over human lives, particularly as science translated into daily
practices to imagine and bring about a post-nuclear society.115 Francois Ewald contends
that the Cold War love affair with science cannot endure the new paradigm of security
emerging in the current crisis. A growing skepticism towards the ability of science to
mitigate the panoply of cultural fears and insecurities of the present moment, for the
rapidly evolving science of the day scarcely lingers has time to linger upon vital
questions before being swept on to the next question or catastrophe. “While the language
of risk, against a backdrop of scientific expertise, used to be sufficient to describe all
types of insecurity, the new paradigm sees uncertainty reappear in the light of even newer
science. It bears witness to a deeply disturbed relationship with a science that is consulted
less for the knowledge it offers than for the doubt it insinuates.”116 As mentioned earlier
specific to the case of smallpox, when science does not contain the means to address the

75
crises of the day, the work of negotiating risk is assumed by the social politics which will
ascribe qualities of risk based upon experiences and cultural histories.
A New Security State
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 formally revived Cold War-type civil
defense by establishing a federal agency nominally dedicated to securing the American
homeland. Directly charged with preventing and responding to terrorist acts, the
Department of Homeland Security models the Cold War state by consolidating authority
and strengthening the power of the executive branch around the threat of terrorism and
enlisting citizen participation in securing everyday life.117 The mission of the new
department was legislated as follows:
(1) IN GENERAL.—The primary mission of the Department is to—
(A) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
(B) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism;
(C) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do
occur within the United States; …
(F) ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is not
diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland.118
References to “prevention,” “vulnerability,” and “securing the homeland” in these lines
echo the Cold War ideology of deterrence and survival. “Assist in recovery” assumes
survival and the continuation of life, while “ensure … economic security” reassures that
these executive efforts will not interfere with American capitalism. Notably, the mission
of the DHS establishes an agency which operates because of terrorism threats, but not
exclusively during terrorist events, for the executive is continually working to reduce
vulnerability and rehearse the terrorism response, practices which must persist so long as
a threat exists.
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The Department of Homeland Security assembled 22 government agencies under
a single authority, establishing a unified mission to achieve domestic preparedness. The
largest restructuring of U.S. government since President Truman combined the War and
Navy departments into the Department of Defense in 1947 brought agencies ranging from
the Secret Service to the Coast Guard to Immigration and Naturalization Service into a
new cabinet-level department.119 Notably, under direction of the President, executive
agencies are both “an executive agency and a military department,” a classification
specifically referenced in the Homeland Security Act (USC 101, Intro, Sec 2.7). Through
this Act, dozens of non-military agencies were assumed into a military department and
given responsibilities to prepare to protect the homeland. This consolidation of power
was rationalized as necessary to improve communication, coordination, and informationgathering.120
The first directive of the new DHS was “to carry out comprehensive assessments
of the vulnerabilities of the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States,
including the performance of risk assessments to determine the risks posed by particular
types of terrorist attacks within the United States,” thus beginning the calculation of risk
and assessment of vulnerability assigned to the security state.121 The DHS definition of
critical infrastructure comes from the Patriot Act (section 1016(e) of Public Law 107-56),
including “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States
that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety.”122 Here,
vitality is measured not only in terms of survival and public health, but in the continuance
of the national economy. As during the Cold War, national security governs all systems
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and assets that sustain the nation, asserting authority over private resources deemed to be
of value to the state: “The term ‘key resources’ means publicly or privately controlled
resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government.”123 Again,
this language enables an expansive response to terrorism preparedness, where federal
authority manages the health and wealth of the nation during an ongoing state of
emergency.
While citizen militias are not the explicit strategy of DHS, the establishment of
an ever-present War on Terror produces a climate of war during which citizens are more
willing to surrender civil liberties to the state, ironically while retaining the civic duty of
preparing for the crisis. Like the NSRB, DHS encompasses the citizenry in articulating its
objectives of “preserving our freedoms, protecting America … we secure our
homeland.”124 As the DHS strategic plan explains, “This exceedingly complex mission
requires a focused effort from our entire society if we are to be successful.”125 The DHS
first situates itself as part of the society at risk, and then recruits all citizens to its mission
to protect freedom. In the introduction to its Ready.gov program, DHS issued the
following statement, now cited word-for-word on more than 100 local preparedness
websites:
All Americans should begin a process of learning about potential threats so we are
better prepared to react during an attack. While there is no way to predict what
will happen, or what your personal circumstances will be, there are simple things
you can do now to prepare yourself and your loved ones.
Citizens are then invited to take specific actions, like assembling a supply kit and
developing a family emergency plan, for “preparing makes sense.” Again, preparedness
is situated as a personal responsibility, overseen by the state from the executive level.
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Though the narrative of national security produced in the years following the
September 11 attacks mirrors Cold War civil defense strategies in several ways, the
contemporary situation poses different challenges to the establishment of a security state.
First, while the Cold War had an “identified” enemy in the Soviet Union, the War on
Terror involves an unknown enemy in the form of an individual or a group rather than a
superpower. In order to produce the requisite levels of fear to instigate social
mobilization, the public must be convinced that terrorists pose a significant threat. On the
other hand, if the enemy continues to be unidentifiable, the risk may slide into Beck’s
realm of the incalculable, rendering the state’s deterrence programs inefficient and
ineffective. As Wald proposes, the transmission of disease which defies boundaries
troubles the effort to identify a particular nation as the Soviet-like enemy of the War on
Terror, but may prove to be effective in reifying national borders through disease
deterrence programs.126 Somehow the state must ensure that terrorists have a face, a
name, a religion, or a nationality—something that identifies them as a threat. Products
like terrorist playing cards and programs of systematic racial profiling show the state’s
continuous effort to put a face to the threat.
A second problem for the contemporary security state is the absence of a single,
identifiable weapon. During the Cold War, the nuclear bomb gave the state a way to
access and control citizens.127 The bomb had particular characteristics that made it useful
in establishing risk: it was deadly enough to pose a far-reaching threat to human life, but
retained the illusion of control (it was contained in a casement, controlled by that Red
Button, detonated in a single blast, and according to the science of the time, had limited
lingering effects). As stated previously, as science made the bomb calculable, it brought
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risk into the realm of human intervention, thereby rationalizing federal civil defense
programs. I propose that the modern U.S. security state grouped biological threats with
chemical and nuclear bombs under the label of Weapons of Mass Destruction—despite
the qualities of bioterrorism which act more like infectious disease than singular blasts—
because it needed to elucidate a singular threat like unto the Cold War’s nuclear bomb.
Biological weapons present a threat which can be made by one person on a small scale,
but has vast potential to grow, reproduce, and mutate. Furthermore, just as nuclear
weapons matched the resources and political power of the Soviet Union, biological
weapons match the resources of terrorists, for they can be shown to emerge from nature
itself, a resource available to anyone including primitive and underfunded terrorists. As
one researcher suggested, “As the might of the U.S. increases and the poverty of other
nations increases … what weapon do they have to strike back with? The only one they
can afford and the only one we might not be protected against are biological weapons.”128
Not only are bioweapons broadly perceived to be cheap, available, and easy to
disperse, but they continually reproduce individual vulnerability. As science expands
people’s knowledge of microbes, vulnerability itself becomes an ever-changing state, a
referent that can never be linked to a particular risk. The testimony of Dr. Roger Brent,
director of the Molecular Sciences Institute, before the Subcommittee on Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attack exemplifies the expansive, yet individualized, response
imagined to prepare for biological events: “Because this threat has changed from the
days of the Cold War germ war program, our defense posture needs to change. Although
it is a good thing we now have enough smallpox vaccine … it is important to remember
that stockpiles of vaccines and drugs are fixed defenses against known threats.”129
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Preparing for known threats might have finite solutions, but preparing for the unknown
demands an expansive response, ever growing to meet the new threats made possible by
science. Brent argues for uncontested support of this national science project: “Building a
defense is a problem of real gravity and complexity; it will require R&D and policy
efforts sustained over decades, which will mean that it will need to enjoy sustained
consensus bipartisan support, as was true for Government support for science and
technology during the Cold War.”130 This direct reference to the nuclear era in support of
an expansive science complex situates the government and science as co-creators of
national security, a role formalized in the Science and Technology Directorate of DHS
whose mission statement brandishes science and technology as tools to “enhance security
and increase efficiency.”131
Restructuring governing agencies to facilitate science study and innovation is not
new to this crisis, but the direct links to national security motivates technological fixes
for security threats and drives the development of technologies which may not be
scrutinized regarding their cultural value or implications for civil liberties. As in so many
historical times, technological innovation infuses acts of war, as society continues in an
endless War on Terror. In the words of President George W. Bush, “We refuse to remain
idle while modern technology might be turned against us; we will rally the great promise
of American science and innovation to confront the greatest danger of our time.”132 When
science and technology expand the enemy’s armory to include incalculable biological and
chemical threats, it is a patriotic necessity to produce equal or greater innovation in the
homeland.
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Finally, the contemporary national security state must now deal with individual
bodies as never before, particularly as they relate to the critical infrastructures of
American society. A bioattack will not destroy buildings, but can still dismantle social
systems. The Cold War civil defense narrative imagined a state of survival in which cities
were destroyed but people survived; bioterrorism proposes the reverse. Bodies also stand
in for the weapons themselves, both in deliverance and in contagion. In his testimony, Dr.
Brent suggested that weapons can be removed from the scenario completely, for people
could infect themselves in order to infect other people. The Committee Chair,
Christopher Cox, explicitly alludes to the limitations of traditional security practices in
his response to Brent’s suggestion of “suicide coughers”:
Mr. COX: And what you suggest, therefore, is that the Cold War model, or really
the model of all prior history in warfare is out the window; we shouldn’t be
looking necessarily for weaponization, the terrorists themselves become the
weapons. Is that what you are suggesting?
Dr. BRENT: That is correct, sir.133
In this world of biological risk, the national security program must treat bodies as both
casualties and weapons of mass destruction, where victims become vectors of the
weapon. Contagion also changes the duration of a single attack, which might continue as
long as vulnerable bodies exist, further altering the scale on which biological threats must
be addressed. These characteristics of biological weapons demand new knowledge of
disease and rationalize the expansion of science research in the name of national security
and the institution of new forms of governance.
Cultural Scarring
In the last moments of the 2005 Congressional hearing on “Engineering Bio-terror
Agents,” Representative John Linder provoked the panel of bioterror experts: “What
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would you say if I told you a scientist from Sweden said that Iranian children emigrating
with their parents from Iran to Sweden have all been vaccinated for smallpox; what
would that mean to you?”134 Likely, a topic so ripe with hearsay and speculation would
be troubling to panelists trained by the scientific method, though the hint at secret
government knowledge was enough to create more than a murmur in online
communities.135 In itself, however, the question exemplifies the ongoing effort to make
the nature of the biothreat visible in the contemporary moment, in this case by reading
human bodies. The cultural history of smallpox brought into the bioterror crisis imbues a
scar with political meaning. In proposed scenario, the scarred bodies also emerge from a
cultural geography which labels them as Middle-Eastern, Iranian, emigrant, and foreign.
The scar does not render them diseased, but rather the opposite, questioning the personal
acts of citizens to produce immunity within a larger narrative of risk. The speaker is
asking scientists to find evidence of state terrorism by reading the evidence of recent
vaccination manifest on subjects’ bodies. Cultural fears of Iranian terrorists and smallpox
converge on the body of a child with a scar.
Sitting on the panel of expert witnesses, Dr. Alibek proposed that people in Iran
simply are not convinced that smallpox has been eradicated and so continue the cultural
practice of previous generations. The scars express a health fear, the lingering social
impact of the world’s deadliest disease in a developing nation. Representative Linder’s
question suggests at the multiplicity of narratives which could makes sense of these
scarred bodies, while strongly hinting at the answer which best serves the security
objectives: do scars manifest a cultural fear of infectious disease or a political reaction to
state terror? In asking whether the fear evidenced by the scarring of Iranian emigrants
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should belong to Americans, the question constructs racialized statements about disease
which have reverberated throughout the history of smallpox and continue to entwine with
narratives of terror. The scars, imagined or not, keep smallpox bound to the present
moment, producing a narrative of risk ridden with secrecy, foreign bodies, national
migration, primitive health, and vulnerability.
The threat of bioterrorism has demanded the reconfiguration of national security
practices based upon fear and knowledge of disease. It should not be assumed that “new”
knowledge of disease will eliminate fear, for as seen with smallpox, even the eradication
of disease does not erase vulnerability. When knowledge itself is rendered suspect, “only
ideology and desire remain as the basis for action.”136 As citizens project their archival
memory of smallpox onto the blank screen of the future, they imagine risk based upon
deeply personal conceptions of life and fear and well as the collective experience of
disease brought into public discourse.137 The objective of survival lies at the center of this
paradigm, the protection of bare life prior to all other social institutions and civil liberties.
The forms of governance which attend to quotidian life itself enter vigorously into
21st-century society, responding to the variety of threats produced by the conflated
histories of disease and national security. Because bioterrorism aligns closely with the
history of infectious disease, close study of the narratives of smallpox illuminates the
origins of the future imaginings of bioterror risk in the experiences of the deadly diseases
of the past. The smallpox eradication campaign exemplifies how disease control
harnesses cultural institutions to achieve state objectives during a war-on-biology.
Jackson and Ramshaw’s publishing dilemma shows how the fear of disease disrupts the
scientific production of knowledge with political concerns over terrorism, evoking the
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culture of secrecy which shaped Cold War society. Even a cheap vitamin, guaranteed by
an internationally-renowned bioterrorism expert to protect one’s immune system, shows
how individual pursuit of security against a natural world ripe with pathogens enters the
market, aligning personal health with the concerns of the security state. Cultural fears are
complicated, and bio-fears are no exception. Addressing the bioterrorism dilemma will
demand broad reconsideration of the ways people know their bodies and how living
entities, large and small, operate within the security state.
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Chapter 2
Building a Biolab: Negotiating Biological Citizenship in Hamilton, Montana
Part One: Building a Better Biolab

On Valentine’s Day, 2002, Mary Wulff read an announcement in the Ravalli
County Republic about a meeting to be held regarding changes at Rocky Mountain
Laboratories. A retired police officer, Wulff had lived in Los Angeles for fourteen years
before settling Hamilton, Montana, a fateful relocation that would shortly bring the
California native into conflict with one of the oldest institutions in the Bitterroot Valley.
At the meeting, lab officials announced to the two dozen attending community members
that a $66 million grant from the federal government would be used to build an
“Integrated Research Facility” (IRF), a swank new structure that would house several
Biosafety Level-4 (BSL4) laboratories designed to study the most dangerous pathogens
on the planet. Wulff recalls hearing the declaration, then looking around the room to
assess whether anyone else was as startled to hear this as she was: “Until that day, I had
never really thought about the lab before. I had never thought that this would happen in
my town.”1 She sat through the meeting in a daze, sensing the enormity of the
announcement, but unsure what to say or how to respond. She went home that night and
started calling people. Within weeks she had established a nonprofit group, the Coalition
for a Safe Lab, and was networking with other groups to discover what was going on in
the red brick buildings west of 4th street.
Over the next four years, Wulff would become fluent in topics ranging from
emerging infectious diseases to biocontainment, as well as the finer points of
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Environmental Impact Statements and the Freedom of Information Act. While
community activism against the BSL4 expansion did not stop its construction, both
laboratory officials and grassroots protestors claim that the resistance movement played
an important role in shaping the first BSL4 laboratory to be built since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Not only has the physical plan for the laboratory changed
to address citizens’ security concerns, but the protest set precedent for assessing the risk
of cultivating deadly microbes within proximity of healthy citizens. The controversy
affirmed that Rocky Mountain Laboratories (RML) is not just part of a national science
community, but an integral part of a local community whose future is complexly invested
in both the physical security and economic prosperity of the institution. Because of the
protest, RML officials were forced to reexamine the responsibilities of the laboratory to
the community, while Hamilton residents had to consider the economic and cultural
impacts of RML upon their hometown. These discussions reiterated issues arising
throughout the lab’s 100-year history, for the Rocky Mountain Labs have been
continuously remade by community resistance, national interest, and trends in disease
science. In this post-9/11 contestation, the lab became a place where both scientists and
citizens were stakeholders in the identification of risk.
This chapter explores how the Rocky Mountain Laboratories have been physically
and ideologically remade in the contemporary moment in order to meet the new threats of
bioterrorism. Through an ethnographic study of the Hamilton protest, I consider how
citizens negotiate the risk of pathogens in an era characterized by bioterrorism and
emerging infectious disease, and how scientists and nonscientists converse about the
proximate threat of microbes within the broader work of governments to care for citizens.
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This research is guided by questions of biological citizenship, asking how the
contemporary climate of national biosecurity produces new forms of citizenship
predicated upon notions of risk to a healthy population. Though theorizations of
biocitizenship abound, the concept references people’s ability to claim a universal right to
life and demand protection of that life on the basis of their biological existence.2 Rose
and Novas explain that the emergence of a new genomic biology has brought new
manifestations of citizenship, and along with it “new spaces of public dispute… new
objects of contestation … novel forums for political debate, new questions for democracy
and new styles of activism” which are informed by unique cultural histories, forms of
governance, and activist traditions.3 Prior conceptualizations of biological citizenship
have emerged from the study of unhealthy bodies damaged by environmental catastrophe
or carrying genetic disease. This research builds upon these cases to consider how healthy
citizens use these new spaces of public dispute to contest state actions and advocate for
biosecurity.
The rise of the new genomic biology in an era of globalization brings new
understandings of biological risk to healthy populations, such as those imagined by
bioterrorism and emerging infectious diseases. The history of RML shows that people
have long understood biological risk in terms of “what might happen” to their bodies,
taking public actions to advocate for their biological security. Nikolas Rose has proposed
that the pastoral role of state health care is diminishing, parceling out responsibility for
collective health to individuals and corporations.4 The case of Rocky Mountain
Laboratories shows how citizens and scientists negotiate biological risk through the court
system, public procedures, and personal interactions, bringing material change to the
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spaces where science is done in the modern age. As the BSL4 laboratory in Hamilton is
just the first of many high-security biolabs to be built in the post-9/11 world, this case
provides insight into how citizens conceptualize and articulate the risks posed by the
scientific study of deadly pathogens, while illuminating the discursive strategies and
bargaining techniques brought to the table in order to acknowledge citizens’ claims to
biological rights, yet still pursue the objectives of the science industry. The situation in
Hamilton, Montana, exemplifies how the expansion of the bioscience complex as a
national security objective brings material outcomes to the lives of citizens, whether there
exists a biological threat or not.
Through the case study of RML this two-part chapter explores how citizens assess
disease risk and weigh the risk of disease in association with a range of political
institutions, from the science industry to the local economy. In Hamilton, the risk of
transmission of deadly diseases is proximate, because foreign microbes will be brought
into the community, albeit in a facility isolated from its environs. Part one of this case
study considers the Rocky Mountain Laboratory itself, where it sits in the landscape and
participates in the exchange of goods and labor with the community. By exploring how
the laboratory came into existence in this place, I investigate the geographies of disease
which brought science to Hamilton and the practices of science which entrench it in the
economic structures of the contemporary society. Throughout this history, citizens
negotiate the question: Can the control of laboratory spaces mitigate risk?
In Part Two, I consider more broadly how Hamilton citizens assess the risks of
biological diseases in the contemporary terrorism crisis. Directed by Rabinow’s
theorization of biosociality, this section examines the groupings of activists, scientists,
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government, and community which form during the protest of the RML expansion
questioning how they produce particular forms of citizenship in relation to the risks posed
by the BSL4 lab. Throughout these two sections, I theorize that the particular
circumstances of this modern age of bioterror have produced a crisis of citizenship in
Hamilton, Montana, where a longstanding institution must be reconsidered under the new
state of emergency. Both the material space of the laboratory and the political
negotiations over the laboratory space form the basis of new forms of citizenship
predicated upon emergent notions of disease and terror. Bioterrorism takes root in
people’s worldview through a sense of communal vulnerability to disease. This case
considers what resources are available to citizens to mitigate risk and minimize their
shared susceptibility to disease.
Laboratory Life
Rocky Mountain Laboratories are known by several names in Hamilton,
Montana: “the spotted fever lab,” “the tick lab,” or simply “the labs.” The word
“laboratory” may conjure images of rooms lined with flasks, formaldehyde-filled jars,
and Bunsen burners, but the stereotypes prompt few specifics about the exterior of the
building. Situated in a neighborhood of Victorian houses set on wide, cottonwood-shaded
streets, the red-brick façade of RML suggests turn-of-the-century boarding school as
much as world-class biological laboratory. The events that take place within these brick
walls, however, render a particular purpose for this space, turning it into the known
cultural form of a laboratory.
A laboratory is a special site where resources are dedicated to specified work,
namely the production of knowledge in the form of texts for publication. While all people
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use observation and experimentation to make judgments and solve problems, in a
laboratory all spaces, practices, and materials are dedicated to this work.5 In his landmark
ethnography of the laboratory, Laboratory Life, Bruno Latour sketches the laboratory as a
square box in which animals, chemicals, and energy are input and “articles” are output.6
He argues that this process leaves “inscriptions” on its outputs, the traces of actions done
in the laboratory which can be represented in publication, until they eventually strip
scientific statements of their situated origins, thus producing “facts.” With all its
resources of material and energy, as well as devices of inscription, the laboratory gains
authority over knowledge. Though nearly erased through the practices of publication, the
materiality of the laboratory itself structures the work of knowledge-making. The
laboratory space is a site of power, for it sustains the belief that truth exists outside its
situated context, and in turn explains what that truth is. As Donna Haraway described,
“The laboratory for Latour is the railroad industry of epistemology, where facts can only
be made to run on the tracks laid down from the laboratory out. Those who control the
railroads control the surrounding territory.”7
The bioterror crisis of the 21st century is reshaping the science community down
to its laboratory spaces. In the last decade, at least five new BSL4 level laboratories have
been announced, more than doubling the square footage devoted to this type of research
in the United States. A new campus for studying the most dangerous pathogens planned
for the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in Frederick,
Maryland, will house two new BSL4 facilities, including the Department of Homeland
Security’s own National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center. Political
attention and funding for bioterrorism preparedness has recreated local laboratories, such

91
as CDC’s Local Response Network (see Chapter 4), and established new collaborations,
such as the Homeland Security Centers for Excellence, which group scientists from
public and private laboratories together to problem-solve security concerns.
Knowledge of new biological risks requires spaces for the production of
knowledge. Latour argued, “For the world to become knowable, it must become a
laboratory.”8 For the “facts” of bioterrorism to become knowable, the crisis must be
processed by the science laboratories. The expansion of the bioscience complex in the
last decade has put more laboratories in more places and brought more citizens into
physical and ideological proximity with bioscience labs than ever before. The quest for
knowledge about bioterrorism has created risk, for it requires scientists to manipulate the
biological agents of disease within the laboratory space, and building new laboratories for
these practices multiplies the sites where killer viruses can be found. The materiality of
knowledge production poses a risk, not only to the scientist, but to those who live near
the laboratory space. The perceived risks of the expanding bioscience industry drive
citizens to demand intervention by science institutions to mitigate risk, particularly
through the control of laboratory spaces. Thus, these laboratories which study bioterror
threats have a particular materiality which focuses upon containing the risk created by the
physical presence of deadly microbes.
As the first such lab to be built since the terror attacks of 2001, the laboratory at
Hamilton has been the frontrunner in negotiating these laboratory risks with
contemporary citizens who are continuously rethinking their biosociality. Investigating
the 100-year history of Rocky Mountain Laboratories, however, shows that the
negotiations over the BSL4 laboratory are reworking ideologies and community relations
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which have been contended since the lab’s creation. By exploring how these motifs were
established and then reworked in the modern era, this chapter investigates the situated
origins of contemporary biosciences, asking how citizens impact science knowledge by
shaping the laboratory spaces that lay down the tracks for knowledge production. This
case study of the protest against RML expansion in the 21st century shows how
laboratories exist simultaneously as scientific and political institutions, borrowing from
both sides to claim authority over citizens’ lives.
Laboratory Community
To theorize the role of the community in the scientific production of knowledge, I
propose telescoping out from Latour’s map to consider the laboratory’s situation within a
surrounding geography (see Figure 2.1). To illuminate flows implied by Latour, but
outside the focus of his anthropological inquiry, I have highlighted, for example, the role
of local farmers in raising animals and feed for animals or the role of community power
companies in producing or attaining energy for the laboratory. Using two-way arrows,
this diagram depicts the repeated movement of scientists and laboratory staff moving
between the lab and the surrounding geography which would include their homes and
social and economic centers like stores and restaurants. Because articles—the primary
output in Latour’s diagram—target the broader scientific and world community, I have
extended that arrow through and beyond the geographic boundary. Similarly, to capture
the crux of concern in Hamilton, the diagram shows microbes being imported from
foreign areas and passing through the community before entering the laboratory.
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Figure 2.1 Situating Latour’s Laboratory in the community.

Two key ideas emerge from this depiction of the laboratory: First, the inputs
which fuel the production of knowledge (energy, supplies, labor) are largely supplied by
a local environment, showing the investment of a community in the work of science
knowledge-making. Second, this depiction challenges the nearly one-way flows of
Latour’s illustration, where the laboratory collects inputs from many tributaries, but
releases just a small trickle of output. Depicting the two-way flows of people and
materials reduces the tendency to perceive the laboratory wall as a barrier which protects
work done behind closed walls from outside contamination. Contemporary biosecurity
practices must confront these multiple circulations, for microbes move on flesh and
through air. The goal of biosecurity is to construct an environment where the necessary
materials for science practice can move easily while dangerous items are contained.9 The
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production of BSL4 laboratory space attunes to the regulation of every flow into and out
of the laboratory space, including the flow of scientific knowledge into the hands of those
who would use information to inflict terror upon populations.
In Hamilton, Montana, the laboratory complex is set apart from the community by
a black steel fence with sculpted, but menacing points—the same type of fencing that
frames and secures the White House. The fence was built in 1995, but for most of its
history, Rocky Mountain Laboratories had an open campus, where local farmers could
stroll into the labs with their diseased chickens in hopes of finding a diagnosis, and high
school students could congregate in the library to study after school. Today, when visitors
come to the RML campus, they are stopped at the newly-constructed visitor center, set
outside the fence at some distance from the main facilities. Though nominally a public
space, the visitor center is clearly little more than a guard station, a gatekeeper of the
laboratory space. By building a visitor center, RML suggests it wants to communicate
with the public, but the center does not receive guests to escort them into the laboratory
so much as it turns them away from the lab itself. Visitors who wish to read the brief
history of the lab presented in displays in the center must show a driver’s license and
undergo security screening, sacrificing anonymity even to explore this public space.
Thus, the visitor center sets up layers of control that will discourage visitors from
pursuing entry.
RML’s fence may fend off terrorists, but it also filters out the farmer with his
chickens, the curious high school students, as well as some of its own. Dr. Willy
Burgdorfer, famous for discovering the bacteria that causes Lyme disease, was granted
emeritus status with the laboratories when he retired in the mid-1980s. Now, Burgdorfer
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must have an escort when he comes to work. Unwilling to work in a place where he can’t
enter “without being accompanied by someone who controls you,” one of the lab’s bestknown scientists refuses to set foot on campus today. Acknowledging that there is work
that should “stay hush,” this soft-spoken scientist worries that the new security measures
send a particular message about the science itself: “If you put police at the entry to the
lab, you are saying that you need police protection to make sure (outsiders) don’t do
things with the equipment. That’s no good. That’s automatically an invitation to do so.”10
Another retired scientist, Dr. John Swanson, now identifies himself as a
“neighbor” of the lab. As a neighbor, Swanson has specific complaints about the
“shrieking” of the laboratory’s incinerator and the loud air handling systems installed to
meet biosafety requirements. Latour’s map conspicuously lacks “waste” as an output
from the laboratory. The work to securely manufacture scientific knowledge results in
byproducts like noise and fumes which easily traverse barriers and travel into the
community. Further, RML’s standing in the community has long been tainted by its
handling of physical waste, including toxic specimens and animal carcasses, recently
culminating in a lawsuit requiring the NIH to pay for the cleanup of a local landfill.11 The
output of waste and pollution puts the laboratory in the center of community relations.
Indeed, Swanson feels that the protest of the IRF was fueled by preexisting concerns over
the noise and the seemingly limitless expansion of the laboratory, and in 2002 unrest
which had simmered for years surfaced in accusations that the laboratory was not
concerned with its impacts upon the Hamilton community.
Recognizing the location of a bioscience laboratory within a community and
documenting the flow of goods surrounding the laboratory helps to elucidate the high
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stakes held by all parties in the contestation of citizen’s biological rights. The work done
within a laboratory matters to a community because the institution draws economic gain
through employment and production of goods, exports waste and pollution as well as
knowledge, and poses some level of risk to the health and well-being of community
members. As laboratory science expands in the 21st century, the question of how citizens
can negotiate these risks in relation to questions of economy and environment will arise
in more and more communities. The bioterror crisis has imbued disease with a new
politics of risk and fear, further confounding such debates. This case study of Rocky
Mountain Laboratories aims to show how the risk of disease has been negotiated in the
public sphere in order to better understand how the fears of the contemporary moment
emerge from the reconfiguration of longstanding cultural understandings of disease.
Accordingly, the study begins by exploring the disease history which led to the erection
of a science laboratory in the Bitterroot Valley, asking how communities form around
shared disease risk. The case explores the transformation of a social program of disease
control into a formal science laboratory for disease study, considering how science
practice changes in response to political ideologies, economic resources, and expanding
knowledge. This provides a basis to study the modern protest of the RML expansion in
depth in order to theorize the notion of a biological community as a group of citizens
united by shared perception of biological risk.
Geography of Disease: Hamilton, Montana
Down the length of a seventy-five-mile valley in Montana runs a river of
mystery…. A hundred years ago Indians believed that the western side of this
river and especially the mountain canyons were inhabited by evil spirits. When
white settlers came they observed that, although dwellers on the east side were
immune, those who built their houses on the west ran the danger of falling victims
to a strange illness.
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It began with chills, an aching head, and painful joints and muscles; then a raging
fever developed, and a red rash flamed out on chest, back, arms and legs. Rocky
Mountain spotted fever was the name that was given to this terrifying and usually
fatal sickness.
--Saturday Evening Post, November 15, 194112

The river that bisects the Bitterroot Valley was once an inexplicable demarcation
of life and death. At the end of the 19th century, a deadly disease emerged in the
population, a disease that seemed to be localized on one side of the river. The mysterious
plague killed four out of five people who contracted the “black measles,” and as people
watched their neighbors succumb to the “mountain fever,” their community was further
divided by fear and suspicion. As one resident said, regarding property on the west side
of the river, “I wouldn’t have it and live on it if they would give it to me—it’s in the
Spotted Fever District.”13 The disease cast a pall over the valley and was identified as
“one of the biggest factors in retarding the growth of this part of the country.”14 The river,
though it was shallow and regularly traversed by humans and animals, seemed to contain
the majority of infection on its western shores, offering a geographical boundary for the
plague. The chilled streams flowing from the western mountains seemed the only
plausible carrier of the fever, until a pathologist in Missoula proved that a pin-sized wood
tick, rising from the earth in the spring in search of a blood feast, was the carrier of the
deadly, microscopic bacterium, Rickettsia rickettsii.
Though early Montana settlers did not know the source of the spotted fever, they
still produced a geographical knowledge of disease. Like modern citizens recognize
malaria or yellow fever as diseases of the tropics (and take certain precautions when
entering those areas), Bitterroot residents ordered their world and modified their behavior

98
according to their understanding of the land as half-diseased, half-secured, with the river
running down the middle. Later work of scientists in the Bitterroot Valley laid new
landscapes atop the old, producing new ways of knowing the disease, its spaces, and its
movements. Still, conventional geographic understandings persisted, influencing both
control measures and public sentiment for several decades.
From such circumstances as existed in the Bitterroot Valley at the turn of the
century emerges the cry for security. Foucault theorizes that shared susceptibility to
disease defines populations in terms of risk and establishes a level of action acceptable by
the governing entity.15 In Montana, the river demarcated a territoriality of the disease
which enabled citizens to feel secure even in the face of the plague. As theorized by
Charles Maier, the bounded geographies of territory “assure a stable sense of
community” by bringing “identity space” into alignment with the “turf that seems to
assure physical, economic, and cultural security.”16 Thus, the very notion of community
is partially predicated upon the belief that being geographically proximate to other
community members will increase social and economic benefits without bringing risks to
physical security. Governance becomes acceptable to keep this relationship in balance.
To make Rocky Mountain spotted fever knowable, the Bitterroot Valley would be
transformed into a laboratory. The state of Montana began sending scientists to the
Bitterroot as early as 1903, and for a decade sent a new specialist each season to study the
problem. Eventually, Dr. Robert A. Cooley set up a semi-permanent laboratory in an
abandoned log cabin on Sweeney Creek, where he and his three assistants studied the life
cycle and habit of the Rocky Mountain wood tick, undressing every two hours for a headto-toe tick inspection to assure their personal security.17 Their research produced
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knowledge of an insect whose eight legs do very little to move it about in the world,
waiting perhaps an entire season to drop from a blade of grass onto a passing mammal for
a blood feast which will feed the next generation of ticks. The movement of the tick on
the landscape follows the movement of its carriers. Wherever a person can walk, a tick
can travel, which means a tick can cross the Bitterroot River or accompany a scientist
home from work.
When a scientist infected with Rocky Mountain spotted fever hopped a train to
Washington, D.C., arriving at the capital just 24 hours before the disease took his life,
national interest in the blight grew, accompanied by increased funding for public health
interventions.18 The employment of a public health response to a disease epidemic shifts
the locus of disease away from territory and onto the population itself. As Foucault
describes, public health interventions do not seek to simply nullify the disease in
individual subjects, but work to minimize disease within the population to serve the
greater public interest.19 The early records of the state’s new Entomology Board show the
employment of a range of traditional public health strategies, such as quarantine and
species extermination, giving way to more innovative land management techniques. Only
after 10 years of tick-control proved unsuccessful in completely eradicating the fever
would the board call for more scientific study of the disease and its transmittal.20
Though public health officials promised to “completely … clean up the entire
Bitter Root (sic) valley,” they often met with opposition from the community, for their
programs asserted state control over land and livestock, the livelihood of Bitterroot
citizens.21 “Dunbar! Dunbar! He done it with a crowbar!” became the rallying cry of
public protestors when John Dunbar was arrested on June 16, 1913, for destroying a
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cattle dipping vat near Stevensville.22 The first arm of the state tick control program was
the “destruction of adult ticks on domestic animals,” accomplished by driving cattle
through an arsenic-laced solution.23 Owners were required to bring their own animals to
the vat, and those who refused to bring their livestock to be dipped had to show they had
handpicked ticks from their animals, or their farms were subject to quarantine, an
authority granted to the Board of Entomology by the Law of 1913. 24 Both dipping and
handpicking required a substantial input of time and labor on the part of the farmer,
perhaps accounting for its unpopularity among locals. While the large, steel vats gave a
visible face to the tick control program and demonstrated the government investment in
community welfare, the death of livestock and eventually two vat workers brought an end
to the mandatory arsenic baths.25
As dipping large mammals became increasingly unpopular, the state concentrated
on killing the tick in the nymph phase through rodent control. For a fee of five to ten
cents per acre, state workers would spread poison on farmers’ land, enticing hungry
ground squirrels when they emerged from hibernation.26 This method, however, failed to
reach the vast expanses of land which harbored the wood tick. In the face of so many
failed methods, the Board concluded that the most effective way to control the tick, and
therefore the disease, was to manage the land itself. If stock could be kept away from
tick-areas in the spring, the spread and survival of the tick might be inhibited. Even in
these early years, however, the Bitterroot community was characterized by part-year
residents, and the absence of these community members was a constant hassle for the
Entomology Board: “At present the persons residing on the agricultural areas … are
bearing the burden of the control work, while those owning the most dangerous land are
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doing nothing except that, by their inaction, they make the work of the residents and of
the State Board more difficult, more long-drawn out and more expensive.”27 Those who
were absent from the community threatened the well-being of the whole through their
inattention to the civic responsibilities for disease control. Despite the acknowledgement
in their reports that the scourge could likely be stopped by land management practices
which would keep livestock out of the mountains during tick season, the Board seemed
unwilling to fight the legal battles that would force cooperation between landowners,
part-year residents, and government agencies like the forest service, favoring instead
visible acts like cattle dipping and poisoning.
The early public health programs in the Bitterroot Valley exemplify how the
security apparatus works as an instrument of governance, responding to a disease crisis
through acts to minimize harm. The health workers in Hamilton could not guarantee a
method to eliminate disease, only to mitigate risk. Significantly, citizens did not yield
responsibility entirely to the state, clinging to simple acts like staying on one side of the
river as expressions of individual autonomy. As one resident explained, “If I believe that
it’s the snow water, I can carry my own well water with me and not worry. If I had to
believe it was ticks, I’d just be scared all the time.”28 Similarly, citizens living in the
contemporary bioterror crisis cling to personal behaviors, however unsubstantiated by
science, as means to build their own security. It is in the moments when people feel like
their biological security is completely outside their control, as residents of Hamilton felt
when the lab announced it would study deadly level-4 pathogens, that citizens begin to
question the authority of the state.
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After five years work in Hamilton, the State Board reported that, “Based on good,
substantial reasons, the residents, both on the farms and in the towns, have a greater
confidence in the future of the valley (and) there is less apprehension concerning the
disease.”29 The work of the public health system appeared to have reduced citizens’ fear.
Through this work, the government also increased its authority over the land and
resources, with most residents accommodating the state efforts as necessary for citizens’
health and the economic prosperity of the region. The scientific work also produced an
understanding of insects as vectors of disease, propagating the perception that citizen’s
health was connect to the control of their environment. The most enduring outcome,
however, would prove to be the presence of the scientists themselves. The work with
spotted fever had brought leading scientific researchers into a place where most people’s
livelihood depended upon the material resources of the land itself. As the fight against
spotted fever faded, the scientists, the workers, and the disease science economy of the
Bitterroot would remain.
A “Suitable” Laboratory
When Dr. Ralph Parker came to the Bitterroot to assist the spotted fever effort, he
shunned Dr. Cooley’s tent-lab and set up in a woodshed behind his house. He began by
preparing the world to be represented in symbols, charts, and diagrams, the preliminary
work in transforming the world into a laboratory.30 As indicated by the acts of the
Entomology Board during the 1910s, early laboratory work centered on understanding
the vector of disease and its habitat. As wildlife biologists might study grizzly bears in
their environment, disease scientists study organisms that, though invisible to the naked
eye, can be known by their marks upon the visible world. Parker mapped the disease
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landscape through a tick census, sweeping large flannel flags along animal trails and then
counting the ticks clinging to the fabric. Back at the woodshed, Parker sorted, tested, and
catalogued the population, using live guinea pigs to identify rickettsia carriers. In this
makeshift laboratory, Parker quantified the occurrence of disease in the landscape; or
following Latour, by running ticks through an inscription device in the laboratory, the
scientist “transform(ed) pieces of matter into written documents.”31
The laboratory also became a place where controlling disease could take a new,
personal formation. While testing the infection rates of ticks in various phases of
development, Parker stumbled upon evidence of immunity. Guinea pigs infected by
juices extracted from ticks carrying Rickettsia ricketsii which had not taken an adult
blood meal did not contract spotted fever; later, these pigs expressed immunity if injected
with infected blood. The existence of the organism in less deadly phases suggested the
possibility of a vaccine. Parker focused his work on the development of a spotted fever
vaccine, turning a field-based control operation into an experimental program involving
test subjects and equipment. Parker’s vaccine work replicated the tick/host interaction in
a setting removed from the site where infections would “naturally” take place. 32
The promise of a vaccine and a particularly deadly spotted fever season in 1921
prompted the U.S. Public Health Service to enlist Parker as a federal employee, allocating
$27,000 and a team of scientists from Washington for vaccine research (field control
work would still fall under Montana state jurisdiction.) With additional funds raised by
the local Chambers of Commerce, Parker’s first task under the new administration was to
find a “suitable” laboratory.33 He settled on an abandoned school building northwest of
Hamilton, cramming the “schoolhouse lab” with collections of ticks and rodents and vials
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of serum. Because vaccine preparation required the handling of infected ticks, grinding
them down with a mortar and pestle into a virulent serum, laboratory workers came into
contact daily with virulent spotted fever. A 100-percent fatality rate among lab workers
who contracted the disease produced a public image of the schoolhouse lab as a
dangerous and unsafe site, full of cracks and crevices where infected ticks could hide.
Despite the limits of the facility, Parker produced a spotted fever vaccine in 1925.
Over the next three years, more than 2,000 individuals in the Bitterroot Valley would
receive the vaccine, demand which challenged workers already dealing with cramped
conditions.34 In 1927, the Montana State legislature appropriated $60,000 “to build and
equip a laboratory for the purpose of conducting experiments and other work for the
control of Rocky Mountain spotted fever and insect-borne diseases.”35 The Board of
Entomology selected 28 acres of land adjacent to the city of Hamilton as the site for a
new laboratory. Significantly, the proposed laboratory would sit on the eastern banks of
the Bitterroot River.36 Rough though they were, the previous three laboratories were
located west of the river, on land already presumed to be tick infested. The new lab
would bring ticks over the river, violating the geographic barrier which protected eastern
residents from the risk of spotted fever. Though scientists had discredited the myth of the
river barrier, the continued fortitude of public perception was displayed in June 1927,
when Hamilton residents filed suit in the 4th District Court, contesting the selection of the
site. The cultural knowledge of disease risk in the Bitterroot Valley which took root long
before scientists mapped a new territory for spotted fever held firm in citizens’ world
view. A space deemed “safe” by the cultural imaginary (the east side of the river) was
threatened by bringing agents of disease (ticks) from outside the community. The
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proposed site located the work of disease scientists within a new community, and the
laboratory now bore the responsibility of proving to that community that the circulations
of people and matter which turn the apparatus would not put citizens at risk.
Laboratories on Trial
In 2004 when the Coalition for a Safe Lab, Friends of the Bitterroot, and
Women’s Voices for the Earth filed a suit in U.S. District Court against the National
Institutes of Health, they were accused of being “against” Rocky Mountain Labs. Called
a fear monger, unpatriotic, leftist, and “unpatriotic leftist fear monger,” Wulff grew tired
of explaining that the lawsuit was filed to demand that an environmental impact
statement be written before proceeding with the building, not to stop the lab altogether.37
Jim Miller, with Friends of the Bitterroot, claims “it was never our intention to stop the
lab. We could have delayed it, but stopping it was never our intention. It was never a
possibility that the lab would not be built.”38 Similarly, in the 1927 suit, the plaintiffs
argued that they were not “complaining of the law for the building of this laboratory...
(for) there has been wonderful work done there for this community.”39 However, both
legal cases were formulated on the idea that Plot 19 in Hamilton, Montana, might not be
the best place for the type of science being done in the labs.
In 1927, scientists went up against citizenry in a court of law to prove that
laboratory work did not threaten the health of those who lived in proximity to the
laboratory, an argument another team of scientists would revive in court some years later.
In both cases, the scientists and their lawyers describe the laboratory as a safe, contained,
and managed space, while citizens consistently view the space in terms of the unknown
and the “what ifs?” In these courtrooms, the varied responsibilities of scientists,
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governments, and individuals in securing the health of the population was delineated,
contested, and sustained. Examining the arguments presented in two courtrooms nearly a
century apart gives insight into the deeply instilled values which emerge in the formation
of a biological community. The narratives developed in these legal battles also show how
citizens articulate their biological rights in terms of the state responsibility to mitigate
risk and provide biosecurity.
One of many venues for the negotiation of biological rights, judicial systems
provide means for citizens to seek redress for biological injury. Petryna’s investigation of
how Chernobyl victims petitioned for social welfare through the legal systems shows
how these systems in turn established categories of citizenship and mechanisms for
creating a “stark order of social and economic exclusion.”40 In Hamilton, however,
citizens did not seek redress for injury but sought to deter future injury. The litigation
demanded specific government action in the present moment which would enable citizens
to endure the biological risks of everyday living. Contemporary living brings countless
unspecifiable biological risks with which humans must come to terms. As Petryna writes,
“daily life is characterized by overwhelming uncertainty and unknowability. It is in this
social, scientific, and legal arena that defining and acquiring a biological citizenship takes
on central interest.”41 The legal cases against Rocky Mountain Laboratories exemplify
how citizens use this arena to establish the parameters of risk and the expectations of
government in assuring biological security.
One notable difference between the 1927 and 2004 lawsuits is that the threat of
Rocky Mountain spotted fever used to rationalize the 1927 expansion was intimate and
local, while the expansion in the 21st century was designed to deal with organisms that,
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by definition, are not localized. Though both eras were characterized by some popular
concern over disease threats, the first expansion of RML brought microbes from across
the river, while the BSL4 laboratory brings microbes that would otherwise only enter the
area through deliberate biological attack. Still, both lawsuits were settled at the most local
level, by directing how the laboratory space would be managed for the security of local
citizens, a notable material outcome showing the sway of the community in regulating the
circulations of laboratory space.
Testimonies of Risk
“(T)he building of a laboratory is a violation of the rights of citizens without due
process of law,” stated the plaintiffs in their opening statement on July 27, 1927, arguing
that an act by the legislature is illegal if it interferes with individual rights to safety,
health, and happiness in a clean and healthful environment.42 In its deliberations the court
would weigh these rights claimed by citizens who lived near the laboratory against the
rights of a broader group of citizens to have better health through the study of disease. In
respect to the laboratory, the court had authority to define the place as either a threat to
citizens or a contained space in which threats might exist internally but did not pose an
external threat great enough to violate human rights. The case hinged on the connection
of fear to “fact” and the jurisdiction of the court. As the defendants suggested, “it is
hardly within the province of a court of equity to enjoin the operation of a laboratory the
work of which constitutes an obviously innocent and harmless purpose.”43
The plaintiffs faced the challenge of claiming biological rights in the case of an
unknown, unpredictable entity like disease. Testimonies ranged from heartfelt pleas on
behalf of innocent children and chilling accounts of deadly laboratory accidents to
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commendations of scientists saving lives and descriptions of “tick-proof” facilities. Both
sides struggled with the task of transforming fear into a measurable entity, to bring it into
the realm of intervention. In the courtroom, through personal testimony and witness
accounts, the notion of fear attains potency unavailable in discussions with scientists.
While scientific discourses can quantify the risk in fractions of a percent, thereby
equating “minimal risk” with “no risk,” some members of the public translate that
fraction of a percent into cause for fear. In the court transcript, their sentiments are
weighted alongside the numbers and figures, showing how fear of future injury factors
into citizenship claims.
When he took the witness stand in 1927, Dr. G.A. Gordon was identified as a
physician who had practiced in Hamilton for 18 years and as a resident living a block and
a half from the proposed laboratory site. Though Dr. Gordon mentioned his experience
treating spotted fever cases, the majority of his testimony was directed at establishing a
communal fear of the new laboratory. In direct examination, the lawyer for the plaintiff
prodded, “What do you say of the attitude and the talk of the people in that community,
the twenty or thirty families with reference to their feelings regarding this institution?”
Gordon responds:
Well, the general impression of the people of that vicinity is one of fear; fear of
the presence of the laboratory; fear of its being built there. We have a laboratory
on the west side and they know how it is conducted, and the general impression
on even that community, where it is, and even myself is one of disgust. And the
people of this community, where they are proposing to erect this building, they
can’t understand why anybody or any body of men would want us, would ask us,
to have it near us. Even though there were no danger from contamination; even
though the grounds and building were conducted as it should be. Yet in the minds
of everybody in that neighborhood there is fear to such an extent that they do not
consider they can live in ease and peace of mind with a laboratory of that kind in
the vicinity.44
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In re-direct examination, Gordon lists by name individuals he has spoken with who have
expressed fear, and in cross-examination, the attorney presents a list of other community
members, exchanges aimed to draw boundaries around fear, connecting fear to proximity
to the laboratory and communication with like-minded people. They also put on the court
record names of individuals who possessed this fear and whose fear was an indicator that
they had been wronged. Is fearlessness a human right, a state-of-being that should be
protected by the court?
The defense worked to undermine the peoples’ fears by showing them to be
unjustified or unavoidable. In one cross-examination, the defense lawyer referred to the
folk wisdom of the disease carried in the snowmelt, asking the witness if he thought those
rumors were groundless:
A. I would say so.
Q. You don’t think that drinking the water causes Rocky Mountain spotted fever?
A. I would hardly think so.
Q. You have heard people say that is the case though? A. I have heard it, yes.
Q. That did not make you afraid, did it? A. Well, not exactly.
Q. Mr. Hagens, don’t you exercise your own judgment when you hear rumors
about the water of the Bitter Root river? A. I certainly would.
Q. Would not you exercise the same judgment with reference to these rumors with
reference to possible danger from the tick laboratory?
A. The dangerous element there is so much more dangerous than the drinking of
the Bitter Root River water.…
Q. You would be afraid of rumors no matter whether they were groundless or
not—rumors from the tick laboratory? A. About the ticks, I certainly am afraid.
Q. I am trying to find out now, whether this is your judgment or just being afraid.
A. I would worry a great deal over such rumors as to whether they were true or
not….
Q. If you found out that this was a cement building, tick proof, rodent proof and
vermin proof, that would allay your fear to a considerable extent, would it not?
A. Well, somewhat. Not very much.
Q. You would still worry about the rumors, even though you found they were
groundless? A. Anything as dangerous as that, I surely would.45
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While claiming the right to rely on his own assessment of danger, Hagens establishes a
hierarchy in which his evaluation of the risk creates a special case and truthfulness is less
important when the risk is high enough. Not only that, but such claims establish fear as an
inexplicable entity, predicated upon subjective assessments of the environment. If
knowledge is the antidote to fear, but no knowledge is strong enough to overcome the
fear, no action can be taken to eliminate fear:
Q. I understand you to say Mr. Hagens that no matter what you might learn from
authorative (sic) sources about the precautions that will be taken to serve the
public health in connection with the operation of this laboratory, you would still
be afraid, you would still have the same fear?
A. Yes, I would.
Q. That is all.46
The defense rests—and throws up its hands at the impossibility of countering such an
argument: “it is not humanly possible to answer the person who says he is afraid and
cannot give a reason for his fear.”47 Fear must be quantified, rationalized in order to be
argued against, and yet the fear was real enough to citizens that they took their arguments
to court to fight for the right to live without fear.
While the plaintiffs brought to court a case for fear, the defense used the
courtroom to build a case for science. They sought to discredit the citizens’ claims as
ungrounded and unscientific, while proving that the proposed laboratory posed no
quantifiable risk to nearby residents. When Dr. George McGrath expressed that the west
side of the river is commonly regarded as the infected area, the examiner launched into a
discussion which did not discredit the myth as much as the local physician’s authority to
speak on the matter:
Q. (D)oes the Bitter Root River stop the transmission of spotted fever—the
virulent ticks—from one side of the Valley to the other?
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A. I can only tell you what has been in the past. Our spotted fever has been on the
west side entirely, to my knowledge, except these two cases. But as for that the
tick is a, that the bridge is a barrier, that a tick cannot be carried across there, I
cannot say that.
Q. Have you made any study to determine whether ticks may migrate from one
point to another? A. I should say not.
Q. You have no idea of what the carriers of the tick are? A. Except what I have
read about them. I have never seen a tick on a rodent in my life….
Q. Have you made any research or study along the general line of tick carriers and
what causes them to get from one point to another? A. No.
Q. Then, of course, you would not know the means by which an infected tick
might be introduced from the west side of the Valley to the east side?48
Seeing, studying, and researching are the path to knowing, and Dr. McGrath’s
secondhand reading on the subject is given less credibility because he has not handled the
rodents who carry the ticks, unlike the scientists who had conducted the study to
document this movement firsthand.49
Next, the plaintiffs paraded a handful of janitors and caretakers across the witness
stand to testify to the numerous accidents and incidents at the schoolhouse lab,
challenging the security of the laboratory space and positioning the materiality of the
building as a biological threat. An animal handler told of a goat that escaped its pen and a
porcupine that climbed through the roof. Others remembered broken bottles and ticksacks with gaping holes in the bottom, or scientists scrambling about the yard with white
cloths, attempting to flag the ticks that had escaped the laboratory. A janitor told how his
son had contracted spotted fever while visiting his father at work, a custodial job which
included inoculating guinea pigs when the lab was short of staff. These testimonies
painted a picture of the scientists running a haphazard operation, unable to control the
larger animals, let alone the ticks, and exploiting untrained personnel to do deadly work.
Janitors and caretakers were portrayed mopping up messes left by careless scientists,
common citizens acting as “the sole protector of the community.”50
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The defendants contended that scientists were not to blame for these incidents, but
the laboratory space itself. They proposed that a new, tick-proof, fire-proof, rodent-proof
laboratory would eliminate these risks, a promise met with skepticism by the residents:
Q. If this laboratory is properly constructed, and according to the best scientific
knowledge of the day, and if it is operated according to the best knowledge for the
protection of laboratory workers, you do not think there is a real danger of
infection being carried.
A. There is a danger. Why would it be any different where they are working now,
and where they will work. (sic)
Q. You think that the new laboratory cannot be so constructed as to minimize the
danger that may exist from the operation of the present laboratory.
A. Well, it may minimize the danger, but it will not exclude any possibility. You
will have a case of spotted fever out there, then you will wake up to what we are
saying. 51
The question of where biolaboratories are secured lies at the heart of this debate. Can
space be managed in a way to completely compensate for human error? More precisely,
can physical security eliminate fear, if that fear comes from the belief that humans make
mistakes? In this case, witnesses described fear based upon on the fallibility of the
scientists, not the quality of the building. Thus, in exchanges like the one above, spatial
modifications are given as the solution for a problem understood to be in the humanity of
the workers—a square peg in a round hole. The implication is that secure spaces are the
best way to compensate for human error, but the task remains of convincing fearful
citizens that a problem perceived to be located in human “nature” can be solved without
changing that human.
The director of Rocky Mountain Laboratories in 2008 recognizes that he has to
tackle the question of human error head-on. In describing the layers of security features
of the BSL4 laboratory, Dr. Marshall Bloom explains that administrative oversight,
trainings, and standard operating procedures become more stringent as the need for safety
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increases, and employees risk losing clearance to work if protocols are ignored. Thus, the
modern biosafety laboratory regulates its human scientists by categorizing behaviors,
writing detailed prescriptions for safe behavior, and punishing behavior considered
unsafe.52 While citizens in 1927 were primarily concerned with the risk of internal human
error, the terrorist attacks of the 21st century further confound these concerns: what
security breaches might be possible with human intent to inflict harm? Even if the
laboratory could guarantee it had designed a space and established protocols that would
compensate for all possibilities of human error, could it guarantee that the laboratory was
secured against external breaches such as a plane crashing into the building or a truck
plowing through the gate? RML’s multi-volume binder of SOPs shows that the human
causes of risk are being managed in detail, an administrative plan monumentally longer
than the six words scrawled on a sign above the old schoolhouse lab warning visitors and
employees to “Enter here at your own risk.”
After three days of testimony, Gordon, Hagens, and the other plaintiffs failed to
convince the judge that the laboratory was infringing upon their rights, and the judge
dismissed the case, saddling the plaintiffs with all legal costs. The presumption that
knowing “fact” should eliminate fear was reiterated in the “Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law” submitted by the judge, and the anecdotal evidence presented by the
plaintiffs diminished beneath the argument that a better facility could contain insects with
limited mobility.53 Notably, throughout the hearing, the lawyer for the defense sought to
discredit the authority of the plaintiffs’ witnesses, who were primarily citizens of
Hamilton residing near the lab site, questioning the purview of a doctor to address
anything outside of his medical practice, or a resident to claim any knowledge of property
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values. The citizenry were presumed ignorant, and their means of producing knowledge
rudimentary when compared to the scientists’.
Three outcomes of this court case come to bear in the future case at RML as well
as broader discussions of how citizens can navigate the legal system to advocate for
biological rights. First, the defense convinced the judge not to interpose in a case where
the plaintiffs were “seeking to enjoin through the imaginary future condition.”54 Persons
advocating for protection against anticipated biological harm must convince courts that
the existent risk of future biological harm warrants directives in the present moment.
Second, the outcomes of the 1927 case clarified the court’s jurisdiction over the
laboratory space, affirming the authority of the judicial branch in regulating the
laboratory on behalf of the community. Finally, the 1927 judge used a relative assessment
of danger on the barometer of tick-related harm, comparing the risk posed by the
laboratory to the existing environmental risk of living in Hamilton. In this court, the right
to health did not include the right to not be exposed to diseases one could “naturally” pick
up walking down the street, a danger which “cannot be eradicated by any known
means.”55 By living near an area where Rocky Mountain spotted fever occurred naturally,
and by interacting with community members who entered that area, the citizens had
already relinquished their rights to live without the disease. Indeed, because the tick in
the lab was in a structurally-controlled space, the laboratory space actually minimized the
danger. This localized scientific agenda at RML would change radically over the next
few decades, and by 2002, when it was announced that BSL4 agents would be brought to
the laboratory, RML was studying dozens of diseases that could not be found in the
Bitterroot Valley. By definition, BSL4 pathogens do not occur locally, meaning that the
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2004 court case was predicated upon a different understanding of risk in which pathogens
were brought into proximity with citizens who could not contract those diseases from
their local environment
In 1927, the work of the laboratory was aimed solely at researching and treating
an illnesses which was dramatically affecting the local population, work identified by the
defense as an “obviously innocent and harmless purpose” which promised benefits to
both scientists and community members. 56 Within the next generation, the work of
scientists would expand as the laboratory attempted to stay afloat in the field of emerging
infectious diseases. In a statement which would come to be ironic, the defense lawyer
proclaimed that the work at RML was far safer than the work in other biolabs which
“handle organisms too small to be seen by the human eye…. (T)here is far greater danger
from the handling of these than from the handling of an insect that can be seen by the
human eye.”57 By World War II, RML would be involved in typhus and yellow fever
research, diseases which were far less of a local threat, indicating that RML was entering
a global field of disease science. Ironically, with the expansion of the laboratory, its
“obviously innocent and harmless purpose” would also fall under scrutiny as citizens had
to remake the value of the laboratory in their lives in order to rationalize the risk of living
near these foreign pathogens.
Building a Disease Economy in the Bitterroot
International interest in insect-borne diseases and a steady supply of national
funding brought more and more scientists to the laboratory, which in 1941 employed 97
people.58 These scientists came for work, bringing their families and settling into long
careers laboring in the Bitterroot Valley. At the same time, citizens of Hamilton were
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culturally and economically integrating the laboratory into their community. Maurine
Hughes remembers her brother raising guinea pigs in cages behind their shed, which he
would sell to the laboratory to make money to support the family. When an egg-based
vaccine replaced the tissue-based spotted fever vaccine, the guinea pig-economy evolved
into an egg-exchange between locals and the laboratory. Partially due to its isolated
location, Rocky Mountain Laboratory relied upon local production for most of its
supplies. RML employed animal handlers, machinists, woodworkers, glassworkers,
clerks, janitors, and a cartoonist, most of them born in the Bitterroot and trained to do
their specific job well. Dr. Bill Hadlow remembers putting his head together with
machinist Frank Tolman to develop a jig to inoculate minks, a tool not available on the
market. Though they were not a diagnostic lab, scientists developed connections in the
community and when a farmer thought her chickens might have TB or a forest ranger
found a bighorn sheep that met a peculiar death, Hadlow would come into work to find a
sheep skull on his worktable or a dead chicken strung over the back of a chair. 59
Dr. Willy Burgdorfer contends that these connections between laboratories and
their communities are critical for “good science.” “When you hear of an infection, you
can’t just drive your car into an area and solve the problem. You have to establish a
contact. You’ll learn more about the area by contact with a farmer than with a scientist.”
The Swiss-born scientist, once president of the local bowling association, worries that
today’s scientists come to Hamilton to work in the labs, but not to be a part of the
community. As we converse in a booth at the Coffee Cup diner, folks wave hello or pause
to chat as they pass by, inquiring after health and family and life during retirement.
Burgdorfer laughs at the memory of friends coming to him for advice regarding every
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headache, sneeze, and fever: “I would tell them, ‘I am not a physician, so I will give you
a layman’s diagnosis: it is the end of tick season, we had a lot of Colorado tick fever this
year; it is not Rocky Mountain spotted fever, so it must be viral. You will recover by
yourself.’” Residents of Hamilton clearly know RML through their personal
acquaintances with the scientists who form their community, who carry their expertise
beyond the walls of the lab and embody science practice during the interactions of daily
life.
Drs. Burgdorfer and Hadlow, now both in their 90s, have been meeting for coffee
every Thursday for almost 50 years. Both renowned scientists, Dr. Burgdorfer for his
discovery of the pathogen which causes Lyme disease, Borrelia burgdorferi, and Dr.
Hadlow as one of the leading scholars on prions and “mad cow disease,” these softspoken gentlemen describe a RML as a communal workplace, recalling their colleagues
and technicians by name, and fondly reliving the comedy and lore of the laboratory
through tales of escaped lab rats and near-misses while working with a smorgasbord of
infectious diseases. Humbly demurring to talk about their own accomplishments, they
talk about their era of science as a time of asking questions, following threads, and
formulating new problems—work they worry may be disappearing in an era of electron
microscopes and scientists who are trained to do, not ask. Their narratives describe a
laboratory situated at the cultural heart of the Bitterroot Valley, as much as it formed the
economic center of the community faced with limited natural resources. In order to
understand the high stakes of a debate concerning the risk and value of RML to the
Hamilton community, it is useful to return again to an examination of the flows into and
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out of the laboratory that anchor it within a community, as well as the economic value of
the bioscience industry in the 21st century.
“After the 1920s, there was no reason for the labs to be here,” says Dr. Swanson.
By the end of that decade, the spotted fever disease did not threaten the community as it
had previously, but a small economy had been built around disease control. Members of
the community earned a living running dipping vats, flagging for ticks, or caring for
animals at the laboratory. When the federal government expanded RML, the construction
of new buildings drew close to a million dollars into the community in the 1930s.60
Expansion brought new jobs, for every scientist who came from outside needed a support
team of technicians and caretakers, most of whom were hired locally. The community
which had once depended upon the laboratory work for biological survival now relied
upon it to sustain the economy. City planners continue to see the economic prosperity of
the community as entwined with the success of the labs, a position that brought the local
government into the heart of the expansion debates of the past several years. The
following discussion aims to show the materiality of the circulations of capital which
sustain Rocky Mountain Laboratories, and how they are animated by complex
interactions between the modes of production, cultural ideologies, and government
apparatuses, as well as the land of the Bitterroot itself.
Hamilton resident Jani Meuchel’s grandparents were on a cross-country road trip
when their car broke down in Montana’s Bitterroot Valley. The family never left. Her
grandfather dabbled in most of the local industries, lending a hand to the local dairy, the
sugar beet farm, and “Copper King” Marcus Daly’s stock farm. “Daly logged the lower
half of the mountains to run the smelter at his copper mine (the Anaconda Mine near
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Butte, Montana),” Meuchel explains. “He liked it here, so he stayed.”61 These last seven
words reverberate through the stories of most Bitterroot residents, who seem not
unhappily entrapped in this long, narrow valley. Driving around her father’s cattle ranch,
Meuchel points to a two-story house with white siding set back from the gravel road.
“Selling that land paid for a new tractor,” she explains. Next comes a lot sold when the
ranch had a bad year, and then a lot that bought a new truck, both now summer homes for
families Meuchel has never met. The land is her father’s insurance policy, savings
account, and retirement plan. When times get tough, he’ll carve out another half-acre to
sell to a California businessman looking for a place to dock a fishing boat. More and
more, Bitterroot landowners stake their economic futures on the tourist economy, leading
to bitter zoning disputes throughout the valley. Conflict with environmental groups and
the US Forest Service have slowed timber extraction in the mountains, forcing the closure
of all but one of the Darby mills. As in many rural communities across the nation, a
diminishing resource economy has driven towns to seek out industries which might be
sustained without timber or minerals or oil. In Hamilton, the preexistence of RML along
with the generally expansive bioscience industry has led the community to stake its
economic future in disease science.
The bioscience industry has an attractive profile to communities courting
economic growth. Not a smokestack industry, biotechnology brings high-paying jobs
which “elevate” employees’ skills and appears environmentally clean. A 2002 economic
needs assessment of the Bitterroot Valley highlighted the tremendous growth of the
county along with the low per capita income and high poverty rate, urging the county to
focus on assets it already had, such as RML, while maintaining the “high quality natural
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environment and setting in the Bitterroot Valley (as) one of the area’s key economic
advantages.”62 In June 2008, the Ravalli County Economic Development Authority
announced plans to build a $1.6 million small-business “incubator” in Hamilton,
designed to “grow” and “nurture” community-oriented businesses in the Bitterroot
Valley.63 Blueprints for the Ravalli Entrepreneurship Center (REC) envision eighteen
laboratories space, encircling a courtyard with tables and benches to encourage meeting
and intermingling, networking the local scientists into a community in addition to
providing space to run experiments. While modern imaginings of the “scientific
community” are increasingly free from the bounds of time and space due to email,
FedEx, and videoconferencing, this arrangement of space emphasizes the advantages of
living and working in a place near other scientists where ideas can be swapped and
resources can be combined.
The proposal contains elaborate promises of future economic gain, suggesting that
35 companies will be “graduated” from the facility in the first ten years, and that 30 of
those will set up permanently in the county. If each of these companies builds its own
1500-square-foot facility, they will invest another $10 million into the community, a
substantial return on the initial investment in the REC. The modern age of bioscience is
characterized by such belief in limitless opportunities for economic expansion through
the study of ever-smaller forms of life, and the growth of the national security complex
has similarly brought economic change to communities once sustained by resource
extraction. (Another example is the establishment of terrorism training facilities, explored
in detail in Chapter 5.) These new economies directly inform the citizenship claims
available to community members.
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Through the REC, Ravalli County is investing in a future in which growing the
bioscience economy is presumed to bring prosperity without cutting down the forests or
polluting the clear skies that drew people to the Bitterroot to begin with. Julie Foster,
head of the REC project, is quick to point out that this type of development possible only
through the presence of Rocky Mountain Laboratories, which provides a base of human
capital.64 Most rural communities would not be able to attract scientists to work on their
own in a community that was not attuned to their work and research. Hamilton, however,
already boasts one successful offshoot of the RML industry, a glassy, prefab factory on
the north edge of town, site of GSK Biologicals. In 1981 four scientists left RML to seek
their fortune in the private sector, converting three chicken coops into a vaccine
laboratory specializing in immune stimulators or adjuvants. Edgar Ribi’s ImmunoChem
Research, Inc., was bought by the pharmaceutical giant in 2005, and two subsequent
expansions have grown 300 jobs and brought a $3 million increase in tax base to the
county65
Kent Meyers, director of Adjuvant Development, claims that RML doesn’t have
the career growth offered by GSK, whose business model allows entry-level employees
to develop skills that will allow them to advance within the company. To community
planners, GSK exemplifies what they hope will happen with the new bioscience center:
postdocs will come to RML and, during their tenure, fall in love with the Bitterroot
Valley. When their short-term appointment is up, instead of leaving the valley, they will
choose to stay, using the REC space to nurture their research ideas and develop business
acumen. Ideally, like Edgar Ribi, they will come up with a highly successful product,
expanding their company and bringing even more jobs and money to the community.
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From this perspective, one of the valued exports from Rocky Mountain Laboratory is its
temporary employees, scientists who work in the laboratories for a few years but have
limited prospects for long-term employment there. Unlike larger urban areas, where
scientists could move from lab to lab without relocating, Hamilton has but one major
laboratory. Thus, self-employment is the only alternative for bioscientists outside of
RML or GSK.66 City planners believe that the draw of the location is strong enough to
pull scientists away from the government research machine and transform them into Ribilike entrepreneurs. Where decades ago one might have said that Hamilton needed
scientists to save lives, city planners now say that the community needs RML to save its
quality of life.
Interestingly, the REC building plan did not receive the public outcry that rippled
when RML announced expansion, though both buildings will similarly bring jobs into the
community and will taxing the city’s water and power resources. Certainly the risk
factors are unequal because REC will not contain BSL4 pathogens, but it is also a locallyengineered plan, which does not have the air of national government acting without the
input of Hamilton residents. RCEDA developed the plan after researching the economic
patterns of the county, taking into account values expressed by people residing in the area
and giving them a sense of agency in planning for their futures. Where the RML project
led citizens to believe their opinions were not heard, let alone valued, this project
emerged from a bottom-up approach to assessing what the community needed and how
city planners could meet citizens’ needs.
While many sustain the idea that through the new biosciences “life is productive
of economic value,” the question of who can access that value remains a bit more
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obscure.67 Studies of the science complex ask who benefits and who participates in the
bioscience industry, showing that the industry has largely been driven by government
funding and medical or pharmaceutical corporations.68 The economy of Hamilton shows
that populations also stand to benefit from the capitalization of life. Communities are
placing hope for economic survival in economies built around bioscience work, and in
Montana’s fastest-growing county with its lowest per-capita income and diminishing
material resources, few citizens seemed to question the sustainability or the limitations of
such an investment, imagining instead an endless line of Edgar Ribis who need little
more than a chicken coop to start a million-dollar enterprise. Rose and Novas call this the
“economy of hope,” made possible as all “aspects of life … become subjects of
deliberation and decision,” fueling an industry which thrives on the production of
healthier futures.69 Rajan adopts the term “Biocapital” to elucidate the ways in which the
life sciences operate by the systems of exchange and circulations of capitalism, at the
same time as modern forms of capitalism have taken on explicitly biopolitical aspects.70
In addressing the question of how biocapital changes the materiality and value of
life through its commodification, Rajan proposes that entirely new forms of capital
emerge alongside the new biology, leading to the question of how capitalism looks when
viewed from the vantage point of the biological. Here, I contend that the life science
laboratory sits at the center of a dynamic modern economy, its circulations part of
broader capitalist structures and its materiality part of a contiguous geographic
community—and vice versa. In conceptualizing the modern laboratory and its value and
risks, one cannot ignore these circulations which ascribe meaning to the space and form
the basis of communal claims to biological citizenship.
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Once, a plague had to be lifted to lure people to Hamilton; now, jobs must be
found to support the people who come eagerly to reside there, despite the tick-infested
woods. Today, bioscience labs represent jobs with health benefits, jobs that don’t smog
up the air, and jobs that might bring college-educated children back home to the
Bitterroot. That hope is perhaps as significant to Bitterroot residents today as the promise
of a spotted fever cure was three generations ago.
Spotted fever may no longer be a death sentence in the Bitterroot Valley, but
deliberate decisions on the part of local and federal governments have brought diseases
into the region in ways incomprehensible a century ago. While supporters laud the clean
technology, global interest, and high pay of bioscience industry, some citizens see risk in
acts of science which threaten their bodies. Bioterrorist attack is but one threat of the new
biology; the expansion of the life science industry in response to perceived biological
threats brings other risks to citizens, including the importation of foreign microbes into
domestic science laboratories. How will citizens negotiate this risk in the midst of the
many fears brought by the contemporary security state? The continuation of the bioterror
crisis will keep this question at the forefront of the public imagination, demanding serious
consideration of the mechanisms of science and care in the age of genomic biology. In
this chapter, I have attempted to show how Rocky Mountain Laboratories attained its
vital place in the cultural identity of Hamilton residents, while repeatedly challenging
them to evaluate the risks posed by disease and disease science as it pertained to their
own biosecurity. Further, I contend that the laboratory is at the center of the political
economy of the Bitterroot Valley, offering a hopeful as well as a fearful future to
residents. These values are inscribed through the circulations of information, goods, and
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people through the laboratory space. In the section which follows, I particularly examine
the political contestation over the expansion of the Rocky Mountain Laboratories from
2002 to 2008, asking how the material space of the laboratory is ascribed with fear and
risk through the legal and scientific negotiations of biological citizenship.
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Part Two: Building a Biolab for the 21st Century

One side would say that that the probability of something happening is
0.0000037. From a scientific view, that’s bombproof. But on the other side, the
emotional side, that number is a measurable thing, something that could happen.
The argument raged because neither side could hear each other talking.
--Russ Lawrence, Hamilton resident1
For much of the first decade of the 21st century, public discourse in Hamilton,
Montana, hummed with quantifications, articulations, speculations, and imaginations of
biological risk. As local bookstore owner Russ Lawrence remembers, people found polar
meanings within the same calculations, displaying the wide-ranging values which
sustained their unique understandings of security. While some focused on probability,
others pondered possibility. Collectively, the community was unwilling to leave any
aspect of their future open to chance, whether they were quantifying every unknown or
envisioning every worst-case scenario. In their refusal to accept any measured or
imagined threat, these modern subjects rendered risk incalculable. In such circumstances,
proposes Sheila Jasanoff, risk can no longer be managed but must be governed. Because
governance garners power through the aggregation of preference, experience, and beliefs
which reside beyond the calculation of science, it makes room for imaginations and
hypotheticals to enter discussions of risk.2 By acknowledging the limits of expertise, risk
governance might be better able to incorporate past experiences and perspectives of the
public than a management strategy entrenched in probabilities.
To be effective, this strategy for mitigating risk demands continuous collaboration
with the authorizing public while maintaining a foundation of trust and transparency.
Jasanoff contends that if done well, policing risk through systems of governance will
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build a resilient population as well as “political environments in which risk morphs into
reality,” offering more hopeful futures to engaged citizens.3 Witnessing the events
surrounding the Rocky Mountain Laboratories expansion, however, exposes a less
optimistic picture of governance, in which citizen efforts to participate in discussions of
risk were initially ignored and then repeatedly undermined in the face of a technocratic
system determined to calculate risk. Citizens’ cravings for transparency could not be
satiated by the governing entities; confounded communications led to confusion and
anger in a debate that raged for five years. Though the governance of risk may not have
produced subjects empowered in producing their own biological futures, these years of
negotiations elucidated the need to rethink how biological risks can be governed in an age
of ever-increasing genomic possibilities.
In this chapter I consider how citizens come to know risk in an era of bioterrorism
and emerging infectious disease, and how scientists and nonscientists converse about the
proximate threat of microbes as well as the responsibility of governments to secure
citizens’ bodies. What strategies were employed by residents of Hamilton to advocate for
their individual and collective health in opposition to the expansive security apparatuses
of the 21st century? How did the National Institutes of Health (NIH) work to convince
citizens that the laboratory could “contain” the risk of pathogens? The protest of the
laboratory expansion at Rocky Mountain Laboratories shows how people use public
institutions to negotiate the risk of disease, and in so doing surrender some control of
their own biological futures. The public debates in Hamilton exemplify how systems of
government, such as Environmental Impact Statements and court hearings, assume the
responsibility for delineating the value of individual and collective lives, as well as the
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terms of biological risk—what is possible within the bioterror crisis and what is not.
Finally, this section will consider how the bioterror crisis has created biological
communities around shared perceptions of health risk, a peculiar form of biosociality
predicated upon the calculation of a future state of being. Contemporary forms of
biological citizenship are both individualizing and collectivizing, and the crisis in
Montana shows that even when united in a biosocial group, people struggle to articulate
their personal and collective experiences of biological risk in ways that attain potency in
the larger public discourse so dominated by the growing national security complex.
Paul Rabinow calls the situation in which the genomic biology brings about new
social orderings “biosociality.”4 He proposes that as people discover new “truths” about
their bodies, they will form groups and identities around these genetic understandings of
themselves. These biosocial groupings have outcomes in producing subjects whose
corporeal experiences substantially inform their ways of living in the world. Certainly
biology has long played an important role in identity formation, but in this biosocial
world alliances formed around biological identities will engage in collective practices
that remake the world along the lines of biology. More than just shared experiences, the
regrouping of society through biosociality raises new questions for democracy,
accompanied by new spaces and mechanisms to contest the biological politic.5 Adriana
Petryna proposes that these alliances will bring health into the political and economic
domain, placing individual biology at the center of citizenship.6 As people engage with
each other on the basis of biology, life “is embedded throughout the social fabric at the
micro-level by a variety of biopolitical practices and discourses.”7
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Scholarly study of these biosocial groupings seeks to uncover how the new
molecular understandings of the self enable people to align themselves culturally to bring
about some outcome, whether it be access to AIDS treatment, the formation of support
groups with sympathetic sufferers, or attaining redress for health injury.8 Such studies of
biological citizenship have largely considered biology in the form of an inscribed genetic
code, an environmental harm, a medical condition, or some particular biological state of
being which subjects have in common. In biological collectives brought about under
bioterrorism, the subjects in alliance may not necessarily share a common biological
identity in the present moment. In other words, their shared identity is not based upon
common understandings of their bodies as they are now, but upon shared perceptions of
how they might be in the future, a risk that not only comes from outside the body, but
from outside the present. Biosociality in the age of bioterrorism involves the production
and consumption of information in the present moment to bring about shared ways of
knowing biological threats, and then collective ways of acting on behalf of those threats.
As the ability to see life on the molecular level changes the ways people know
their own bodies, it changes the ways people know threats to their bodies. In the
biosociality of bioterrorism, these claims to biological rights are being made by
individuals with “healthy” bodies who perceive health risk because of scientific and
political practice. Further, because few individuals have experienced bioterrorism events
firsthand, the perception of risk does not emerge from people’s environmental present or
experiential past, but is constructed through social behaviors. As a form of biosociality,
bioterrorism preparedness groups together people of different biological pasts, with no
particular biological similarity, in order to advocate for a shared biological future.
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Finally, when dealing with biopreparedness, not only do pain and suffering
become rationalized, but the potential for pain and suffering is rationalized such that
value can be ascribed and utilized even though an event has not actually taken place. The
controversy surrounding Rocky Mountain Laboratories following the announcement of
the expansion shows how citizens attempted to rationalize the risk of a BSL4 laboratory,
using a variety of political instruments, from Environmental Impact Statements to town
hall meetings. The alliances formed during this controversy brought a new type of
biosociality to Hamilton, institutionalizing conceptions of science and risk long
associated with the laboratory and rethinking the situation of the laboratory within a post9/11 world. In the end, however, the biosocial alliance of citizens proved unable to
establish its claims to common biological risk in the face of powerful discourses
produced by the science establishment. This picture is less optimistic than Rose’s politics
of hope, for the biosocial movement also remakes citizens in the eyes of authorities, and
in Hamilton the claims of future harm faded beneath the high value ascribed to the
science industry locally and within the massive national security complex. A close read
of the scientific, legal, and social criteria of citizenship presented by this community
activism reveals the struggles of citizens negotiating a new world of unspecified
biological risks.
Montana, Biocitizens Unite!
Now little bitty Hamilton—little picturesque Hamilton, the Bitterroot Valley—is
facing a nightmare they have never seen before. How do you contain a nightmare?
It is impossible. Foolish men have throughout time stated that it is possible to
contain, it is possible to keep ships from sinking, and every time they are proven
wrong. Ships do sink. And biosafety hazard level four containment areas do get
breached. It happens. And that’s just, that’s just too much for this little
community. It’s too much.
--Matthew Lemax
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If there are risks I want to hear about them—in detail. If there are alternatives, I
want to hear about them—in detail. I want to be able to make an intelligent
decision in my own heart about this lab, because I know you all do wonderful
work over there. But I don’t believe that we’ve been treated as the intelligent
people that we are in this community. And I don’t like being condescended to. I
don’t like snide comments back on my comments. I made a comment in another
meeting, ‘Is this a done deal? Should we just all go home? Is it already a done
deal?’ And I was told I hadn’t been listening. I have been listening. I have been
paying attention. But we’re not getting answers. And I will go back to my very
first comment, the very first meeting that I went to. I can tell you one thing:
People back in Washington, D.C., in Bethesda, Maryland, do not give a damn
about people in Hamilton, Montana. There are only a few of us, but they don’t
care about us. And I tell you, you’re naïve if you believe that they care about you.
They don’t. So, my question, Marshall: Is this a done deal?
--Joan Perry
--Comments made at the first public hearing for the
Draft Environmental Impact Statement, June 2003
How do you measure the impact of a laboratory upon its environment? Under the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), any project involving federal
funding is subject to environmental review, a process designed to expose not only
environmental but also social and economic impacts of infrastructure development in the
United States. When the National Institutes of Health initially proposed the BSL4
expansion at RML, they assessed the environmentally impacted area to be 100,000 square
feet, roughly the amount of dirt that would be disturbed by the building itself. The project
timeline indicated that the agency would do a basic Environmental Assessment, which
would lead to a “Finding of No Significant Impact,” allowing construction to proceed
without undertaking a lengthier and more-rigorous Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS). Recalls one activist, “There was literally no acknowledgement (at the time) from
NIH that this lab would have any more potential impact on the community than a large
office building would.”9 While this building did have offices, it would also contain
Biosafety Level-4 laboratory space, housing deadly microbes and rendering the space
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unlike any other facility to be built under the NEPA guidelines. In the contemporary
political climate, the laboratory space was being evaluated against new standards of
environmental risk, one increasingly focused on worst-case scenarios and struggling to
find mechanisms to assess the extent of microbial threats. By demanding a full EIS, the
community demanded that the NIH rationalize all the ways that the building, its systems,
and employees interacted with the physical and social environment surrounding it,
showing the reach of biological impact to extend deeply into the community.
NEPA procedures also require opportunities for public comment, providing a
space for citizens to determine whether the assessment of risk presented in the EIS
identifies all perceived sites of risk and harmonizes with their own ways of understanding
the environmental threat. In the process of drafting the EIS, NIH and RML rationalized
the risk of a BSL4 laboratory according to broadly accepted methods of assessing harm,
as if the risk of such laboratories were accessible by the same methods of quantification
and evaluation as any highway or pipeline project. In public comment sessions, both
sides discovered the difficulty of identifying, labeling, and addressing such vague ideas
as “fear,” “worst case,” or “safety.” Citizens expressed frustration with the NIH on many
levels—for treating them as ignorant, unimportant, or inconvenient, for withholding
information, for being careless, and for discounting concerns expressed in public and
private. Supporters of the lab accused opponents of irrationally trying to impede the
process, hurting the economy of the valley, and disrespecting their neighbors who work
in the lab. Through the NEPA process, RML and NIH became more skillful at directing
public comment and, in the end, institutionalized EIS as a mechanism for assessing the
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impacts of BSL4 laboratories, a model likely to be mimicked in the several BSL4
laboratories currently under construction or consideration.
A BSL4 laboratory seems less like an office building in a post-9/11 world, a
world where office buildings have proven to be very deadly when impacted by terrorist
weapons. Alex Gorman, who became involved in the RML case through her work with
Women’s Voices for the Earth (WVE), believes that competing timelines collided during
the NEPA process. NIH was driven by the momentum (and money) surrounding national
security, desiring that the lab should be operational as soon as possible. The political
climate demanded action from the science community to prepare the country for terrorist
threats, and President Bush had charged the NIH with studying bioterrorism agents. The
first presentation of the BSL4 laboratory to the public, in February 2002, conveyed the
expansion as an opportunity for Hamilton to do its part for biosecurity and did not hedge
around the idea that the expansion was designed to study “bioterrorism agents” and
“diseases caused by the intentional release of pathogens into human populations.”10
While officials acknowledged security concerns, the proposal addressed the issue in
vague and presumptive terms, suggesting that citizens could trust the laboratory to look
out for their safety, even though they offered few details into what that would entail.
Officials presented the clean safety records of the nation’s four other BSL4 labs as
evidence, but those, too, had been built before September 11, 2001, and citizens were
now living in a world where the unimaginable played out on every major broadcast
network in real time. In this new biological climate, residents were unable to trust the lab
to tell them their building was secure.
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The NIH scientists’ initial confidence that their proposal would be readily
accepted was not unfounded. From an architectural point of view, the difference between
a Level 3 and Level 4 facility is incremental. At that very moment RML was on the verge
of opening a BSL3 expansion, which was ratified in the late 1990s with merely an
Environmental Assessment and nary a peep from the public. Less than a decade later the
world had changed and citizens demanded that biological events be scrutinized to the full
extent allowed by public process. “Given the timing, people were pretty worried about
things like planes that might crash into the lab, etc. It didn’t take much for local residents
to think up some pretty scary worst case scenarios. And the response from the NIH (who
apparently had not put much thought into worst case scenarios) was to ask the public to
trust them: they knew what they were doing and it was all going to be very safe. That
didn’t sit well with a lot of folks—so the whole project got a lot more attention and
controversy than the NIH ever expected.”11 NIH was going to have to prove “security” to
the public in definitive, specific, and active measures, because the public demanded that
the laboratory be subject to established protocols for evaluating risk, ultimately
redefining the laboratory as much more than a 100,000 square foot office building.
An early and oft-repeated citizen complaint was that the BSL4 expansion was
presented to the public as a “done deal,” discrediting the fundamental principle of the
NEPA process which allows that sometimes the most favorable outcome is to take no
action. The project timeline presented in February showed construction beginning in less
than a year, after a swift Environmental Assessment determined there would be no
significant impact. The conclusions, it seemed, had already been drawn. NIH proceeded
with the Environmental Assessment and held the requisite public meetings, but
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throughout the summer it became clear that the citizens of Hamilton were going to
demand the more rigorous scrutiny of an Environmental Impact Statement. Even when
NIAID Director Anthony Fauci announced on September 12, 2002, that they would
conduct an EIS after all, his statement presumed that the public comment period would
absolve concerns without altering the outcome: "I'm totally confident that the people of
the Bitterroot Valley want to be a part of what is happening here. In the same breath, we
want to make sure they are a part of the process and comfortable with the lab."12 Such
discourses did not seem to allow the possibility that the EIS would conclude that the
biological risk outweighed the value of the building and construction should not proceed.
Throughout this process, Hamilton residents found new ways to speak out for
their biological rights. In the seven months since the announcement of the expansion,
people had been studying the NEPA protocols, led by groups like Friends of the
Bitterroot who had previously worked through the process in advocating for land
management issues. The Coalition for a Safe Lab was established in August, and had
been staging meetings parallel to the NIH-sponsored gatherings. While Friends and WVE
adopted the lab issue into existing environmental advocacy platforms, the Coalition was
established to enable citizen participation in discussions specifically about the laboratory.
This group met a need by providing a forum where worst case scenarios and security
questions could be handled in conversation instead of being dismissed as fearful rhetoric.
These activist groupings also worked to frame the parameters of the argument, locating
biological risk as an environmental concern, a local problem, a women’s issue, as well as
a new issue centered around the transformation of laboratory spaces.
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Around the same time it began the EIS process, RML established a Community
Liaison Group, part of the lab’s strategy to “be a good neighbor.” The “CLG” includes
laboratory officials and representatives of various community sectors, such as the fire
department and the Chamber of Commerce, handpicked to facilitate the flow of
information between the lab and community members. Initially organized to address
concerns regarding the BSL4 expansion, RML committed to keeping the group in place
for ongoing interactions between the lab and community. RML provides CLG members
with a packet of information prior to each quarterly meeting, giving updates on laboratory
happenings, as well as news from the science community in general. Members can
review materials, talk to their “constituents,” and then raise concerns at group meetings,
where lab officials are present to respond to questions. In all these interactions RML
retains control as a gatekeeper of information. One CLG member points out that
information seems to flow downhill from the lab, with a lot of propaganda and without
much sincere discussion. “They put on the face that they want the community to see—it’s
nothing but a PR apparatus. They are going to say what will calm you down, until you
become accepting of it. New ideas are tough to swallow.”13 RML has little at stake in its
community group: by the existence of the CLG, the laboratory can promote itself as
community-minded, while instituting a system that accepts input only from a faux
representative council. The power relations are askew, for CLG members ultimately have
no authority to enact change within RML or NIH. By establishing the CLG, however,
RML made a statement that the laboratory exists in a community and that it has a
responsibility to communicate—in some structured way—with that community. Said
Director Bloom, “What we do here is a privilege, not a right—and one given to us by the
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taxpayers.”14 The CLG also formalized an understanding that the laboratory had to
account for its role in the safety and well-being of its neighbors, a belief that emerged in
the 1910s and 1920s during the spotted fever campaign but was largely taken for granted
until the bioterror crisis demanded new types of accountability. The work of the CLG, as
well as the Coalition for a Safe Lab and other community groups, was to identify
precisely what are the obligations of a laboratory to its community.
The establishment of the CLG tacitly recognized that RML was part of a larger
geography, bringing the community more formally into the scope of the EIS.15 For the
next two years, the NEPA process framed discussions of the Integrated Research Facility.
The interplay of public comment and EIS documents inscribed the varied sentiments
floating around the lab and in the community into a ritualized exchange. The NIH would
present a draft EIS; the public would respond; NIH would revise, and the public reacted
again. The documents and hearings proceeded as follows:
EA Scoping meeting

July 2002

Draft EIS (DEIS)

May 2003

Public Comment Period, meeting on DEIS

June-July 2003

Supplemental Draft EIS (SDEIS),

December 29, 2003

SDEIS comment period and public meeting

January-February 2004

Final EIS (FEIS)

April 2004

FEIS comment period,

May-June 2004

FEIS released

July 26, 2004

lawsuit filed to request new EIS

July 2004

settlement agreement reached

September 2004

This protocol places citizens in a reactionary role, for NIH and its contractors did the
work of creating the documents which framed the discussion. Some members of the
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public contended that their concerns were not addressed in the documents, but when they
raised these concerns in other venues, they were told that they would be addressed in
subsequent versions. When they finally received the Draft EIS—a 100-page document,
which one person ironically described as smaller than the Hamilton phone book—they
didn’t find answers, and vocalized their complaints in the meeting: “Many people had
questions they were told were going to be addressed in the EIS. You have an obligation
to answer those questions. It’s not an option.” “I resent that people who are asking
questions are labeled as afraid or ignorant. Maybe I won’t be afraid if I get the answer.”
“Help me to not be so cynical about the process.” People sought information in order to
assess the risk the lab posed to their own well-being, and expected those who prepared
the EIS (an outside company) to do the work of collecting, analyzing, and evaluating the
risk. They themselves felt unable to quantify the risk, but retained the right to make
decisions when presented with information they perceived to be adequate. As a
mechanism for assessing environmental impacts, the EIS had to, first, identify and
evaluate the potential outcomes according to its own standards, and then evaluate
scenarios identified by the public through information gathering sessions. Rather than
showing that the risks hypothesized by the public had been recognized and evaluated, the
document simply excluded those impacts, producing public sentiment that their concerns
had been ignored. In actuality, the biological scenarios imagined by the public presented
situations which had never before been addressed through the EIS process. The
limitations of the protocols to recognize evolving types of risk led to public
disgruntlement about the process in general.
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Environmental Impact Statements are commissioned by institutions and prepared
by companies specializing in the drafting of such documents. The public comment period
is established to ensure that the preparing agency surveys the range of issues involved
and addresses the majority of public concerns in the published document. Public response
to the EIS indicated that many citizens felt key items were being ignored in the process,
whether intentionally or because traditional mechanisms for assessing environmental
impact were not adequate to address the complexities of biological risk in an age of
terror.
Assessing the Scope of a Laboratory
As previously discussed, the range of impact of a BSL4 laboratory might be
determined to be as small as the building’s footprint or as vast as the entire nation or even
the planet. The tradeoff in defining the scope of the EIS was that in order to claim
positive regional or national impacts of the laboratory in its assessment, the scope had to
be broadened to also consider the potential negative impacts in these areas.16 Scope, in
this case, deals with the range of issues—actions, alternatives, and impacts—addressed
by the document, as well as the scoping of public comments during comment periods.
NIH made deliberate decisions regarding how it defined the scope of the RML expansion
project. Skeptics of the process claimed, “NIH has arbitrarily limited the scope of the
DEIS. This is an obvious and transparent attempt to limit the scope to a location and
budget that was predetermined to avoid considering a reasonable range of alternatives,
and disclosing the rational for the choice of location or budget tradeoffs.”17 NIH was in a
complicated position. On the one hand, the laboratory had been called critical to a
national security need and lauded as a regional center of excellence in the Northwest, but
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such a scope would require a tremendous EIS . NIH was a federal agency, with several
established BSL4 laboratories and access to a $500 million budget for building BSL4
labs, of which they had only committed $65 million to the RML expansion.18 With the
addition of research projects on every continent and the importation of microbes from
overseas, the scope of the work done in the RML could easily be called global. An impact
statement of such a scope would be unwieldy.
Still, the various drafts of the EIS and the public comment periods affirmed clearly
that the impacts of a laboratory dealing with highly-infectious diseases push beyond the
laboratory walls. One public concern, for example, was how the agents to be studied
would be brought to the laboratory (or shared between BSL4 facilities.) Clearly, Ebola
did not occur locally and the highly protected laboratory space did not isolate the virus
during transportation. The lab explained that pathogens were transported by commercial
shipping companies who were regulated by the CDC, contending that because RML did
not oversee the training or certification of these agencies, this issue was outside the scope
of the EIS. In alarm, citizens swapped jibes about the shipments of Ebola being delivered
by the FedEx truck, integrating the delivery company into their worst-case scenarios:
What if the FedEx truck crashes? What happens when someone snags the FedEx truck,
left running on the street while the driver pops into the drugstore? Such comments
conceived of a scope beyond even the nation or community, encompassing all “the world
on time.”
The EIS did broaden the scope of the project to include some community
infrastructure, both in Hamilton and Missoula. Citizens expressed concern that the
community lacked the facilities and resources to adequately protect its citizens should an
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accident occur. Marcus Daly Memorial Hospital was not as well equipped as hospitals in
large cities hosting BSL4 labs, and people worried that should an incident occur it would
be exponentially worse due to limited resources on hand. Not only did the EIS assess the
preparedness of the laboratory to deal with emergencies, but it considered the readiness
of the support personnel who would be the next in line to deal with an incident. By this
conception, the evaluation of emergency situations—not just day-to-day practices—fell
within the scope of the EIS. While the laboratory could take physical measures to secure
its space, “securing” the community required a combination of personnel, training, and
infrastructure. For example, a bid was put out to hospitals within 100 miles of the lab
(which was only two) to contract with RML for emergency support. Saint Patrick’s
Hospital in Missoula received money to build two isolation rooms, and Dr. George Risi,
who had long consulted with the labs, is now on contract and paid by the laboratory to
respond to emergency situations.19 The drafting of the EIS produced RML as a place that
went beyond its four laboratory walls, for if the security of the facility were breached, the
bounds of the laboratory would expand, engulfing a region that included, at least on
paper, the city of Missoula, sixty miles to the north.
The presence of the BSL4 laboratory also redefined the town’s position within the
global terrorism landscape. As Jim Miller watched the facility being built, he commented
that the decision to build, “Did put us on the map for terrorism. I imagine there are people
out there thinking about how they can really create a ruckus in Hamilton.” The EIS
addressed this hypothetical by claiming that there would not be enough infectious
material within the laboratory to attract the interest of a terrorist, and it would not be
weapons-grade, anyways. Here the EIS claimed authority to delineate how much
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biological matter would be of value to terrorists, presuming knowledge of human
behavior as it relates to contemporary terrorist mindsets and attempting to quantify the
risk posed by people who had their own subjectivity. The risks of bioterrorism resist
calculation because human agency leaves so many unknowns. Residents of Hamilton saw
this risk, but the governing apparatus presumed the unknown meant unlikely. Though the
threat may be minimal, even a minimal risk is still a risk. Or so the community tried to
convince scientists throughout the EIS process.
Quantifying Laboratory Risk
“Risks only exist when there are decisions to be taken.”20 Because Giddens’
definition of risk depends on the position of the subject, in this case a “society
increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety),” risk is generated by
people’s actions, particularly decision-making by agencies that intervene on behalf of the
individual or collective.21 The NEPA process was supposed to generate information that
would lead to a decision regarding the construction of the IRF, information that would
transform the hazards, dangers, and threats of the laboratory into a measured and
calculated risk. The BSL4 laboratory was a risk because it was an imagined future entity
which could (theoretically) be eliminated through decisions in the present: the NIH could
decide not to build, or the legal actions based upon the EIS could use the rule of law to
prevent the building. As a risk-management practice NEPA aims to bring about the most
desirable future outcome as measured by the actions which will bring the least amount of
harm to people and environments. In Giddens’ risk society, however, the unremitting
advancement of science “manufactures” risk, producing a society in which the
uncertainties of science cannot be dealt with except by further advances in science and
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technology.22 These new risks have little historical precedent and, “we often don’t really
know what the risks are, let alone how to calculate them accurately in terms of
probability tables.”23 The life sciences of the modern age manufactures such risks, and
the expansive threats of bioterrorism made possible by the new biology can only be
countered by the rapid growth of the science complex which promises better technologies
to facilitate a faster, more efficient response to any possible event.
Consequently, a two-sided problem in identifying and assessing the impact of a
BSL4 laboratory emerged through the EIS process: the preparers of the report did not
successfully identify and assess a full range of hazards, while community members put
forth increasingly extravagant scenarios which resisted quantification. Is risk an
environmental impact? While imagined future catastrophe might be considered in
assessing future environments, how can the risk of that event be calculated in planning
for that future? Through meetings and written comments citizens negotiated contradictory
assessments of whether there was a risk, how great that risk was, and what responsibility
of the lab is in minimizing the risk.
In its earliest version, the Environmental Impact Statement proposed that it is not
possible to measure the risk of a BSL4 laboratory. General terms like “high risk” and
“low risk” established a vague scale of risk.24 The DEIS noted that the proposed action
presented “remote increased risk to the community” (DEIS 2-11), but that the “potential
added risk to the community from the Proposed Action cannot be effectively quantified”
(DEIS 4-2). Though the risk can’t be measured, according to the DEIS, it can be
mitigated through standard operating practices, for the “safety measures inherent to RML
would effectively reduce threats of terrorism and the possibility of a release of a studied
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agent into the community.” Support for this claim cited the laboratory’s past safety
record, without acknowledging the changed future conditions that created the risk, again
failing to recognize that the very idea of risk is entwined with the subject’s perception of
the future, not the past.
While some community members, including Mayor Joe, accepted the risk as
negligible and trusted that past record, others insisted that the difficulty in assessing risk
was no reason not to try. The comments on the DEIS submitted by the three community
advocacy groups argued that “the fact that it is difficult to assess risk in this case does not
mean that it is impossible to quantify in an EIS.”25 Further, they argued that even when
the risk is minimal, it is still within the bounds of the EIS to study that risk and that “risk
assessment is a common practice of the Federal Government.”26 Citizens ascribed
authority over risk assessment to the contracted agency preparing the EIS and the groups
who generate statistical information about risk, in this case scientists (who conduct the
studies reviewed by the preparers of the EIS) and the government (who “commonly
practice(s)” risk assessment). The calculation of risk is not a practice open to anyone, but
is assigned to the government.
The purpose of calculating risk is to establish the level of acceptable regulation
which will counter the risk, presuming that knowing the threat will illuminate an
appropriate response. Mitchell Dean distinguishes “social risk,” presented as a
characteristic of the modern age by Beck and others, from a particular type of
“governmental risk,” in which risk is rationalized with the object of enabling
intervention.27 Assessment practices make risk knowable, but they also make it
governable, binding the notion of risk with outcomes to be brought about by state action.
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The question follows of why citizens themselves cannot quantify the risk? Several
circumstances sustain the authority of the state over the calculation of risk. First, through
the federally mandated NEPA process, citizens transfer responsibility for risk assessment
to an entity which is supposedly impartial and has access to the skills and resources to
undertake a project of some magnitude. The involvement of neutral third parties
presumes that determinations of risk have material outcomes in the capitalist quest for
economic advance and that entities might deliberately distort dangers in order to achieve
independent objectives. Second, due to the well-secured practices of the science complex,
citizens do not feel like they have access to the information necessary to conduct a valid
risk assessment. In asking for an assessment of risk, citizens were demanding disclosure
of the practices and procedures that brought about the risk. They requested access to
information throughout the process, including a list identifying precisely the microbes
that would be studied in the BSL4 lab, a full history of accidents at RML and other BSL4
labs, and detailed accounts of how Hamilton was chosen as the site for the lab.28
Furthermore, citizens place the burden of proof upon those who are agents in bringing
change to the community. Gorman explained that the goal of their activism was to make
the government accountable to the citizens: “We need you to prove you can do this safely
and responsibly in Hamilton.”29 RML would be responsible for mitigating risk should the
laboratory be built, and part of proving that they could do this well was proving that they
had clearly identified what the risks were. Interestingly, community members did not
seem willing to accept that the labs posed no threat, even when the methods of their
designated authority led to this conclusion.
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The Final EIS more fully incorporated risk assessment into its methods, including
sections titled “community risk” and “risk assessment scenarios.” The NIH-developed
Maximum Possible Risk model claimed to build credibility by “simplifying assumptions
(which) we know for certain are more unfavorable than any credible assumptions.” This
design purports to build “extra confidence since the actual risks are certain to be less than
the risks presented in the analysis.”30 Even the model used to assess risk presumes the
risk to be less than the numbers worked through the model. The EIS described six
“reasonably foreseeable, credible threat” scenarios which were run through the MPR
model, concluding in every case that the risk is “none.”
There is an important play of statistics at work here, for in reality the numbers
were so small they were rounded to zero. One scenario concluded, “The calculated
potential release described in this scenario would be 0.000011 spores. Since release of a
partial spore is not feasible, this number is practically rounded to zero.” Or in another,
“The risk of public harm is so minute that it may be considered zero.”31 In the eyes of the
public, however, minimal risk did not equal no risk. Comments by the advocacy group
argued that the numbers being used to assess risk did not account for the changing
position of BSL4 laboratories in the world. The assessment of risk was fundamentally
different because high-security science laboratories were becoming more numerous than
they had been in the past. In other words, statistics based upon two or three working
BSL4 laboratories might be small, but the trend in NIH was to build more and more
laboratories, making these numbers much greater. Thus, “with a Ten Fold increase in
BSL4 experiments the probability of a single community release over 25 years can raise
over nine times that of the previous 25 years.”32 The FEIS still assessed risk based on
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past precedent, a method that also proved unsatisfactory and even contradictory. A
literature review of laboratory-acquired infections cited more than 5,000 occupationally
acquired infections since 1898, with six occurring since 1999, and one occurring in a
BSL4 laboratory, then concludes by stating that “the overall safety record of biomedical
and microbiological laboratories also indicates that there is not a risk of accidental
release.”33 Not only does the conclusion seem to contradict the evidence, but the
reference to past events was not convincing in a future-looking climate of risk. The risk
of a BSL4 facility could not be determined by the past precedent of laboratories, for the
changes of the war on terror, the new drive for biosecurity, and the evolving face of fear
in the community all looked towards the future. The world was a different place now and
knowing risk meant understanding the future, for the past was not as relevant to the
citizens as their own imagined futures.
Finally, the unpredictability of human beings complicates the calculation of risk.
“Scientists are so glued to their microscopes, they can’t see the world around them.
They’re not infallible, even if they seem to be.”34 Human error and human intent
undermine the security of the new BSL4 facility. The scientists who worked at RML
lived in a small community where their foibles and fallibility were on display outside the
laboratory, lifting the hem on that cloak of mystery which so often surrounds scientific
work. People also did not have to look much beyond the anthrax incidents two years
earlier to believe that some scientists also have intent to do harm. Hamilton residents
proved to be extremely creative in concocting their own “reasonably foreseeable”
scenarios, and they expected that to be addressed in the EIS, and they expected the
government’s answers to resonate with their ways of seeing the world. Larry Campbell

148
recalled a meeting where someone suggested that a person with ill intent could load a
cement truck full of explosives, drive it right down 3rd street, and then slam it into the
laboratory building. In response, an NIH director said that the heat of such an explosion
would kill the pathogens. “But people live through explosions—we see that all the time.
Why couldn’t a microbe? This dismissive type of analysis is totally dangerous.”35 The
EIS proved unsatisfactory to residents because it refused to address in detail these “worst
case” scenarios. They saw these as part of the government’s responsibility in assessing
and communicating the risk of the laboratory. To scientists, these worst-case scenes were
statistically insignificant, but to the residents who had recently witnessed bombings in so
many federal buildings, they were critical.
The refusal of the laboratory to acknowledge worse-case scenarios in meetings or
through the EIS served riled the people who set these scenes at the foundation of their
discussion of risk. As one resident stated, in the comment session on the Draft EIS,
And then it goes on to say that the ‘proposed added risk to the community from
the proposed action cannot be effectively quantified’—and because it can’t be
effectively quantified, we’ll just ignore it. And I think that is an egregious
oversight. There’s no discussion of the possible accidental or purposeful breach of
security, the potential direct or indirect or cumulative effects of such a thing if it
does happen. The ‘What if?’ The ‘nightmare.’ … What happens if the worst
happens? Because obviously it’s a possibility because the whole document talks
about taking, you know, reducing the risk. ... But the risk never goes away.…
What happens to the Bitterroot Valley if we do have the worst-case scenario?
Let’s have it out on paper. ‘Cause it’s a possibility. And don’t ignore it. And don’t
ignore those of us that are concerned about it and treat us like we are stupid.36
Musings over hypothetical situations pitted community members against each other, as
supporters of the accused those who raised these concerns of being unpatriotic, selfish, or
fearmongerers. Giddens describes the risk society as encompassing a “new moral climate
of politics, one marked by a push-and-pull between accusations of scaremongering on the
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one hand and of cover-ups on the other.”37 Those who see risk feel compelled to proclaim
and publicize, and are accused of scaremongering if no harm emerges (on the other hand,
if authorities proclaim the risk is minimal, they can be accused of a cover-up.) While
Giddens seems to suggest that anyone from scientist to politician to lay person could
proclaim the risk equally, the situation in Hamilton shows that citizens were not equally
vested with authority to identify risk. Though some of their comments were addressed in
the EIS, the document still dismissed most of the scenarios and information requests as
“outside the scope” of the EIS. Furthermore, the label of “fearmongerer” was applied to
citizens by their peers before any event had played out, showing that the subjective ways
of knowing risk can be definitive enough to exist outside of any results. People who
supported the laboratory were so convinced of its safety that they could accuse others of
using scare tactics and lacking proof that their fears were ill-founded before the future
played out. More importantly, the authoritative actions of the NIH, RML, and other
governmental agencies were powerful enough to relegate fear to the domain of ignorance.
Where risk was perceived, ignorance was presumed.
By this reasoning, risk could be overcome through the production of knowledge
and the education of the citizenry, demanding no material change to the laboratory or its
practices. Citizens like Joan Perry (above) felt like public officials were mistreating and
condescending to them, but still sustained this equation of knowledge and risk by
repeatedly demanding more information. In writing about the crisis at Chernobyl, Petryna
says that after the nuclear meltdown, “life was perceived to be in the hands of an invisible allknowing expert” who controlled the flow of information about health risks. In the face of a
crisis, people sought information “to render an uncertain and unknowable world knowable and
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inhabitable in some way.” 38 Knowledge of the physical world offered access to life and
survival; communication offers access to that knowledge, but the state still controls access to
that information. The NEPA process exemplifies one way the state assigns risk, for by
subjecting a new entity of unknown scope and impact to NEPA oversight, the governing
agency retained power to set parameters and quantify risk. Rather than presenting a full
spectrum of risks to be evaluated and compared, the EIS dealt in absolutes where only
certain risks were given enough credibility to be quantified and all “negligible,”
“minimal,” and “slight” risks were rounded down to “none.”
“Is This a Done Deal?”
The NEPA process stipulates that an EIS should present at least three types of
alternatives: the proposed action, no action, and other actions that would also meet the
need. The document presented to Hamilton residents in June 2003 considered only the
“preferred action” and “no action,” having eliminated alternatives due to budgetary
issues. Ten percent of the 588 comments received during the scoping period requested
NIH to consider alternatives to building in Hamilton, particularly in the center of town.
By framing the issue as a “this-action-or-no-action” contest, the delineation of economic
benefits took the spotlight away from suggestions that risk could be managed by
considering alternative locations or situations. If people wanted the lab to continue to
bless their community and support their nation’s defense, their only choice was to accept
the new laboratory as proposed, for there simply were no alternatives. Residents who
suggested that the IRF could be built outside of town, downwind and downstream, or as a
self-contained facility found no action to support, for there was none. Within such a
framework, people could not claim biological rights while still supporting the work and
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workers of the laboratory. Their biological citizenship came into direct conflict with the
plan to build, for the EIS reified the contest as a lab/no lab fight.
Advocacy groups claimed that this approach violated the spirit of the NEPA
process, which purports to consider a range of alternatives in order to select the least
damaging option. An EIS is a document for assessment, and is not to be used in
“justifying decisions already made.” (CEQ 1502.2 (g)) The lack of alternatives furthered
the perception that the building of the IRF was predetermined, and the agency was simply
going through the motions in submitting to an EIS. As Gorman explained,
The thing that really struck folks from that first meeting though—was that they
definitely presented the plan as a done deal. They had the space to build it (RML
is a NIH campus and had plenty of room), they had the funds secured from
Congress, and they had the blessing of the scientists at RML couldn't have been
more pleased about getting a fancy new lab. The thing is there were some
additional hoops they still had to jump through.39
Public officials spoke of the laboratory as if it were already approved, ideologically
undermining the possibility that such a laboratory might not be built because it was
shown to be environmentally harmful. Scientists were excited about the chance to be on
the cutting edge of the virology field, and many saw this as a chance for Montana to play
a role in the War on Terror.40 It seemed that everything was in order to proceed, if only
the EIS could assure everyone that there was no risk of harm. RML had begun
contracting with builders, developing blueprints, and otherwise investing money into the
project. Although this was not displacing dirt, it seemed that if the IRF were not
approved, the community would already lose some of its investment.
When established measures for protecting the collective health are compromised,
even—or especially—in a time of national crisis, citizens’ biological rights are
compromised. Institutions organized to protect biological rights, such as NEPA and the
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NIH, establish priorities on citizen health which may not coincide with people’s
perception of their own biological needs. If the national need for biosecurity drowns out
the voices of individuals in Hamilton, Montana, they lose agency in determining their
own biological citizenship. During the bioterror crisis, the biological basis for citizenship
may not withstand the apparatus of security, as individuals sacrifice their universal right
to life and the state passes broad judgment on the worth of individual humans.41
“The” Memo: Valuing Biological Citizens
During conversations with Hamilton residents in 2008, people repeatedly asked if
I had seen “the memo.” Alexandra Gorman found the unsigned memo deep in a stack of
papers released by a Freedom of Information Act request. When confronted with the
memo, NIH officials accused people opposed to the lab expansion of writing the memo to
support some sort of conspiracy theory. Though no one seemed to have a copy of the
memo, everyone remembered it, recounting the gist of the message in their own words:
“Hamilton is disposable.” “They chose us because we’re away from major population
centers.” “The internal memo makes it seem like the worst is going to happen, so it might
as well happen here.” They presented this document as evidence that the selection of
Hamilton was more than just the perfect marriage with RML and that deliberate decisions
involving their own bodies had been made in selecting the site.42
Though it refers to a “clear and present danger posed by the daily threat of human
and agricultural bioterrorism,” the famous memo was written in December 2000, a year
before the anthrax attacks would raise the profile of biosecurity. The memo cites multiple
reasons for expanding NIH facilities in Montana, including unused land on the large
campus, collegial relationships with RML and Hamilton, and closer proximity to west-
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coast population centers which would minimize delays during a public health disaster in
Seattle, San Francisco, or Los Angeles. The line that caught Hamilton’s attention read:
“Third, the RML campus is located in rural western Montana, well removed from major
population centers. The location of the laboratory reduces the possibility that an
accidental release of a Biosafety Level-4 organism would lead to a major public health
disaster.” Citizens in Hamilton clearly had a different conception of what constitutes a
“major” public health disaster, and the overall message was that their lives would be
expendable. To have such a message put down on paper—even in an unsigned memo—
suggested that the institution did not value the lives of Hamilton residents as much as it
valued its citizens in other population centers.
These lines, though brief, framed a biosocial argument claiming that when it
comes to bioterrorism, the government does not value the lives of all people equally, and
that those living near research facilities must assume the risk on behalf of all citizens.
These lives were less valued because of their remote location. When the memo was
brought into circulation at a Coalition for a Safe Lab meeting, people began to imagine
the geography of the Bitterroot as it might be seen through the federal government. “For
one thing, it would be really easy to quarantine the valley. There’s only one paved artery
in and out at both ends. At my most cynical, I can imagine them just shutting it off, then
they could go back in and see where the bodies lay. In my own point of view, that kind of
awful thinking is not unthinkable in the U.S. defense industry.”43 The transfer of accident
to intent seeps into this assessment: an accident produces an opportunity to study disease,
unwillingly turning people’s bodies into objects in a virology experiment. Citizens are
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bound to place, and by describing the Bitterroot Valley as an acceptable sacrifice zone
the NIH devalued the lives of the people who lived there.
Several years later, people recited the legendary lines of the memo as example of
just how “ugly” things were during the BSL4 controversy. They still felt disbelief, not
just that the words had been said, but that they had been recorded on paper, threatening to
undermine the well-crafted claims that the government meant no risk or harm to
Hamilton residents. The memo pitted the people of this rural community against an
agency that did not seem to have their best interests at heart, prioritizing bioterrorism
research over their individual lives. The David and Goliath archetype situated small-town
citizens against a national industry of science and government. While people didn’t seem
to seriously believe their valley would deliberately be turned into a bioterrorism testing
ground, referencing the memo seemed to push them to imagine just what the government
was capable of. It created the possibility that despite their activism, biological rights may
be out of reach to this small community. In addition, the memo suggests the events that
played out after Valentine’s Day 2002 were set in motion, not by September 11, but by a
national agenda established prior to December 2000, one that identified bioterrorism as a
problem and established BSL4 research as part of the solution.
Security Settlement
On September 24, 2004, Jim Olsen, Alex Gorman, and Larry Campbell sat in a
chamber at the Great Falls courthouse negotiating a settlement with the National
Institutes of Health regarding the future of the Rocky Mountain Laboratories. From 9:00
a.m. to 1:00 a.m., counsel shuffled between a room of Hamilton residents and a room
packed with officials from NIH headquarters, setting out the terms that would end legal
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action brought by the Coalition for a Safe Lab, Women’s Voices for the Earth, and
Friends of the Bitterroot. After the release of the FEIS earlier that year, these collectives
went to court to demand an EIS which took seriously the new forms of risk created by the
biolab. The lawsuit demanded that NIH scrap the previous EIS and commission a new
assessment by a new firm, before proceeding with plans for the laboratory. Still feeling
national pressure to build the BSL4 laboratory and working on a timeline now held up by
months of community protest, NIH offered to settle.
In the settlement, NIH agreed to a range of safety measures demanded by the
advocacy groups. Gorman recalls feeling surprised that they agreed to everything they
asked: “I should have asked for more, they were so agreeable.” The terms of the
settlement addressed risks the plaintiffs felt had not been identified in the FEIS, including
training for local health personnel and the co-development of an emergency response
plan with the county. Community responses to the settlement were mixed: on the one
hand, some felt their concerns over safety were being addressed, bringing the desired
outcomes though the established processes had failed. Others felt some disappointment
that the issue did not go to court, believing that they “traded away an opportunity to hold
NIH’s feet to the fire to come up with a legally defensible EIS.”44
By threatening litigation, the alliances formed around the biolab issue found a
way to bring about specific outcomes in regards to citizen health and security. The EIS
process failed to delineate or address security concerns, but in court, NIH found a way to
circumvent legislative process and meet the frantic timelines of the national security
complex be agreeing to certain tangible outcomes. Whether the lab was a biological risk
or not, certain practices would be undertaken to increase biosecurity, making the presence
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of risk irrelevant. Neither judge, nor EIS preparer, nor scientist bore the burden of
proving that there was or was not a risk, but agreed to certain actions that would help
citizens feel secure. The settlement was action-oriented, legally binding NIH to specific
conduct regarding safety, security, and community involvement. Thus, biosecurity was
removed from the realm of ideological assessment and translated into material practice.
Campbell claims that NIH “is getting by with totally insufficient documentation,” a poor
precedent for future assessments of biolevel four laboratories.45 In choosing to settle, the
community groups prioritized outcome over ideology, deciding that if the lab would
agree to behave in a certain way, the delineation of risk was less important to citizens’
well-being. This dissociation of action and risk, however, reinforced the idea that security
actions should be taken even if there is no evidence of potential for harm. Finding ways
to accurately assess the biological threat was not necessary to justify action, a precedent
being used throughout the national security state.
On the other hand, Gorman contends the entire NEPA process and subsequent
settlement will be a model for future BSL4 developments. NIH now recognizes that these
laboratories have broad impacts and that citizens are attuned to microbial threats. She
believes that because of the community involvement, even to the point of the lawsuit,
NIH “put a lot of systems in place they never would have done, and did a lot of additional
planning and coordination, which they now realize was necessary to make this a more
viable project.” The settlement also bound NIH/RML to the community, formalizing a
casual relationship that had existed for generations, and assigning specific and significant
legal responsibilities to the laboratory in relation with the people who live around it.
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Remaking Laboratories in an Age of Bioterrorism
As we walk three blocks from the lab to the Sunshine Diner, RML Director
Marshall Bloom talks about fishing and his advocacy for trout conservation in the
Bitterroot River. A virologist by training, Bloom has worked in the lab for 30 years,
coming to the directorship in 2002 in the midst of the controversy over the lab expansion.
Today he seems relieved that those heated debates are behind him, and excited to leave
behind his directorship and focus on his own research in the new laboratory. Though
some of the lower level labs in the IRF are now operational, the BSL4 laboratory is still
undergoing tests in order to receive the numerous certifications required for operation. As
Bloom explains the systems of redundancy and security in the BSL4 laboratory, he
recites story told hundreds of times in the last six years, spiced by the personal
enthusiasm of a scientist who will be working in the laboratory. He believes in the work
of RML, in the importance of studying emerging infectious diseases in a world where
diseases still cause social upheaval not unlike what the Bitterroot experienced a century
ago. While Bloom acknowledges that bioterrorism and biosecurity funding is building the
new lab, he says “we don’t consider ourselves as working on bioterrorism, but as working
on emerging infectious diseases.”46 Still, the laboratory Bloom is building is a product of
the modern age of bioterrorism and it looks different from all other labs because of the
events of the last decade. Though the terror of disease has long shaped the spaces used to
study microscopic biological threats, the material changes to the laboratory brought by
the contestation in Hamilton show that the manipulation of space and the endless
production of knowledge are primary means for convincing citizens that the state is
caring for their biological survival.
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The promise that space can be managed to compensate for human error is
expressed in the floor plans of biological laboratories everywhere, particularly in the
multi-chambered entrances and sealed outlets of BSL4 facilities. Like most such labs, the
laboratory in Hamilton has submarine doors, four-foot walls coated with epoxy (because
air can move through cement), and an elaborate system of ducts and vents to
continuously push air through the laboratory and purify it on the way out. The laboratory
space sits in the center of the IRF, buffered by hallways on all sides. An upper story
houses the water and air purification systems. The space is designed to contain, to secure
microorganisms which move by vectors of air and water and human flesh. The standard
design presumes that the laboratory exists entirely within its walls, and nothing can
escape. Human bodies and laboratory equipment that move out of the secure space must
pass through a sequence of decontamination which will transform them from risky
carriers of disease into neutral entities.
Though the isolation sequence—exit, shower, disrobe, shower again—has been
ritualized in modern BSL4 laboratories, the routine of personal cleansing when moving
from “hot” areas into the vulnerable community have long been understood as a way to
contain biological threats. In the early “tick lab,” “the dangerous work of tick rearing and
vaccine making … (took) place in quarters which, except for a single door, are shut off
from the rest of the laboratory. Even the janitor is forbidden to enter. On going out of the
department, the men in charge of tick rearing leave their white coveralls to be baked in an
electric oven, take a shower bath, and examine their bodies carefully for ticks before a
three-paneled mirror.”47 The space is designed to create a buffer zone, where the human

159
body can be transformed from a potential vector for disease into a “normal” body free to
move about the community.
When this sequence is violated, whether intentionally or in a medical emergency,
the body enters the community in a state of risk. The contestation in Hamilton over the
BSL4 lab challenged the conception of the laboratory space as self-contained, arguing
through the settlement that spaces beyond those four walls were part of the laboratory
space and also needed to be secured. The settlement agreement assigned responsibility to
NIH for medical services in the community, water and air flowing out of the facility, and
transportation of microbes. Not only did NIH agree to build an isolation room in the IRF,
but it contracted with a local hospital to provide “patient isolation services” and
“isolation transportation service.”48 Providing a secure way to move a sick and infected
person through the community was determined to be part of the laboratory’s
responsibility to protect the biological health of Hamilton residents. The settlement also
stipulated that NIH would evaluate and regularly assess the function of its air and water
systems, and that it would comply with regulations in transporting BSL4 agents. By
determining that RML has jurisdiction over its water and air, and by recognizing the
partial responsibility for shipping, the settlement identified three material outputs from
the lab, challenging the assumption that such a facility is isolated, and insisting that the
entities flowing from the lab should also be assessed and protected.
To minimize fear, the laboratory itself must be produced as a space that looks
secure in the eyes of the public. After the 1927 court case against the lab, RML decided
to build a moat around the laboratory building, reproducing the conventional wisdom of
the day that ticks could not cross the Bitterroot River by constructing a water barrier
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around the laboratory itself. Floors and walls were built without cracks and crevices, an
advanced technology in the day, and tick holding rooms were designed without corners to
alleviate the fear of ticks lurking in tight, dark spaces. These physical alterations to the
building visually reproduced the idea that the laboratory was a secure, safe space, sending
a message to the community that it was concerned with protecting their health and wellbeing. These visual gestures communicated concern with citizen safety without having to
provide further evidence of safety precautions, raising the question of whether
institutionalized security measures which are less visible (such as air filtration systems)
can sustain community trust in the laboratory without being accompanied by visual
alterations to the physical space. In the IRF, many of the security measures are internal,
hidden within the building and blocked from inspection by the community. The NIH
settlement required disclosure of status reports on these safety measures, which still
requires the public to trust their agents who run tests and report results, as opposed to
what they can see with their own eyes. In addition, the community repeatedly requested
the EIS to consider alternative locations for the IRF outside the residential community,
showing that citizens believe distance offers some degree of security from the risks posed
by the microbes. The decision to build in Hamilton and the fact that the IRF simply looks
like an office building, demanded that the laboratory find other ways, beyond spatial
configurations, to convince citizens their bodies are secure.
Citizenship through Protest
The citizen protest of the IRF expansion institutionalized forms of risk
communication at Rocky Mountain Laboratories, for the physical closing of the
laboratory to local citizens has demanded new ways to make the laboratory space
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knowable and familiar, and therefore less fearful. The lab hired its first public affairs
officer to develop and present a unified message to the public. The Community Liaison
Group was ratified in the settlement, with the stipulation that the group would continue to
meet “at a location outside the RML campus and will allow a reasonable time for public
comment at such meetings.”49 In the settlement NIH promised to communicate
information about the pathogens being studied, their medical symptoms, accident reports,
and safety inspections to the public and their representatives. To enable community
medical and safety personnel to recognize potential threats and pinpoint indicators of
increased harm, the lawsuit required mandatory reporting of disease symptoms among lab
employees and encouraged workers to disclose their employment to their personal health
care providers. By these stipulations, the settlement ratified the perception that
biosecurity hinges upon effective communication, binding local entities beyond the
laboratory walls to practices happening within.
The settlement agreement also stipulated that a local health officer, a local health
board member, and a representative of the plaintiffs would have a seat on RML’s
Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), the group that reviews proposals for research.
Typically such boards are internal to institutions and all members are affiliated scientists
and officials. Bringing local community members onto this board was an innovative
move, suggesting that nonscientists could contribute to conversations which center on the
ethics, outcomes, and methods of advanced scientific techniques. Gorman, who sits on
the board for the plaintiffs, recalls a lot of tension during the first meeting, while longstanding committee members figured out what the three public representatives had to
offer. Now, she says, this is where they have the conversations that emerged during the

162
NEPA process. Because they will defend their proposals to lay members of the public,
scientists must elaborate, in writing, processes which might otherwise be presumed. By
accepting these members on the biosafety committee, RML acknowledged that people
who are not a part of the science industry are vested in science practices and may have a
voice in stipulating the parameters under which science work is done.
The presumption that knowledge conquers fear was reiterated by scientists and
citizens alike throughout the BSL4 contestation. While NIH officials promised the public
that if they could only comprehend the scale of the risk, they would not be afraid,
advocacy groups settled with the provision that NIH would maintain communication and
disclose information to the community. The sense of security initially created through the
manipulation of physical space is sustained through the production of knowledge. The
control of public spaces in the name of security—constructing gates, issuing ID tags,
requiring escorts—furthers the need to produce biosecurity through knowledge, for when
citizens cannot enter the laboratory space, they can only know that space by the
information that flows from within. However, while people can judge secure spaces with
firsthand sensory experience, they have to develop trust in secondhand accounts of
security. In Hamilton, such trust developed during the long-standing and economically
beneficial presence of RML in the community, but had to be reconfigured in a world
where national security concerns seemed to override citizens’ interests in their individual
biological security.
These efforts to engage the community in the governance of risk show the first
steps in building trust and transparency between citizens and government. 50 It may be
that following the outcry and hyperbolic imaginings of the BSL4 debate, risk governance
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is finding its way in Hamilton, Montana. Certainly, it seems the mechanisms of framing
and deliberative learning proposed in Jasanoff’s essay gained momentum as effective
strategies for focusing wide-ranging public concerns. The question remains, however, of
whether risk can effectively be mitigated through improved forms of governance.
Perhaps, indeed, this is fundamentally a question of perception management; in
Hamilton, the perception that community members can speak out through the CLG and
IBC seems to provide a sense of security to its citizens. Whether this is truly a form of
governance can only be tested as the governing agency, in this case NIH and RML,
integrates the collection of public experiences through these venues into changed
practices and policies, bringing measurable outcomes as a result of public engagement.
“I Never Want to Say ‘I Told You So’”
A shiny new building sits today on the RML campus, reflecting the snow-capped
peaks of the Bitterroot Range in its shatterproof windowpanes. Fishing season is in full
swing, and residents are heading out to enjoy the brief Montana summer. By their
conversations they seem more concerned about drought and forest fire than Ebola and
smallpox. People have not forgotten the contention over the lab, but they seem to accept
its presence. And no one plans to leave town when the IRF goes to level 4. Mary Wulff
stayed in Hamilton, though she still looks skeptically towards the future: “I never want to
say ‘I told you so.’ If I do, we’re all toast.” She contends that the collectivities which
formed around the laboratory protest will endure, playing out in new ways in the future.
The present lack of concern among residents, even as the IRF finally goes live, raises the
question of how the new biosociality provides opportunities for citizens to gather
temporarily to activate for their biology, and then disperses when those biological
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conditions no longer exist, perhaps when cancer is cured or risk fades. Certainly these
forms account for the dynamic quality of life itself, for how could subjects build static
identities on such fluxing terms? The outcomes in Hamilton, however, suggest that
biosociality gains potency precisely because it provides a unifying ideology by which
citizens can take collective action. Perhaps the biosocial communities do not dissolve due
to changing conditions of life—for the biological risk in Hamilton endures today—but
because their usefulness as political tools fades. When biological claims become less
effective in accessing social and economic inclusion, citizens feel less bound to each
other on the basis of that shared identity.
The rise of the security culture in the United States has remade the terms of
citizenship in the modern age. Petryna proposes that “the very idea of citizenship is now
charged with the superadded burden of survival,” shifting away from a sense of
citizenship founded on tenets of civic participation and human rights, because those
principles cannot guarantee basic survival. 51 The tension which emerges when structures
of governance are unable to meet this essential biological goal is pushing the formation of
new democratic systems and reshaping biopolitics in general. If survival is the primary
biopolitical goal, any entity which threatens survival must be handled prior to and in
conjunction with all other negotiations of citizenship. If the state is parceling out the
intimate care of citizens to individuals and corporations, as Rose proposes, perhaps it is
because the burden of watching over survival more broadly has grown with the rise of the
national security state.52 When the issue of survival overwhelms negotiations of
citizenship between state and subject, less effort can be directed to the discussions of
individual freedom and liberal rights. Certainly bioterrorism and the imagination of a
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disease-ridden future effectively moves questions of collective and individual survival to
the fore of political interactions.
The story of a twice-contested laboratory in rural Montana illuminates how
citizens attempt to claim certain biological rights in dynamic times of science and terror,
and how governments work to sustain larger circulations of wealth and information in
order to further a broader security agenda. Motives of fear, trust, risk, and prosperity
worked conjunctively through the hundred-year project of making Rocky Mountain
Laboratories, simultaneously shaping the community in which it stands. Through all
these negotiations, community members often felt helpless in the face of the power and
politics of the science regime. A witness in the 1927 trial explained why his neighbor
refused to join the case against the labs: “He is very much in fear of ticks, and does not
feel there is a chance to get rid of this laboratory. He thinks the Government are (sic) too
powerful, and it was useless to contest the Government.” Though the citizen collectives
which came together at various times to protest Rocky Mountain Labs rarely achieved
their purported goals, they exemplify the desire of citizens to act on behalf of a biological
future. The recent protest of the BSL4 expansion reveals how untried conceptions of the
world and its risks are emerging alongside the new life sciences and the endless war on
terror. Such “serious speech acts” of citizens and scientists have “problematized” the
modern laboratory space. A Foucauldian “problematization” brings objects into “the play
of true and false” through discourse, and as Rabinow explains, “the reason why
problematizations are problematic, not surprisingly, is that something prior ‘must have
happened to introduce uncertainty, a loss of familiarity; that loss, that uncertainty is the
result of difficulties in our previous way of understanding, acting, relating.”53 The new
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biology presents countless uncertainties to the human condition, as does the politics of
the War on Terror. In Hamilton, a familiar space received new scrutiny because political
events surrounding bioterrorism introduced uncertainty into the local science complex,
rendering the lab unfamiliar and inciting discursive negotiations of fear, harm, and risk.
Thus, the bioterror crisis brings material effect by remaking spaces and redefining the
terms of biological citizenship.
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Chapter 3
Wash Your Hands, Watch Your Neighbor, and Make Your Nation Safe!:
Science and Surveillance as National Security Practice
at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
The Commission believes that unless the world community acts decisively and
with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction
will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. The
Commission further believes that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain
and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon.
--World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the
Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism.1

In 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) established an
incident command center on the second floor of Building 21, a glassy 12-story high-rise
that dominates the agency’s Atlanta campus. Funded in part by private donors, the
Director’s Emergency Operations Center (DEOC) is a place where division chiefs,
subject matter experts, budget personnel, and support teams can congregate to address a
crisis situation.2 When no incidents abound and no drills are underway, the rows of
workstations and high-tech meeting rooms sit empty, but for two workers staffing a 24hour hotline to connect local public health workers with subject matter experts at CDC.
When operational, DEOC is designed to command—to communicate, document, make
decisions, measure outcomes—and has the infrastructure to establish direct lines of
authority from a room in Building 21 to any other site in the country. Dan Sosin, acting
director of the Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
(COTPER) which oversees the DEOC, believes CDC’s expertise on biological agents
brought the agency into the emergency response environment, and then “money followed
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and expanded dramatically after we had experience with events that were deemed to have
a public health impact. The science has been chasing behind the application of
programmatic dollars to do something about this concern.”3 With counter-terrorism
funding, CDC created a space where the agency could act authoritatively in emergency
situations, a space awaiting the insertion of appropriate and available personnel during a
worthy event.
Colorful pennants hang on the walls of the command center, tallying incidents
when the DEOC was mobilized: green flags mark international events; blue and red flags
mark events in the United States; and solid colors mark the drills and scenarios staged in
the center. Flags commemorating bioterrorism preparedness exercises hang alongside
flags marking the space shuttle Columbia explosion and the latest hurricane season,
chronicling simulations on equal level with events that took place within the population.
Whether activated for preparedness or response, using the incident command produces a
form of expertise concerned with how people act during crisis, knowledge which will be
used to structure the systems and conditions of state authority during a biological event.
By directing every incident—large or small, real or simulated—from the command space,
CDC treats an array of situations as events in need of authoritarian discipline from a
central agency. Using such a space to rehearse a disease response, even under the
auspices of determining its weaknesses and improving response capabilities, inscribes it
with the purpose of mobilizing a timely, nationwide response to disease.
Historically, CDC has claimed to offer its expertise only upon request, primarily
by sending field agents to advise local governments and health workers during health
emergencies. While incident command has not replaced the use of such agents, and
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COTPER boasts an ability to deploy a team of field-ready experts within hours of an
event, DEOC displaces some of the authority traditionally given to field agents by
building a chain of command to the national level. Certainly, the science expertise
produced by this agency, which is consistently ranked among the most trustworthy
government entities, is not passive, for CDC’s research has institutionalized particular
ways of managing health and disease throughout the world.4 In building the DEOC, the
agency has produced a space at its national headquarters to command a response.
With its remote communications, secure telephone lines, video conferencing, and
real-time data, DEOC enables CDC to offer its expertise remotely, to physically avoid the
site of biologic risk while still controlling the disease response. Ironically, while the
DEOC was created to bring experts and decision-makers into common space to facilitate
an effective emergency response to a health crisis, the agency is now implementing ways
for people to report to DEOC from their homes or other remote locations, based upon the
belief that physical proximity could facilitate the spread of disease during a health crisis.
Dispensers of waterless hand sanitizer mounted in every room of the DEOC subtly
remind employees of their own vulnerability to disease, as do protocols requiring
individuals to stand ten feet apart when talking to each other in the DEOC during
pandemic events. Disease shapes the DEOC and the interactions of the people who work
there, for even the agency’s highly secure BSL4 laboratories are not exempt from the
agency’s mantra of the social control of disease.
To explore the question of how disease serves the security state, this chapter
considers how the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the nation’s expert agency
on public health, has been remade as an authority on national security, bringing its
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scientific expertise and a collection of healthcare practices into the service of a broader
domestic security agenda. I examine how the agency’s mission has been rewritten around
the notion of bioterrorism preparedness, and then explore the changing practices CDC
has adopted to meet these preparedness goals, particularly in the areas of science,
surveillance, and risk communication. While it is not unreasonable that an agency like
CDC will adapt to meet the new health challenges posed by the possibility of
bioterrorism, if protecting the nation means militarizing its systems of care, citizens’
bodies will be scrutinized against a new standard of health and risk. By adopting the
counterterrorism agenda, a branch of government with the primary purpose of providing
care to the population is being recruited to the War on Terror. Furthermore, increased
health authority at the national level challenges the traditionally local focus of public
health in the name of producing a timely, nationwide response to protect the population
during a disease event on a national scale. However, disease control practices deemed
acceptable to contain an epidemic may violate citizens’ privacy and autonomy when
enacted in the absence of a biological event. Ultimately, if preventing an attack is “not
sufficient” to the national security agenda, then biosecurity may never be attained,
producing a bioterror crisis characterized by a never-ending threat and demanding
rigorous attention on the part of its potential victims.5
In a 2008 report to Congress, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of
Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism prophesied that “a weapon of mass
destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.”6
This committee of security and subject matter experts called upon the services of the
nation’s health system to fight the “War on Terror,” a departure from the international
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diplomacy it recommends to combat nuclear terrorism. With bioterrorism “prevention
alone is not sufficient, and a robust system for public health preparedness and response is
vital to the nation’s security. In order to deter biological attacks, we need to
demonstrate—through effective preparedness measures and public exercises—that we are
capable of blunting the impact of an attack and thus thwarting the terrorists’ objectives.”7
By this articulation, bioterrorism cannot be contained by the work of policymakers
crafting treaties on foreign soils, but must be battled by the domestic health system.
According to these experts, national biosecurity hinges upon the ability of the health
system to respond to a biological attack so swiftly and efficiently that the event, in
essence, would have no impact upon the population. The health system must also
publicly demonstrate that it is so prepared. Fueled by billions of dollars in bioterrorism
preparedness grants, the project to achieve nationwide biosecurity by remaking the public
health system has been underway for the past decade and is bringing a new level of
militarism to the everyday practices of health and wellness. Because disease is battled at
the individual, intimate level of the human body, restructuring care mechanisms has
profound impact not only on how the healthy population is delineated, but on how bodies
are constituted and managed by the modern security state. The morphing of microbes into
weapons of mass destruction, as imagined by the technoscientific practices of genomic
biology, has rearranged the parameters by which disease is known, requiring new
equations of biological risk and new interventions to preserve the nation’s health.
The Care of the CDC
To accomplish its mission to care for the population by “controlling the
introduction and spread of infectious diseases,” CDC conducts laboratory research,
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collects disease surveillance data, develops health promotion programs, and sends
epidemiologists into communities to respond to disease outbreaks.8 In this capacity, CDC
was on the front lines for the anthrax attacks of 2001, and soon after Director Julie
Gerberding testified before Congress that CDC would be a part of the domestic terrorism
response: “The events of September and October 2001 made it very clear that terrorism is
a serious threat to our Nation and the world. The Bush Administration and Congress
responded forcefully to this threat by providing funding to strengthen our medical and
public health capacities to protect our citizens from future attacks. To support [The
Department of Health and Human Services], CDC has made terrorism preparedness and
emergency response one of two overarching agency goals and has built an infrastructure
to catalyze and implement biodefense activities.”9 As Gerberding promised, CDC
immediately made changes that would further define it as an agency concerned with
bioterrorism preparedness. The Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and
Emergency Response was established in 2002, and became one of the seven Coordinating
Centers that structure the agency.10 Through COTPER and acting under directive from
Congress, CDC created the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) of vaccines and medical
supplies, established a nationwide Laboratory Response Network (LRN) to test microbial
agents, developed BioSense programs to share health information and track the spread of
health threats, and built a state-of-the-art incident command center to use during
emergency events. In 2007, COTPER managed $1.5 billion appropriated by Congress for
terrorism preparedness and emergency response, about one-sixth of CDC’s $8.4 billion
budget.11
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With this infrastructure in place, CDC declared in 2006 that it was shifting its
preparedness focus towards improving emergency response time through science
research and scenario analysis.12 Bioterrorism infused the agency with a sense of
urgency, expanding CDC’s nominal focus on disease control and prevention to include
emergency response. Dr. Gerberding identified terrorism as the catalyst for a reformation
of national health strategy:
The philosophy of public health during the 20th century has been to prevent
natural outbreaks. In the 21st century, however this is not enough. The threat of
terrorism necessitates that we improve our public health and medical systems so
that we can respond with greater flexibility, speed, and capacity to handle mass
casualties and large-scale emergency response in coordination with our traditional
emergency response partners as well as those at Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and Department of Defense (DoD).13
Gerberding explained CDC’s alliance with the nation’s military agencies as an answer to
a new regime of disease, where disease is somehow faster and larger, requiring the
reaction of soldiers not just scientists. Though presented by Gerberding as a new
association, the alliance of departments of health and war characterized military conflict
throughout the 20th century. The medical community continues to grapple with the deeds
of Nazi physicians during the Second World War, as well as so-called public health
practices like sterilization or mass quarantine.14 Scholars have argued that the new
knowledge of infectious disease emerging at the turn of the century has been used to
rationalize the victimization of certain populations, whether through the policing of
hygiene or the discursive formation of victimized communities through the dialogues of
disease and risk.15 The military exploited new fears of disease which emerged as
scientists showed disease to be external, transmissible, tropical, parasitic, and endemic,
and public health practices which might have been deemed intolerable infringements
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upon civil liberties were sanctioned by belief in the priority of disease control and the
scientific promise that disease could be eliminated by the careful management of
populations. Incidents of violent genocide continuing into the 21st century illustrate the
most extreme consequences of the militarization of public health, but even now-routine
acts like medical surveying, also begun during World War II, show that the social fear of
disease allowed health practices to be brought increasingly into the service of the nationstate, conceiving of disease in terms of nationalized populations rather than global
humanity.16
The emergence of the germ theory of disease in the 19th century brought disease
into the calculation of security because it identified a source of disease outside the human
body. Disease is a bearer of deviance, for the presence of disease renders some members
of a population less healthy than others. Through the mechanisms of security, an
acceptable level of disease within a population can be calculated, allowing morbidity to
be a part of a normally healthy life, while still enabling the security apparatus to work
against deviant cases and individuals to act upon their personal will to be healthy.
Foucault theorizes a changing relationship between people and disease based upon the
ability to calculate risk and create a population, a collection of living beings defined by
their biological and pathological characteristics and subject to common mechanisms of
governing. 17 If security comes from the ability to determine and maintain a “normal”
condition of the population, and the liberal state is governed so that all individuals can
work to attain that normalcy, then the mechanisms of security must extend deeply into
the many social conditions of life which have the potential to deviate within the
population. Because liberal citizens have the right and responsibility to govern their
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social interactions as they relate to the risk of contracting disease, the technologies of
disease control work effectively as a security apparatus. By the time the scientific
promise that disease could be wiped from the earth faded in the late-twentieth century,
disease control practices were entrenched in practices of citizenship and national security
and could be appropriated by a new disease response where the eruption of disease within
the population is presumed and anticipated.
By articulating bioterrorism as a disease threat and using security techniques
developed for disease outbreaks, the state employs a unique blend of liberalism and
militarism to promote individual preparedness while simultaneously organizing a largescale governmental response. This strategy imagines citizens as agents in producing
biosecurity, a role emphasized by Senator Graham’s Commission. While their report said
little about how citizens could aid in nuclear nonproliferation, they admonished people to
take on a range of behaviors to promote biosecurity, such as logging onto the government
preparedness website, Ready.gov, or learning how to identify and report a neighbor’s
suspicious activities. Diseases can be battled by the individual, and the prescription of
minimally disruptive techniques like vaccination and social distancing proposes to
interrupt the chain of contagion that would turn disease into a crisis.18 Social distancing,
for example, encourages people who exhibit symptoms of disease to isolate themselves
from the population, a voluntary action which relieves the state of the responsibility to
enforce quarantine, a rule of law. Because contagion creates social fear around human
interactions by transforming all bodies into vectors of disease, healthy individuals govern
themselves out of fear of contracting disease, as evidenced by people who donned
surgical masks to walk through parts of certain cities during the SARS outbreak in 2003.
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While legal regulations can require certain behaviors of individuals infected with disease,
such as prohibiting TB patients from flying on commercial airlines, the security apparatus
manages the circumstance where the apparently healthy members of a population are still
potential carriers of disease. Bioterrorism (and disease) preparedness operates presuming
that artificial controls can limit the disease before its spread is “naturally” contained,
reducing morbidity and mortality and producing a higher level of security for the
population.19 By aligning terrorism with disease, the social controls long used to secure
the population against disease can be reproduced in the daily acts of national security.
The population, however, encompasses both those who are ill and those who are not,
subjecting healthy bodies to the techniques of governing the sick. Interestingly,
bioterrorism imagines the population as a collection of presently healthy bodies where
disease, though currently absent, is still calculated into the risk that defines the
population. The healthy population is distinctively regulated by the possibility that
disease could be introduced, unknown to the individual or the state, at any moment.
When the belief that the nation needs to be secured against bioterrorist threats
rationalizes a wide-scale biosecurity response, the military state harnesses fears of disease
and terrorism in ways that also transform the meaning of disease. Weaponization violates
the “natural” bounds, such as climate or reproduction, which regulate the expansion of
disease within a population. CDC’s scientific practices have produced a store of expertise
concerning how microbes live, grow, and move within populations, and along with that
an expectation that disease can be controlled by knowing the parameters under which
diseases survive. Bioterrorism violates these (presumed) boundaries, rendering CDC’s
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expertise less useful in combating an intentional release, for disease is both a social and
natural process. As one CDC employee explained,
When you’re dealing with an outbreak of plague that’s epizootic, that is coming
from prairie dogs, you can anticipate who’s going to be at risk and the control
measures you need to put in place to stop that outbreak. If you’re dealing with
something that was intentionally released, you don’t necessarily have that
boundary that you can rely on for how to respond and keep it from happening
again, because who knows if it’s going to be released somewhere else.… People
are a lot more interested in an intentional outbreak of plague than in reading about
prairie dogs in Arizona.20
The disease expertise which enables CDC to intervene in outbreaks presumes that disease
is limited by consistent and knowable controls, but bioterrorism creates new parameters
for disease which cannot be known through study of microbes. Because weaponization
and intentionality create so many unknowns regarding the disease and its environment,
CDC must develop new knowledge to uphold its expert role. Preparedness expertise
attends to the knowable qualities of the population when faced with an unknowable
disease threat.
By opening the possibility for a seemingly limitless number of biological threats,
bioterrorism changes what it means to be “prepared” for disease. No longer can
individuals take directed actions to prevent a finite list of risky diseases, for disease could
come from anywhere, including new strains concocted in laboratories; no longer can
disease be known “in terms of the calculus of probabilities.”21 With less ability to act in
the interests of their own health, individuals seek new knowledge and expertise, leading
to an expansion in the knowledge-producing role of government. Because the global
condition and the rise of genomic science have produced diseases that are constantly
emerging, resurrecting, and mutating, disease can never be knowable, demanding that the
security apparatus adopt mechanisms of disease control that have as much to do with the
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militant protection of national borders and disease laboratories as with the scientific study
of particular microbes.
“Preparedness” differs from “prevention” by its focus on the health infrastructure
rather than a particular disease, and the imagining of future threats rather than the
calculation of past events.22 Collier and Lakoff describe preparedness as a “crucial
interface between public health and national security,” identifying preparedness
techniques as those which model future threats in order to locate and act upon
vulnerabilities in the present infrastructure.23 Though the goal to secure the population
remains, preparedness employs the vagueness of the threat to broaden the security
response. In adopting a strategic preparedness plan, CDC has integrated security against
future threats with its liberal ideals of total health. CDC’s investment in preparedness
particularly targets the production of a timely response to a health emergency, as if to
promise minimal disruption to the normalcy of life. Further, because preparedness entails
infrastructure change rather than specific knowledge of disease, CDC is changing its role
as an “expertise-only” agency, acquiring resources and training personnel that will be
deployed as part of the agency’s timely response. The security apparatus of
“preparedness” has consequences in reshaping a public health infrastructure that is built
to respond to, rather than diagnose, deter, or eliminate disease. In this scenario,
vulnerability is not eliminated, but contained.
In 2004, CDC named “preparedness” as one of its four strategic Health Protection
Goals, along with healthy people, healthy places, and global health. Two years later, the
agency declared it would be shifting from a preparedness plan concerned with building
infrastructure to an effort to improve response time in emergency situations, including
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natural disasters and terrorist attacks. “Our goals measure the speed in which we prevent,
detect, investigate, and control public health emergencies.”24 Indeed, CDC’s
preparedness goals before, during, and after an event center on decreasing the time to
detect, identify, provide countermeasures, restore health services, and implement
changes. Not only does the CDC’s plan to improve the timeliness of its response reify the
event as part of an inevitable future, but it also reproduces disease as an event, directing
attention and resources to handling disease when it happens. Though CDC is involved in
a range of long-term health initiatives, such as anti-smoking or anti-obesity campaigns,
the agency is still a first responder in disease emergencies, and the study of infectious
disease continues to dominate CDC’s research agenda.25 While CDC may stand to benefit
from the perception of disease as an event of national proportions, particularly because an
outbreak has potential to rally public support and secure resources for other disease
control programs, aligning disease with disaster-like events has consequences in shaping
a militarized response to disease rather than a consideration of the wide political causes
and outcomes of infection.26 Preparing for an event presumes the health status of the
population will change, likely dramatically, in some future time. By this iteration, the
present situation becomes the standard of normalcy and the objective of public health is
to maintain status quo, thereby normalizing health problems that already exist within the
population.
To rationalize bioterrorism expenditures, public health advocates allude to the
dual-use potential of preparedness technologies. The justification ranges from the belief
that bioterrorism is improving the overall public health infrastructure, to the claim that
the public system will be able to assist domestic security, often military, responses to
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other events of national proportions, such as hurricanes or nuclear attacks. Pamela Diaz,
associate director of science for CDC’s Division of Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response, argues that “bioterrorism funds helped moved communicable disease
investigation into the 20th century. It did, and we were not going to get that money any
other way, because there had been such dissolution of public health in the 20 years prior
with categorical funding going constantly down. Now, we’re trying to get into the 21st
century.”27 Because these funds are prioritized for emergency preparedness, however, the
public health infrastructure is being reshaped around the emergency response to disease.
Though laboratories and clinics may be better equipped overall, the question remains of
how that equipment shapes the work being done in those places, for even an
infrastructure with multiple capabilities will have primary and priority uses. Whether
attention to terror is distracting from more critical disease concerns, or beneficial to the
public health system overall, bioterrorism preparedness is producing a public health
system working for timely responses to disease emergencies, giving tenacity to the belief
that an event will take place and that the government is responsible for intervening at the
local public health level.
In order to create the interest and urgency to mobilize government and citizens,
and to justify bioterrorism expenditures, CDC has identified a series of biological events
which threaten the national health in succession, thereby imagining the population as
vulnerable, not just to a single event, but to a series of health catastrophes. This
multiplication of risk produces a population that is perpetually threatened by bioweapons,
pandemic disease, flooding, hurricanes, and global travel. In developing an overarching,
all-hazards preparedness strategy, CDC ascribes an elevated sense of urgency and
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timeliness to many aspects of the nation’s health plan and increases the number and types
of individual behaviors which threaten the population. Not only does the endless threat
justify an armed-and-ready health militia, but when CDC responds to hurricane sites or
earthquake zones, the techniques of the largely militarized disaster response become part
of the standard for disease control practices.
CDC’s 15,000 employees are involved in a range of disease prevention activities,
such as mobilizing local health workers, offering on-site expertise, networking, and
regulating channels of communication. To explore how CDC produces bioterrorism, I
will consider three particular practices: scientific study of disease and human disease
behavior, surveillance of the population, and communicating preparedness interventions
to individuals. In this discussion, I will consider how these practices work to secure the
population by regulating its social interactions, producing a security mechanism that
operates at the level of the individual and subjects who work to secure the nation against
the bioterror threat.

Scientific Study. “Remember, at CDC, data is king! It’s the lifeblood of the organization,
the mother’s milk.”28 This CDC scientist described science as the overarching force
driving CDC actions, determining what CDC does, how it intervenes, and how it spends
its money. The agency, however, is a place where science and public health overlap, and
as Dixie Snider, former Chief Science Officer explains, in CDC laboratories “there’s this
idea that there’s some practical issue to be addressed. We don’t have the orientation …
that scientific knowledge is intriguing and interesting on its own merits, and if there’s a
practical spin-off that’s great. As a public health agency, we don’t have the dollars for
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that kind of research.”29 Such a research agenda enlists the methods of science in the
service of public health, establishing CDC as source for a particular class of disease
information as it relates to the health of the population. The ideology that scientific study
can and should bring about change in health practice fits well with CDC’s preparedness
goals, which presume that vulnerabilities exist but must be identified in order to be acted
upon. The agency’s research practices, including the goals expressed in CDC’s
comprehensive research guide, shows that CDC is developing a particular research
agenda around bioterrorism preparedness, one which presupposes that the population is at
risk and is focused on providing techniques which will impact how that risk is assessed
and mitigated in the population.30
In 2006, CDC published “Advancing the Nation’s Health: A guide to public
health research needs, 2006-2015,” a 139-page compendium outlining the agency’s
research priorities as established through internal working groups, input from employees
and partner agencies, and formalized public comment. The “Research Guide” claims to
identify gaps in knowledge which, if filled, will justify public health interventions and
improve the effectiveness of public health work.31 The guide lists “preparedness” as the
second of CDC’s seven major research areas, for “although emergency public health has
always been a public health activity, health services research in preparedness and
response must be made a priority.”32 The preparedness goals focus on infrastructure,
emergency responders, communications, and vulnerable communities, rendering the
people who respond to an event as the priority to be studied over the microbes
themselves.33 Not only does this agenda presume communities are vulnerable, but also
that the factors which produce vulnerability can be quantified and measured in ways that
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will bring about change in the population and produce preparedness.34 Because the
research proposed to support CDC’s preparedness effort imagines communities as groups
of individuals with calculable behaviors and characteristics that produce vulnerability,
these studies will facilitate health interventions which are sustained by this quantified
assessment of people and risk. This research produces expertise of human behavior, not
disease and microorganisms, a distinction which has potential to change the role CDC
will play in responding to crises.
During the anthrax events of 2001, CDC assumed a role as an authority in field
techniques, for not only did the event demand answers from CDC scientists regarding the
microbe, but it required expertise regarding the risk of the disease within a particular
context. For example, when CDC workers were cleaning spaces contaminated with
anthrax spores, they confronted the question, “How clean is ‘clean’?” The agency had to
quantify and prove cleanliness, a task Diaz says her research team continues to debate in
their work to develop standards which can be used in the field: “How clean does it have
to be? How do you translate the risk of a spore or two spores in light of a human being?
How accurate does a test have to be?”35 Preparedness funds at CDC are being directed at
answering these questions, and collaborating with partner agencies to identify and answer
fundamental questions related to biological attacks. CDC works to translate risk to
individuals and make recommendations for a population.36 The work CDC scientists do
to develop better field assays, establish protocols for handling potential bioterrorist
agents, and collaborate with national security agencies builds the agency’s expertise on
bioterrorist events, in addition to its role in studying biological agents. While science
informs these debates, one director in the bioterrorism preparedness office says that in his
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experience public health decisions are based upon evidence, while “bioterror decisions
are based upon politics.”37 The social context influences the questions being asked and
therefore the evidence being produced, and while all science is political in this regard, the
attention and demand for timely answers produced by bioterrorism may distance the
scientist from involvement in formulating pertinent questions.
Of particular challenge in emergency preparedness is the irregularity of events,
limiting the amount of data available to be gathered and analyzed from the field. To
compensate for the lack of field data, CDC and other agencies are increasingly turning to
drills and simulations to imagine the outcomes of bioterrorism events, and CDC claims
the research goal to “ensure scientific rigor in the design, implementation, and evaluation
of drills and exercises.”38 Such scenarios produce data regarding potential participant
responses and event outcomes. As a scientific method this practice falls somewhere
between observation and experiment, and is notably different from the laboratory science
and field work that has built CDC’s disease expertise, though these scenarios are
designed based upon knowledge of disease contagion acquired in the laboratory and
assessments of vulnerability produced by social science research of the population.
Because bioterrorism and other emergency situations change how disease moves within
the population, CDC is undertaking new study of how disease might move during crisis
situations.
Access to bioterror preparedness funds is enabling the public health discipline to
conduct research which will justify a range of past, present, and future security actions,
“developing a science base for public health practice” and establishing expertise, not just
on disease, but on populations.39 CDC’s research agenda profiles populations in terms of
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risk and vulnerability to disease, calling upon scientists to use measures to quantify and
compare communities, thereby rationalizing national security actions within certain
communities. By describing communities in terms of vulnerability to disease, science can
be used to explain the biological impacts of social interactions, subjecting communal
behavior to the rule of health experts.40 CDC explains the world in terms of disease,
calling for disease scientists to keep pace with globalization and study how the social
conditions that bring about contagion produce risk and vulnerability due to bioterrorism.
CDC maps the population as a network of people and places made vulnerable by lines of
interaction and weaknesses in infrastructure, and as CDC grows into its role as a
bioterrorism authority, it brings these social networks under the scrutiny of national
security concerns.

Surveillance. Like the famous horseshoe seating of NASA’s mission control, all
workstations in CDC’s Emergency Operations Center are oriented towards a large bank
of screens covering the long wall of the center room. While the content of these screens
will be changed as needed during an incident, on this day a screen on the far right shows
the day’s scheduled events while the two screens on the far left stream CNN and the
Atlanta news. In the center, a half-dozen screens display health-related information
around the world. One map of the United States shows the number of flu outbreaks in the
country to date; another map charts salmonella in North America. A global outlook map
tracks diseases of interest around the word, as reported over the last two weeks. Another
map shows a satellite weather image, so CDC can track the advance of Hurricane
Poloma. One screen lists individuals on the airline industry’s “Do Not Board” list; there
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are 23 people on the list on this day, primarily individuals with tuberculosis. This
electronic wall of the DEOC creates a timely image of the nation’s health, an up-to-theminute calculation of the people and places being monitored by the health sector, visually
situated between the day-to-day operations of CDC and the constant streaming of events
presented by news media. CDC serves as a national center for handling surveillance data
and the effective collection and distribution of this information is at the core of its public
health mission. Surveillance of the population for disease, particularly the collection and
use of surveillance data in policymaking, also plays a role producing the healthy
population as vulnerable to bioterrorism and therefore in need of securing. CDC’s
surveillance capabilities have expanded with bioterrorism funding, increasing its stores of
national health information.
Public health surveillance involves the systematic collection of data regarding
disease and health behaviors and the analysis of that information to impact public health
practice. Methods range from laws that require health care providers to report certain
diseases to local health departments, to voluntary surveys that solicit information about
health practices directly from the population.41 Information can also be gleaned from vital
records, hospital reports, laboratories, or police reports. New technologies are changing
traditional health surveillance techniques. For example, CDC is working with Google to
explore ways of tracking internet searches for disease symptoms in order to locate
outbreaks in their earliest phases—before individuals start going to the doctor.
Environmental sensor technology, as used in the DHS BioWatch program, attempts to
locate disease-causing microbes in the air before they impact human hosts. Ultimately,
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disease surveillance targets microbes, but humans are implicated as the microbial hosts
and must be dissembled in order to scrutinize the disease-causing agents.42
Biosurveillance practices build networks that connect local populations to the
nation in real-time, for even while the geographic scale expands to the global, the
chronological scale is shrinking, offering the possibility to quantify the health status of
the world in the immediately present moment.43 By allowing health workers and citizens
to “see” the disease-present status of the world, surveillance technology facilitates a
belief that it is possible to act against disease in the present moment, for surveillance
tracks the marks of disease upon the population even while the microbes themselves
remain invisible. The hope that a bioterrorist event can be mitigated depends upon the
belief that such an event can be detected in a timely fashion. New surveillance
technology offers hope that detection will be fast enough.
Where CDC has traditionally distributed disease expertise to populations through
local health departments, the expansion of CDC’s surveillance capabilities through the
BioSense program instituted following 9/11 has increased the role of the federal agency
in collecting information about populations from the local public health service. Along
with BioWatch and BioShield, the BioSense program was part of the Bush
administration’s three-pronged attack on bioterrorism. Established in 2003, BioSense
aims to collect “real-time” data from a range of local health centers with the goal of
detecting anomalies in disease patterns which would indicate an unusual disease event,
whether terrorist attack or food poisoning. The technology uses an Internet-based
platform for reporting and tracking information, an attempt to standardize the myriad
reporting systems currently being used by local health organizations. With a price tag
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now approaching half a billion dollars, BioSense has not been popular with public health
practitioners and will likely be fully revised and implemented no earlier than 2012.44
CDC claims the benefits of “real-time” information will not only serve national security
issues, but will empower local departments to communicate effectively with each other in
order to better serve their populations.45 On the other hand, local health departments must
invest additional labor into BioSense training and reporting, but receive no additional
funding to do so. After establishing its own department to collect and analyze BioSense
data, CDC analysts now have the ability to map the patterns of normalcy around the
nation and sound an alert when they spot abnormalities, but local health workers are now
expected to respond to such alerts promptly, further taxing a system that already
complains of being short-staffed and undersupplied.46
Surveillance is not a passive technology. Engineers of surveillance devices make
calculated decisions about what data will be collected, how it will be analyzed, and
therefore how it can be used.47 Design decisions include everything from what organisms
or symptoms to monitor, to calibrating how sensitive the system should be to aberrations.
Then, the surveillance technology must be programmed with a norm and a way to
recognize specified types of deviance, relying on both science expertise and government
to establish what level of deviance should signal an alert. “We have to set up systems
sensitive enough to pick up the organisms without spending taxpayers’ money on false
alarms.”48 Designers program the technology with protocol to determine whether an
event is “real,” masking the decision-making which established the parameters that would
sound the alarm and quantifying the precise level of deviance which can be accepted
within the healthy population. Dr. Snider explains, “At the end of the day, we have to err
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on the side of having a civic system that’s sensitive, but not overly so. There’s pressure
from Congress to develop those types of systems. We’re developing several systems. I
am not so arrogant as to say we’ve got it, but we’re getting there. We’re getting closer to
not one, but a suite of systems.”49 Though surveillance has long been valued by the
public health apparatus, Snider alludes to new pressure from government to watch over
the population.50 When used as a detection device, rather than a means to gather
information about disease for science research, surveillance technologies produce data
which will prompt swift, militant action upon the population by health authorities and the
state. By locating decision-making about surveillance at the national level, biosecurity
programs like BioSense and BioWatch are transforming a traditionally local health
practice of data collection into a national effort, shifting a scale of public health that has
long tilted towards the local a bit more in favor of national control.51
As with other bioterrorism preparedness programs, surveillance activities are
justified by their multiple uses and synergistic public benefit. Dan Sosin, acting director
of CDC’s Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response,
argues that surveillance activities bound by the same rigors of science method that inform
CDC’s laboratory activities can potentially sustain the dual-use platform of bioterrorism
preparedness measures:
We need effective systems of gathering and sharing timely health information to
lead to quality improvement and effective decision making. That requires
scientific emphasis on identifying the appropriate metrics of interest for
surveillance, both from the standpoint of improving the provision of care, whether
that’s clinical care or public health care, and for measurement in quality
improvement. This focus on the science of gleaning health related information
from real-time electronic sources, and how we make better use of that both in
targeted ways and in ways of discovery, are an important place in which we can
advance multiple objectives of public health at the same time…and that can be
driven by science.52
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A dual-use approach to disease research, however, will produce different science
outcomes by shifting the locus of inquiry from the microbe and body to the population at
large. Because surveillance shows a geography of disease—how microbes impact people
in places over time—changing the scale from local to national shows disease risk in terms
of the national body rather than individuals within a community. Surveillance also
animates disease by showing how outbreaks move over space and time, providing a map
for an intervention. When surveillance is used within a dual-use platform which includes
the potential for any disease to outbreak anywhere, at any time through bioterrorist acts,
there is potential for the science objectives to favor enabling a rapid response during an
event over identifying and addressing long-term health trends. Still, Dr. Sosin sees
surveillance as a “leverage point” in biosecurity: something that if done well will affect
the outcome of bioterrorist events, “if we invest appropriately and apply a rigorous
scientific approach to the extrapolation of that knowledge.”53
The expansion of CDC’s surveillance programs characterizes the post-9/11 world
where existing technologies find broader application and popular support during a crisis,
and the time of “exception” becomes a new state of governing.54 Since September 11 the
surveillance state has manifest as a surveillance society, where the mechanisms of
surveillance and the role of surveyor are dispersed through many actors whose roles are
elevated by the crisis.55 By deploying the technological fix—expanding the use of
existing surveillance technologies against an unknown enemy—the response is calculated
by available solutions rather than the threat itself.56 Because surveillance systems are
perceived to be passively “watching” the population, they are characterized by a lack of
accountability. David Lyon sees danger in the surveillance solution because it expands
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the potential to classify the population, centralizes state authority, and is generally
supported by people who submit to surveillance as the ‘price of security.’ When they are
under surveillance, citizens assume a new identity grounded in risk, built around a
normalized population and the perception that they are living in a state of exception.
Health surveillance technologies produce all members of the population as potential
victims of disease, and the discursive production of the crisis articulates a shared identity
in that vulnerability. Senator Graham’s commission’s definition of victimhood which
gave all people access to the identity of a victim: “In every terrorist strike anywhere in
the world, to every innocent life lost must be added thousands more who were just hours
away…. In those moments of danger, we are all, first and foremost, citizens of a world at
risk.”57

Risk Communication. In 2007, CDC revamped its website, a redesign based upon
“science, best practices, and evidence-based research” to better serve the 9 million
“diverse customers” who search for health content on CDC.gov.58 While CDC’s
traditional customers are state and local public health departments, the agency’s expertise
is increasingly being sought by other government agencies, the press, and the public. The
overhaul of CDC’s internet presence followed the recognition that individual citizens
were turning directly to CDC to find answers to their health questions. “For many years
we thought we were a wholesaler of health information, but now we realize that we are
both a wholesaler and a retailer. It took a while to realize we were in that role and now
we are making adjustments to be a good retailer, too. It’s a new concept for us; we hadn’t
been trained to do that.”59 The reordering of time and space that accompany digital
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technology enable individuals to turn directly to CDC for health information, and CDC is
recognizing a new role in producing a message that bypasses health departments and is
consumed directly by the citizen.
Remaking CDC into a retailer of information reverses a flow of expertise that has
carried information from CDC to the public through intermediaries, whether field agents
at an epidemiological event or local doctors who display posters in their offices. While a
public website seems to empower subjects to make decisions regarding their own health,
citizens do not have access to the raw data collected by scientists, but to a crafted
message about how they should manage their own health. In rethinking its gatekeeping
strategies—how it packages and displays those products for the public consumer—CDC
is making deliberate decisions about enticing consumers and producing citizens who will
govern their own behaviors.
Bioterrorism has been articulated as a crisis of national scale, and while liberal
subjects still seek health expertise locally and individually, the technologies of the digital
age remake a large, distant group of experts as an accessible authority. While many of
CDC’s disease-control messages remain consistent during bioterrorism events—wash
your hands, cover your mouth, cook your food thoroughly—as the agency assumes a role
to communicate directly to citizens, it builds government authority over the health of the
population. Again, the national agency increasingly assumes a role it previously
delegated to local health authorities, establishing its own authority over the public health
response.
As a public health agency, CDC is motivated by “the belief that the government
can and should do something to improve the lives of citizens.”60 Jim Curran, now dean of
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the Emory School of Public Health and former head of CDC’s AIDS program, says the
goal of public health is to “redefine the unacceptable.”61 For example, scientists can
collect data showing that smoking will cause cancer, but the public health debate lies in
what should be done about it, and how much work the government should do to push the
population towards fear and panic in order to bring a positive social effect.62 While
scientific study of the population establishes the parameters of unacceptable behavior,
risk communication plays a role in creating the public opinion that will bring about
change. The work that CDC does using science knowledge to impact citizen behavior is a
form of biopolitical governance eminently useful to the security state in accessing the
population.
Beginning in 2002, CDC introduced a risk communication curriculum into its
semiannual training for Epidemiological Intelligence Service officers, the experts who
respond to disease events locally. The course teaches strategies for building trust,
nonverbal communication techniques, how to stage a public exhibit, run a public
meeting, and work with the media.63 In the curriculum, effective communication is
directly correlated with positive health outcomes, while possible effects of poor risk
communication include “demands for unneeded treatment, disorganized group behavior
(stealing/looting), bribery and fraud, … unreasonable trade and travel restrictions, …
misallocation of limited response resources, … (and) increased disease and death.”64 The
expectation that EIS officers will be asked to speak as authorities remakes their adviseupon-invitation-only role in the field, and the training anticipates that CDC
communications will impact citizen behavior.65 In addition, media staff participates in
CDC drills and planning meetings with the express purpose of anticipating what
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questions the public will have during bioterrorism events and other emergencies.66 The
strengthening of CDC’s media corps since the 2001 anthrax events reflects the agency’s
commitment to developing crafted media messages during times of emergency.
While a communicator during a crisis may be concerned with explaining CDC
actions or the science of a particular biological agent, CDC works daily to prepare the
population to receive instruction during emergency events. The director of the Office of
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response believes this communication engages
individuals in emergency preparedness: “if they feel like you’re responding and you’re
thinking about these issues, they’re going to feel a lot less anxiety. They know what’s
going on and how you’ll respond to it.” CDC regularly publishes preparedness plans
which describe specific actions people might take before and during an emergency.
Isolation, home quarantine, closures of schools, cancellation of public gatherings, handwashing, and covering one’s mouth when sneezing are advocated in CDC publications,
targeting individuals and attempting to persuade people to adopt or eliminate personal
behaviors, repackaging familiar disease-prevention behaviors as acts to secure the nation
and producing individual health behaviors as patriotic or community-minded actions.67
CDC communicates a bioterrorism preparedness message that simultaneously
assures the citizenry that the government is at work solving the problem, but that its work
can only be successful through the citizens’ governing of themselves. As a security
technology, risk communication practices must incite action without causing a level of
fear which would create insecurity. CDC is also concerned with upholding its expertise
through its risk communication techniques, retaining its privileged access to information
which will shape the experience of bioterrorism. Aihwa Ong recognizes the biopolitical
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foundations of governing in practices that extract living resources from the population,
with the dual purposes of governing the individual body to optimize its capacities while
building the collective capabilities of the population. CDC must protect individual health
while governing the interactions that sustain the nation’s living resources. Neoliberal
“technologies of subjectivity rely on an array of knowledge and expert systems to induce
self-animation and self-government so that citizens can optimize choices, efficiency, and
competitiveness in turbulent market conditions.”68 Science, surveillance, and
communication technologies used by CDC are producing such an array of expertise,
making opportunities for the biological citizen to negotiate the risks of bioterrorism.69
Material Outcomes of Bioterrorism Preparedness
Both scientists and CDC officials interviewed in this research expressed the
difficulty of showing citizens what federal bioterrorism preparedness funds are buying
and of convincing people that the nation is “prepared” for biological attacks. In the
absence of a bioterrorist event to demonstrate preparedness (or lack thereof), agencies
may point to tangible indicators of preparedness, such as stockpiles of pharmaceuticals,
or evidence that the funds are providing a social benefit beyond preparedness, such as
improvements to public health laboratories. Examining the ways in which new spaces are
built or old spaces are reappointed in order to support CDC’s new science, surveillance,
and communication practices shows how the agency is being materially remade as a
national security entity. Places at CDC headquarters, like the DEOC, facilitate a national,
militarized response to disease events, showing how concerns over biosecurity have
brought public health more forcefully into the domain of national government. However,
CDC allocates most of its bioterrorism budget to support biosecurity at the state and local

196
level, creating at all levels of public health dual-use spaces which promote public
wellbeing on a daily basis, but can be taken over during a “crisis” to serve a timely
security purpose.70 Thus, by accessing the existing public health apparatus, the national
security state accesses both liberal claims to health security and militant authority over
bodies during times of crisis. The state authority over citizens’ health depends upon
expertise on biological threats, and CDC’s science and health practices both order
knowledge and institutionalize power. New products and places are changing how CDC
does business, structuring the conditions under which knowledge of disease and
populations is produced. Furthermore, as the agency stockpiles vaccines and hosts private
sector training institutes, CDC is becoming a national repository for goods and
information which will be vital to citizens during a biological event. In this new economy
of bioterrorism preparedness, expertise is trafficked alongside pharmaceuticals, and
CDC’s authority has the potential to sway markets.

Strategic National Stockpile. Biosecurity funding has changed the expertise-only model
at CDC by building the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), which gives CDC
responsibility over a reserve of vaccines and other pharmaceutical supplies to be used in a
biological event. Through SNS, CDC claims it can deliver 15 semi-trucks full of medical
supplies to any location in the contiguous 48 states within 12 hours. An “adrenaline
junkie’s dream job,” SNS workers excel at logistics and have the technological and
personal connections to move items rapidly through space.71 While local and state
agencies are responsible for the distribution of supplies to the population, SNS stores are
bought and managed by the federal government, giving CDC its first large-scale physical
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product: millions of doses of antibiotics, vaccines, and other countermeasures to
biological attacks. As the largest collection of such goods, CDC’s decisions on what
drugs to purchase, from whom, and how often, have no small impact upon the
pharmaceutical industry, and the agency must also assume responsibility for maintaining,
rotating, and restocking such a reserve. Prior to the establishment of SNS through
bioterrorism funding, local health departments were solely responsible for acquiring
disease treatments, even during emergency events. Now, while these groups play a vital
role in first response and then distribution and administration of pharmaceuticals, all
commodities beyond a small local reserve are controlled at the national level in the name
of security and efficiency. Individuals are discouraged from purchasing or storing
vaccines and antibiotics, and are specifically instructed not to seek out such items so that
the national stockpile will not be depleted. Instead, citizens must trust in the state to
provide appropriate antidotes and to distribute supplies to the places and people who need
them most. By controlling the countermeasures, the national agency magnifies the role it
will play during a bioterror event, and the caring act of governance becomes the timely
dispersal of drugs. Citizens are bound to the federal agency by the need to access
pharmaceuticals during an emergency event.
As CDC grows into its role as a goods distributor, the capabilities of SNS
personnel have found multiple uses as well. Capt. O’Conner tells of FEMA seeking CDC
assistance during a hurricane incident when field workers found the cots in their medical
tents were too small to accommodate overweight patients; CDC came up with a plan to
bring in piles of wrestling mats and through the logistics work of SNS was able to locate
and ship the mats to the coast. Thus, in addition to its expertise on biological agents and
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vulnerable populations, CDC is also developing its expertise in managing and distributing
goods. The SNS operates from a room in the DEOC, where the logistics experts will be
close at hand during emergency situations, reflecting the increased use of CDC’s new
expertise in directing disaster. As CDC increases its knowledge of transportation,
distribution and managing resources, it creates a new base of authority for the national
security apparatus.

Laboratory Response Network. Though they are denied first-hand knowledge of the
stockpile and its location, the public can readily visualize a vast, national medicine
cabinet stocked with antibiotics and vaccines as a tangible outcome of bioterrorism
preparedness measures. Lisa Rotz, director of CDC’s Division of Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response (DBPR), argues that the Laboratory Response Network
(LRN) has a similar, measurable impact because people can equally imagine a network of
laboratories with standardized diagnostic capabilities. Established in 1999, the LRN now
includes about 150 laboratories in every state, including public health, military,
environmental, and veterinary labs. LRN labs use a standardized platform to test for
biological agents and staffed by people trained to run the appropriate tests. Thus, instead
of sending samples to CDC to be tested, the terrorism response begins locally in labs that
have been prepared to handle such diagnostics. In theory, the LRN facilitates timelier
bioterrorism response by enabling a local diagnosis of bioterror agents. LRN directors
cite other benefits of such a system, particularly in times of emergency, such as having
laboratories that are used to working together and have the same instrument platforms72.
Also, agencies such as the FBI and state department have official agreements to work

199
with LRN labs, because CDC understands and agrees to the chain of custody issues that
surround criminal investigations.
CDC heads the LRN by developing protocols for the laboratory response, training
laboratory personnel, and determining which assays and equipment platforms will be
used in local labs.73 Rotz points out that the network is not a network unless the entire
network is maintained, a task consistently constrained by funding. CDC’s work is
federally funded and LRN labs have some access to federal funding through grants, but
for the most part individual states must be convinced to allocate funds for the training and
equipment that will keep the labs on the national network. While the LRN minimizes the
role of CDC laboratories in identifying biological agents, the work DBPR does in
drafting protocols, developing assays, and selecting equipment consolidates greater
authority over the national laboratory system as a whole at the federal level.
CDC’s status as an expert agency on diagnostics is also impacting the markets for
biological field equipment which have emerged with the influx of biosecurity funding.
Dr. Stephen Morse of DBPR pulls a weighty, spiral-bound catalogue from a shelf of
biology journals and flips through hundreds of glossy pages, each showing a piece of
biotech equipment for sale. As local emergency response teams collect their bioterrorism
preparedness funds, they turn to volumes like this to purchase gadgets which claim to
diagnose anthrax on the spot or detect foreign pathogens in the air. Morse argues that
much of the equipment offered here is inadequate or unnecessary, but that people with
budgets to burn are buying it up because the technology is out there.74 As a scientist and a
public health worker, Morse prioritizes standardization, warning that in an emergency
poor fieldwork could paralyze the public health system with hundreds of thousands of
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unusable samples collected by untrained responders using substandard equipment.
Furthermore, local laboratories make decisions to purchase supplies to test for particular
biological agents, a decision complicated by the limitless possibilities for bioterrorist
agents. “People aren’t going to buy and stockpile tests that are never going be used unless
there’s an event. It’s not like flu, which comes every year. You have no idea how many
tests you’re going to need or what tests you’re going to need.”75 Through the LRN, CDC
assumes responsibility for those decisions at the national level, but also creates a market
for the tests and equipment it deems most useful. Again, under the auspices of creating a
timely emergency response, CDC has increased its authority over the mechanisms of
local public health, and by standardizing the equipment on the counter and the assays in
the refrigerators of laboratories around the country, it is changing the local face of public
health.
Conclusions: The Citizens’ CDC
“Having a plan doesn’t mean you are prepared because you haven’t shown you
can implement it.” Susan True explains the challenge of preparedness to top-level
planners from state and local government during the Meta-Leadership Summits for
Preparedness she runs through the CDC Foundation.76 At the Summit, CDC reaches out
to groups who will partner with the agency during a crisis, learning, in the words of CDC
Director Gerberding, “how to build a connectivity that includes people who are not like
us—people in business, people in the faith-based sector, people in the health care
delivery system, people in the nonprofit community.”77 The Summit proposes to build a
network between groups and individuals who may have competing goals during an
emergency, with the belief that connecting these people beforehand will smooth the
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interactions under crisis. In such efforts to further involve citizens in CDC activities, the
CDC Foundation works to establish that the public has a responsibility to sustain the
work of the governing agency, while also providing a way for individuals to financially
contribute to disease preparedness activities.
Established by Congress in 1995, the CDC Foundation represents the continually
changing face of public health in this country, not only in the blurring of boundaries
between local and national care, but also that which is private, corporate, governmental,
biological, and scientific. The CDC Foundation operates with federal funds in order to
fundraise for CDC and return those investments back to the agency. In 14 years, CDC
Foundation has invested $170 million in CDC health programs, drawing large and small
donations from corporations and private citizens.78 The idea that a non-governmental
organization can help CDC do better work, faster, underlies the foundation’s mission,
particularly in regards to the Emergency Preparedness and Response program.
As a fundraising agency, the Foundation must balance a booster message about
the good works of the CDC with a warning about the weaknesses which can be overcome
with additional financing. The Meta-Leadership summit, for example, identifies diverse
local governments and private entities as vulnerabilities in the emergency response
system, and promises a stronger public health response by developing expertise in how to
strengthen community relations. Another oft-repeated anecdote tells of CDC
epidemiologists working in the field who needed emergency supplies beyond their kits of
bandages and antibiotics, such as a banner from Kinko’s or some rope from Home Depot.
To circumvent the time delays of purchasing through government channels, CDC
Foundation issues field workers credit cards that they can use to buy equipment on the
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spot. “After working so long in government and dealing with the bureaucracy, I had to
ask, ‘Can it really be this easy?’” reflects Foundation VP for Programs Kevin Brady.79
The cards are funded through the Emergency Preparedness and Response Fund, which
collects donations through an online form on the Foundation website, an easy way for
individuals to financially contribute to the work CDC employees do on the front lines.80
The Foundation represents the agency of citizens to contribute to the science and
practices that impact their health, though the options for participation are skewed towards
monetary donations. While this private venture seems to favor citizen participation, the
CDC Foundation in no way challenges state control of the nation’s health, instead placing
responsibility upon citizens to sustain the work of the government through private
monetary investment.
Initiatives like the Emergency Preparedness and Response Fund provide a way for
individuals to contribute to the national preparedness initiative, even when discouraged
from personally stockpiling antibiotics or directly phoning CDC’s subject matter experts.
As a fundraising organization, however, CDC Foundation stands to gain from the public
perception of a biological threat just as the agency itself benefits from congressional
belief in bioterrorism risk. The on-going, preemptive nature of bioterrorism preparedness
ensures that the public health system will be constantly employed on behalf of national
security and that citizens who desire to secure their personal health will continuously turn
to government resources and expertise. In the endless war against an invisible threat as
enduring and adaptive as microbes themselves, and where preventing attack is “not
sufficient” and cannot be proven, the banners of success are the material evidence that the
government is taking action. Dr. Sosin explains, “This isn’t a disease that we conquer or
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that we tire of, and then go onto another condition. In this instance, it’s really the
infrastructure that supports high-profile, high-impact kinds of response to these types of
events. Inevitably, we will continue to have them over time, and depending on how
successfully we execute the resources we receive, and how well we measure and account
for them, those resources are unlikely to dissipate in the grand scheme over time.”81
The absence of a specifiable threat is the never-ending threat of the modern age,
and the reasoning behind the mobilization of resources for security. In Sosin’s vision, the
infrastructure will continue to grow, expanding the technological fixes available to the
security state. The nonspecified disease threat rationalizes this growth because the
mechanisms of security are rendered even more vital to act against unknown and
imagined threats. The crisis sustains public health practice today, and the crisis is known
by the endless potential for disease, a permanent condition of living in society.
Infrastructure built for bioterror will shape our ways of knowing disease and risk,
for it orders the scientific process and sustains a “high-profile, high-impact” state
response. A malady that originates outside the normal condition of society seems to
require an obstructive approach to disease control, creating a high profile through a
timely, militant, large-scale effort to separate the vectors of disease from the normal,
healthy population. Not only does bioterrorism preparedness harness the social fear of
disease, but it uses and expands disease control practices, including the scientific study of
pathogens, recreating them as national security practices. New biosecurity strategies
produce new ways of accessing citizens and institutionalize forms of knowledge central
to state authority. Waging the war on terror in the domain of public health connects local
populations to the state through surveillance and access to care, bringing local health
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systems into a network where they depend upon the knowledge and resources of the state
to function. While the dual-use agenda of public health proposes to create an
infrastructure that will care for the population in times of crisis as well as “normal” times,
a system designed to care for people during an event may not provide the best care
overall, and may also infringe upon personal liberties and divert resources that might
serve the population in other ways. Bioterrorism preparedness centralizes the
mechanisms of care at the national level, militarizing the daily rituals of health and
reproducing individual acts like hand washing as critical acts of national safety and
security. The belief that citizens’ liberal claim to health and wellness can only be attained
through a militant war on disease rationalizes this way of governing individual bodies.
Finally, the infrastructure created for bioterrorism preparedness ensures that citizens can
establish a collective identity grounded in their common biological vulnerability.
Surveillance technologies set the parameters of a biological collective, while depicting
every individual within a population as a potential “ground zero” for biological attack.
The project to protect a group from external biological threats can only be accomplished
through the technologies which make it visible. CDC’s bioterrorism preparedness
practices have given public face and common form to fears of germs and disease,
creating opportunities for citizens to build a sense of well-being which hinges upon
evidence of state intervention. The promise that ever-expanding infrastructure and
expertise can mitigate the never-ending bioterror threat and protect citizens’ lives affirms
the continued growth of state authority over health and human life.
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Chapter 4
Bombed, Again: New Mexico’s Militarized Landscape
in the National Security Economy
“Sun for healthy living. Anyone with a little capital can be independent!”
--1930 Leaflet promoting Columbus, New Mexico

New Mexico Highway 9 hems a hundred miles of United States soil at the
southern border of the nation, a river of pavement meandering through the desert where
the only markers of nationhood are five-mile stretches of border fence and green-striped
Border Patrol trucks. Locals claim that if your car breaks down in those isolated stretches
between the towns of Hatchita, Columbus, and Sunland Park, in less than fifteen minutes
you will have an officer pulling up to lend a hand in changing that flat tire. Agents are
suspicious of anyone who might stop and linger, perhaps waiting for illegal travelers
crossing that desert landscape from the south on foot. Driving Highway 9 on an afternoon
drive in July 2009, I passed one sedan with local plates and twenty-three Border Patrol
vehicles, including a Suburban inching along the shoulder of the road while the driver
hung his head out the window, scanning for migrant footprints crossing the smooth sand
path near the highway. White blimps hovering above the road heighten the sense that
every movement along this border is being watched, and after travelling through this
landscape for just over an hour, I developed a keen sense that my presence on this
highway was unwelcome and suspicious.
While the militarization of the U.S./Mexico border begins and perhaps ends with
the question of immigration, I had come to the borderlands to consider particularly how
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bioterrorism preparedness work on our nation’s borders sustains notions of nationhood
and citizenship. Gleaming white Border Patrol SUVs, sophisticated surveillance
technologies, and miles of security fence, evidence a booming security economy in the
region, drawing federal funding to support jobs in construction, protection, and
technology. Less visible to the highway traveler are the technologies which regulate the
movement of nonhuman life through the desert, seeking to create a biological buffer zone
around the nation’s border. I theorized that border communities were seeking terrorism
preparedness funding sources in order to upgrade their public health systems and provide
general care for their citizens. During my time in the area, however, I discovered that the
security economy runs deeper than I imagined, restructuring agricultural and mineralbased markets and binding health programs to a range of social systems.
In this chapter, I interrogate how national security is bartered in the borderland
economy. As communities invest in preparedness programs, these sites become part of
the emerging security apparatus which continuously defines and gives form to the
terrorist threat, teaching citizens new survival strategies in the post 9/11 world. In the
following cultural history of New Mexico’s borderlands, I also aim to substantiate two
theses about security practices in the border states. First, the recognition of the nation’s
border as a fluid, inhabited space, crossed by biological entities of all sorts, informs how
border residents undertake national security projects locally. Second, contemporary
security practices continue the work of the national nuclear program in producing the
desert southwest as a sacrifice zone and a laboratory for new kinds of violence. Thus, the
very real outcome of the economic drive to implement terrorism preparedness programs
along our nation’s borders is the profound militarization of daily life in this region.
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Columbus: Sun, Water, and War
Residents of Columbus, New Mexico, have taken the idea of the “snowbird”—an
individual who relocates to warmer climates during cold winter months—to its extreme,
travelling south until they are within spitting distance of the border before dropping the
trailer hitch and pulling out the barbeque grill. A shiny, new border crossing station
separates Columbus from the Chihuahuan town Puerto Palomas, but residents of both
communities regularly commute the short distance over the border. While the Americans
head south in search of cheap prescriptions and dentist appointments, Mexicans come
north to attend school and to fill jugs of clean, free water from the spout in front of the
civic offices, a tradition sustained for generations and symbolic of the truth that though
these two communities are increasingly rent by fences and politics, neither town would
exist without the other, their fates flowing together by blood, water, and money. Citizens
await the opening of a nearby biorefinery, where microscopic algae grown in the endless
sunshine will be processed into biofuel, but for now the local economy centers on the
border itself, as well as a small grocery story, service station, bed and breakfast, and a
state park commemorating a violent moment in the area’s history.
A century ago, Columbus bustled with the border protection business. An outpost
on the skirts of town, Camp Furlong, was one of several army camps providing military
might to secure the nation’s border during the ongoing revolution in Mexico. With the
arrival of additional troops in the days following Pancho Villa’s famous 1916 raid on the
border town, Columbus’s population swelled to over 15,000, becoming the largest city in
New Mexico. From here the US army pursued Villa deep into Mexican soil, employing
automobiles and aircraft in military attack for the first time in U.S. history, a field test for
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new technologies of warfare (aircraft surveilled the Villistas from above while the
armored supply vehicles which supported the expedition from the north were ironically
fueled by gasoline carried by pack horses). Some claim the army’s year-long pursuit of
Villa and the Border Campaign played a vital role in preparing troops for US entry into
World War I, rhetoric which identifies a military invasion of Mexico as little more than a
training ground for US military might.1 Thirty thousand soldiers participated in the
pursuit of the Mexican bandit, and by mid-June more than 100,000 members of the
National Guard would be stationed along the border to handle other skirmishes incited by
Mexican Revolution. As the unrest in Mexico diminished and conflict increased overseas,
the military relinquished the groundwork of border protection, making way for new
conceptions of national security where non-military entities assumed the work of
protecting the homeland.
Without the military presence on the border, the population of Columbus
dwindled. When the railroad finally left town in the 1950s, mapmakers began to mark
Columbus as a ghost town. Without the military, the promise of a 1930 brochure
promoting Columbus proved to be an immediate failure: “Sun and climate for healthy
living: where anyone with a little capital can be independent.” It seems the only capital
for this border town is the border itself—and the need to protect it with troops,
automobiles, and airplanes or border patrol, blimps, and fences. In the 21st century, drug
violence south of the border, including beheadings, the murder of the mayor of Palomas,
and a much-publicized incident where a dentist was robbed at gunpoint while the mayor
of Columbus sat slack-jawed in his chair, has slowed the demand for cheap
pharmaceuticals and dental work on the Mexican side of the border. One Columbus
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snowbird assures me that she feels perfectly safe in town, for once the smugglers cross
into the U.S. they flee “like a prison break,” far from the border itself.2 Palomas,
however, suffers from the violence as residents relocate, many taking permanent
residence in their sister city to the north, and popular tourist attractions south of the
border sit empty.
In this time of unease at the border, the annual Camp Furlong Day, a
commemoration of the 1916 attacks, seems perhaps more significant. Formerly called
“Raid Days,” the festivities center on a reenactment of Pancho Villa’s attack on
Columbus. Led by an actor portraying the famous bandit himself, the Calbagata of
Mexican riders travel over the border, where they are met by a group of Americans on
horseback. Rather than opening fire, the two groups blend together to parade through
town in a show of reconciliation and commonality. The festival draws scholars and
celebrants from both sides of the border, even as naysayers point to the ironic celebration
of the most significant terrorist attack on US soil prior to September 11, 2001. Indeed,
one USA Today reporter likened this to an imagined “Osama bin Laden State Park” in
Lower Manhattan, where tourists “learn how the Muslim militant planned the attack on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, how he eluded U.S. forces, and why he hated
America.”3 One attendee pointed out a thick-mustached likeness between Pancho Villa
and Saddam Hussein, whispered that Villa “just looks like he was a terrorist.”4 Because
the name Pancho Villa carries the weight of legends and a heap of Hollywood glitz,
locals hesitate to drop the famous name and its potential tourist draw. Rather, as the
Pancho Villa State Park manager argued in a statement about Camp Furlong Day, the
event honors longstanding bonds between the two communities and “the celebration of
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our common heritage.”5 Residents of the borderlands invest in this space with their
celebration as well as their labor, claiming identities which are neither fixed nor
homogenous and embrace a complicated narrative of nationhood, conquest, and
economic dependency. Though the technologies which define the U.S./Mexico border
have changed over time, along with the types of work performed at the borders to
produce national security, both the annual parade of “Pancho Villa” onto US soil and the
daily parade of individuals crossing the border in pursuit of water and health care, are
reminders that there exists no stable subject in national security discourses. While this
may seem evident in the bilingual, resource-sharing communities of the borderlands, the
new configurations of daily life in the borderlands brought by the changing security
economy produce new ideas of citizenship and value for residents of these places.
Santa Teresa: Cows and Vegetables
About a mile down the border from the port of entry where the modern-day
Pancho Villa crosses into the U.S. with his Calbagata lies another type of facility, where
thousands of four-legged Mexican immigrants will be scrutinized before being granted
entry into the United States. Mexico exports almost a million cows to the U.S. each year,
supplying the large herds of cattle that graze in Texas, California, and the Midwest.
About a third of these animals will pass through one of the two ports of entry in New
Mexico, where they are held and inspected for signs of disease.6 The exchange of goods,
including food, over the border further exposes the border as a dynamic space, where
biology is as suspect as nationality and where specific ways of policing bodies protects
national security. The work of these checkpoints is to inspect cows and cull infection,
preventing diseases apparent in Mexican herds, such as tuberculosis, from transmitting to
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US cattle and desiccating a multi-billion-dollar beef industry. Here, the distinct qualities
of nationhood are negotiated on bovine bodies, where animals which manifest health are
permitted on one side of the border and animals infected by microbes are sent away.
Further, this work is done in the name of protecting the US food system and citizens’
bodies, but must also be done in a way which ensures the continuous and successful
supply of vital resources to US markets. Recent attacks on ranchers and agriculture
inspectors in the borderlands has drawn scrutiny to the food safety practices which take
place in the borderlands, entwining discussions of ranching, terrorism, immigration, and
drug wars, and creating a complex representation of cows and insects as national security
threats.
The Santa Teresa/Jeronimo cattle crossing is recognized as an efficient and
effective inspection facility where cattle are literally allowed to walk over the border, in
contrast with other sites which are more spread out and require animals to be moved by
truck. Cows are held at the site in quarantine for 14 days, allowing time for diseases to
manifest in their bodies. Veterinarians test for infection, then cowboys run the cattle
through disinfecting skin baths on the Mexican side of the border before prodding the
animals northward where they are again tested on the US side. Dozens of semis with a
rainbow of license plates line up outside the facility, ready to disperse these animals into
the ever-moving flows of the livestock industry. Union Ganadera Regional de Chihuahua,
a Mexican Livestock Cooperative working on behalf of more than 3,000 ranchers in
northern Mexico, runs both sides of the Santa Teresa facility and the southern part of the
Columbus site. To ensure that all human bodies can do their work but still end up on the
appropriate side of the border at the end of the day, the handlers wear vests, allowing
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border patrol officials to watch and regulate the workers’ bodies, even as they labor
within the facility. Thus, while the quarantine facility is designed to make disease visible
in the bodies of cattle, the daily operations here also work to produce the border as a
space where both biology and nationality are suspect and bodies of all sorts must be
carefully policed.
As in other border security divisions, agriculture inspection practices have been
infused with new security measures following drug-related violence near the border. In
2010, agriculture inspection work which was once done on the Mexican side of the Texan
border was relocated to the U.S. two months after USDA inspectors were held at
gunpoint at the Nuevo Laredo inspection facility. FEMA funding through the border
security initiative “Operation Stonegarden” now provides armed escorts for New Mexico
Department of Agriculture (NMDA) workers performing annual inspections of livestock
scales on the remote ranches south of Interstate 10. Almost all bodies are suspicious this
far from paved roads and cell phone service, and the distinction between a border patrol
agent and a weights-and-scales inspector may be unimportant to an armed and cornered
participant in illegal border activities. After the much-publicized murder of Arizona
rancher Robert Krentz around the same time, Governor Bill Richardson deployed the
New Mexico National Guard to the borderlands in an executive decision reminiscent of
presidential directives following the Pancho Villa Raids nearly a century earlier. These
state-initiated acts to protect the border with military might accompany a broader takingup of arms by residents and citizen-militias in the area (one local arms shop reported a
twenty percent increase in gun sales following the Krentz murder.)7 The disruption of
daily life on the US/Mexico border links the uncertainty of individual survival to the
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broader economic concerns of the state (in the case at hand, agriculture and trade, though
many other economic needs also drive international diplomacy), an intertwining which,
according to Arjun Appadurai, is increasingly evident in contemporary forms of
terrorism. Appadurai argues that 9/11 bound local histories and political turmoil in a new
“geography of anger” and “freshly charged [the] relationship between uncertainty in
ordinary life and insecurity in the affairs of states.”8 In New Mexico, the security
response simultaneously attends to the well-being of individual citizens, protection of
state workers and their labor, and preservation of a diplomatically-guided economic
relationship between nations—all under the banner of issues as wide-ranging as drugs,
immigration, terrorism, and disease.
While protecting New Mexico’s $6 billion agriculture industry provides a local
incentive for national agriculture security, the borderlands are also significantly
conceived as a buffer zone for an ecological boundary which cannot be policed by fences
and other technologies.9 Not only do mountain lions and butterflies move through the
landscape without regard to national borders, but the deliberate transportation of people,
cattle, cotton, and bananas simultaneously relocates microbial hitchhikers, potentially
introducing disease into the US food system. The NMDA’s Southwest Border Food
Safety and Defense Center was established at New Mexico State University to grapple
with this particular problem. Director Billie Dictson is quick to point out that eating in the
United States depends upon the safe transportation of edibles across borders.10 Dictson
claims that the agriculture economy supports 17% of the American population, not
counting those of us who eat. Contamination in the food supply threatens lives, and more
than 5,000 people die every year from food contamination. In reports that read like major
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drug busts, border patrol agents boast of “seizing and destroying” hundreds of pounds of
illegal vegetables, laying wrapped meats and packages of produce on the evidence table
like bricks of marijuana.11 As concerned as Americans are about drugs and humans being
trafficked over the border, protecting against the accidental or intentional introduction of
contaminants into the food supply is a primary goal of the Border Food Safety and
Defense Center and its government partners. The key, however, is containing the
circulation of biological threats without hindering the vital flow of animals and
vegetables through the borderlands.12 Following Foucault, Bingham and Hinchliffe
suggest that regulating circulations is a key characteristic of biosecurity.13 With the goal
to encourage “good” things to move while slowing “bad” things, biosecurity practices
attend to the specific qualities of environments which enable this regulation to take place.
Furthermore, biosecurity is not so concerned with dramatically rebuilding spaces so much
as modifying existing situations to maximize the circulation of the “good.” Thus, the
cattle crossings at the border seek to regulate the import of healthy cows by using a
facility to identify and remove unhealthy animals; while recognizing that the only way to
guarantee that no disease would cross the border would be to stop the imports entirely,
biosecurity practices focus on removing the specific obstacles within the operation after
understanding the local conditions. Similarly, as explored in the following section, the
Border Food Safety and Defense Center seeks intimate knowledge of the biological
conditions of the borderlands in order to modulate preparedness programs in a way which
provides maximum benefit to the area’s agrarian economy.
While the statement that disease knows no borders seems a bit cliché, Dictson and
co-director Jeff Witte have wrestled seriously with the challenges of addressing
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biosecurity in a diverse and sparsely populated border region. Dictson claims the biggest
challenge to his work to secure the biological border has been putting disease on “the
radar.” Thanks to H1N1 “Swine” Flu and E. coli-infested spinach, people are thinking
about disease as never before, and Dictson says now they must “take them from the
awareness level and get them to a place to respond.”14 Not only do the many hands in the
agricultural pot create confusion about who to call during emergency events, but
emergency planners are often called upon to think creatively about, say, how to round up
100 head of escaped cattle. Dictson claims that people “do” logistics in daily life, and are
very good at it, but they don’t know how to use those skills in organized emergency
response.
As part of an international agro-security project, Witte runs the Ten States Border
Training Initiative, involving participants from all states which form the US/Mexico
border in planning and rehearsing a coordinated response to an agricultural event. In
order to plan and prepare a food-systems-emergency response for the border region,
Witte staged three agroterrorism training events from 2004 to 2009, including tabletop
exercises and a full-scale simulation. These exercises involved more than 250 people,
from governors and Homeland Security agents to USDA inspectors and veterinarians.
Participants role-played a response to either an agricultural or livestock event, such as
foot and mouth disease or an apple moth infestation. While these simulations work to
keep people’s attention riveted on agricultural concerns and establish a mechanism of
response, the dual acts of planning and performing emergency events are also prescribing
a distinct role for government in caring for the population, and not just during times of
crisis. The simulation disciplines citizens to behave in particular ways during the
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emergency, but it also forges networks which operate in daily life to build the foundation
of national security systems.
Publicly rehearsing the response to an event shapes the perception of the threat
itself, while creating spaces to mitigate risk, and materially and ideologically arranging
the community around the idea of responding to crisis. As Joseph Masco describes it,
“the scripting of disaster in the imagination has profound social effects: it defines the
conditions of insecurity, renders other threats invisible, and articulates the terms of both
value and loss.”15 Designed to identify vulnerabilities and anticipate the unexpected, the
simulation uses an unreal, if “realistic,” catalyst and real, if “role-playing,” participants to
imagine outcomes which can be valued as authentic, delivering more political punch. As
a training mechanism, simulation also supplants an individualized, skills-based measure
of preparedness with requisite group coordination and response, thereby stripping
subjects of the ability to mitigate disaster independently and shifting responsibility to a
community, where success can only be achieved through the fulfillment of particular
roles within the social network. The condition of security, then, is the constant readiness
of disciplined workers to perform a planned emergency response function.
Developing such a scripted and sustainable preparedness system with two federal,
ten state, and numerous local governments is a particular challenge of the Border States
Training program. For example, Dictson explains that while US agencies fight for local
control and readily act within their perceived jurisdictions, the Mexican states seem to
favor acquiring the blessing of federal government before proceeding with local actions,
creating competing timelines for achieving established benchmarks. At one level, part of
the problem stems from different languages, not just Spanish and English, but also the

217
acronym-laden jargon of the US government. Witte has been working to ratify the use of
the favored model for emergency response in the United States, the Incident Command
System or ICS, as part of their border security plan. He recently received a call from a
Mexican planner who said he’d finally received federal permission to use the “CSI”
model in their emergency response plan, confusing the acronym and mistakenly
referencing forensic crime studies and a popular television series. More significant than
misspeaking an acronym, this anecdote exemplifies the work being done to export
models of governance, in this case Incident Command, in the name of producing a
unified emergency response. The global adoption of the ICS model brings a standardized,
structured model to events, one which can be rehearsed for biological events along with
forest fires and hurricanes. Again, the expectation falls upon individuals to master their
roles within the system, and in training modules they are taught that working outside
these roles leads to negative consequences, such as slowing the response, gobbling up
resources, or instilling fear and panic.16 The proposal that all nations need a unified
response to events rationalizes the exportation of US forms of governance during times of
crisis, and the regular rehearsal of this response through preparedness exercises further
instills familiarity and proficiency in new forms of government.
In talking to Witte and Dictson, one gets a sense that the biosecurity business is
booming. They are undertaking a wide range of projects, from helping New Mexico
communities develop terrorism preparedness plans, to distributing DHS brochures and
20,000 response bags to local elementary schools. A leader in border preparedness, the
group is also active at the federal level, recently receiving a $2 million grant from DHS to
develop a national curriculum for multi-day courses on preparing communities for
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agroterrorism. DHS has stringent curriculum requirements and the resulting textbooklength manual will be subject to peer review at the national level and mandatory updates
every three years. A course with the DHS seal of approval, however, can be accessed for
free by communities who receive DHS funding, saving the $5,000 to $500,000 expense
of contracting with a private company for biosecurity training. Significantly, DHS
stipulates that its funds cannot be used to train people who are foreign nationals, limiting
the ability of responders to train together for a unified multi-national response. Dictson is
also concerned because it is front line agricultural workers who will see disease first, and
are therefore the ones who need to learn how to recognize an apple moth infestation or a
cow with foot and mouth disease. He reiterates that “pests don’t know borders” and that
American citizens will benefit by educating individuals on both sides of the borders.
Dictson believes the culture of secrecy on the border, along with a tradition of covering
things up and working independently, creates a false perception that locals won’t work to
secure the food system, but “though training, awareness, and scaring the hell out of ‘em,
now they just might call someone when they see that white powder.”17
Playas: Minerals
As funding for terrorism preparedness initiatives declines, Dictson and Witte are
seeking new ways to make their programs sustainable in New Mexico. Communities
invest in biosecurity because they can see long-term benefits to the health and safety of
their citizens, but also because programs like Operation Stonegarden and the Border
Health Securities Act infuse these rural areas with federal funding. Economists have
theorized the particular challenges facing borderland economies, particularly distance
from population centers and the disruption of a political boundary.18 In the remainder of
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this chapter, I will explore the possibility that biosecurity programs and increased
attention to national security concerns provide some degree of economic opportunity in
border communities struck by dwindling natural resources and declining tourist travel.
The case study of the town of Playas raises the question of whether these rural
communities which already suffer economic decline due to their remote locations are
targeted because of their desolate landscapes, small populations, and isolation, precisely
the reason the state was selected for nuclear development programs three generations
ago. Does New Mexico’s participation in current national security projects revive notions
of a national sacrifice zone? How do border residents articulate their participation in
homeland security? I will also revisit the question of simulation, considering how roleplaying a fearful future constitutes a profoundly political act of meaning-making,
producing an expansive response focused on increasing the capacity of the nation to
respond to an ever-growing range of threats.
In southern New Mexico, Interstate 10 takes drivers into a strange, militarized
landscape, paralleling the national border where a white fence snakes from coast to coast.
Periodic customs checkpoints break up the blurred, brown landscape, startling reminders
of the human presence in this seemingly empty space. Here the 75 mph highway speed
limit drops suddenly to divert traffic under shaded canopies to be scrutinized by eyes,
mirrors and cameras. Trained canines, held on leashes by uniformed agents with soldierlike posture, sniff for evidence overlooked by the many pairs of eyes. The trucks and
automobiles which stack up at these checkpoints are the primary transportation through
the desert southwest today, since the construction of the interstate pulled commerce away
from the railroad line a few miles north. Today’s drivers barely glimpse towns like Gage,
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Separ, and Shakespeare, which are nestled around abandoned train depots over the hill
and out of sight from the highway. Communities which once boasted a lively railroad
economy now struggle to divert the curious traveler or hungry trucker away from the
sterile roadside comfort stations and into their quiet, vacant coffee shops. Dozens of
abandoned buildings and hundreds of seemingly unlivable mobile housing units might
lead one to presume that here the desert is indeed uninhabitable.
Leaving the interstate at Highway 113, one can drive south into New Mexico’s
bootheel, a wedge of land jutting abruptly into Mexico and then easing back to the
Arizona border. This road ends abruptly forty miles from the border at an abandoned
factory once known as “La Estrella del Norte,” or the North Star, because the lights on its
smokestacks provided a beacon in the north for travelers navigating the borderlands at
night. For 25 years, this smelter also shone brightly as the economic center of the
bootheel region, but the abandoned site now speaks of the boom or bust economies of the
West sustained, as in so many other areas, by the glint of mineral wealth. Built in the
early 1970s by Phelps Dodge Corporation, the Hidalgo smelter collected ore from the
company’s numerous mines to extract and refine copper locally before shipping to
market. The bootheel site was selected because of its proximity to mines in New Mexico
and Arizona—two of the top three copper exporters in the nation—but also because the
remote location separated population centers from the toxic byproducts of copper
smelting.19 With little attention to environmental woes, residents and political leaders in
Hidalgo County rallied around the development, celebrating the influx of jobs, and
embracing a new identity for the area as an industrial center. As imagined in a 1974
comprehensive development plan for Hidalgo County,
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The smelter will make a substantial contribution to the economies of the
immediate area and the State of New Mexico. In addition to the annual smelter
payroll of around four million, Phelps-Dodge expects to pay nearly ten million
dollars per year for services and supplies … The increase of a significant number
of industrial jobs in a community has a number of side effects… In addition to an
increase of the population to 900 there will be a rise in the average personal
income. In the past, agriculture has been an important factor in the economy of
Hidalgo County, but with Phelps-Dodge’s expansion, this will change. The
principal employment for the county will be mining and mineral processing.20
Composed while the paint was still drying in 200 homes in the company town of Playas,
the 55-page development plan fairly bursts with the anticipation of a new economic
future. Sections on education, health, employment, and recreation all end with paragraphs
suggesting that while this is how it was, with the new development in Playas, things will
be different now.
Significantly, the economic development plan promotes the benefits of the
smelter to the quotidian experiences of Hidalgo County residents, conceptually binding
the social existence of the county to the fates of the copper industry. Strong support for
the smelter continued for decades, and a 1992 newspaper headline, now framed on the
walls of the Lordsburg Historical Museum, celebrated “A Hidalgo County Dream that
Came True,” the completion of a million-dollar road-building project which would
geographically close the gap between the company town and the county seat. Less than
ten years later that road would dead end at an abandoned factory in the desert.
In 25 years of operation, the Hidalgo smelter altered the cultural landscape of the
bootheel. Railroad tracks crisscrossed the land, drawing ore from the mines to the
refinery, where round-the-clock workers used heat and chemicals to extract the precious
metals. These laborers lived ten miles north, in neat suburban homes on a patch of New
Mexican desert. Designed with aesthetics of the suburban ideal, the company town of
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Figure 4.1 Playas, 1974. Image courtesy Lordsburg Historical Society.

Playas plotted 250 two-and-a-half-bath homes on well-manicured lawns in neat cul-desacs. Residents paid $50 a month to rent a home, or $25 a month for an apartment in one
of the town’s six apartment complexes. Banks, churches, bars, parks, a grocery store and
a bowling alley made this site an oasis in the desert, and children who grew up in Playas
remember Fourth of July picnics at the pool, sneaking out with friends to drink beer in
the desert, and breathtaking sunsets viewed from the neighbor’s porch.21 More than 900
people lived in Playas when the copper industry was booming, and in 1996, the Phelps
Dodge smelter was the second largest copper producer in the country, employing 500
people and selling $488 million worth of marketable copper.22
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Changing technologies for smelting ore and the plummeting price of copper,
however, brought a swift end to the Hidalgo smelter. On June 30, 1999, the plant
president warned Lordsburg Mayor Arthur Smith, of an upcoming economic blow when
“virtually all” Hidalgo employees would “sustain an employment loss between
September 5-18, 1999.”23 The plant would keep a skeleton crew to close out operations,
and eventually the entire town would be put up for sale. Recognizing that the community
was once again being struck by the peaks and plummets of a mineral-based economy,
Hidalgo County planners revived the Hidalgo Area Development Corporation
(HADECO), an economic development agency established in the 1960s to promote
economic growth. Interestingly, this commission is housed under the nonprofit group
“Hidalgo Medical Services” with the philosophy that “healthy people are better workers,
and productive workers are necessary for economic success.”24 Through HMS and
HADECO, county planners are promoting an image of the area quite distant from its
land- and mineral-based roots, seeking to attract businesses to the bootheel through local
infrastructure development and improved health services. Though framed in an argument
about the unending fluctuations of agricultural and mineral economies, and their
accompanying transportation mechanisms, HADECO aims to invest federal funds for
health programs, which have long been accessed by this impoverished area, in ways
which will boost local business development and attract new work. Thus, while Playas
residents were closing up and abandoning their homes, a new planning philosophy was
taking root, one which would partially loosen the community’s natural resource
dependence while turning to the federal government in search of seed money for a new
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type of development. Significantly, at the start of the 21st century, the nation’s attention
was riveted on foreign terrorist threats and strengthening homeland security.
Trinity: Uranium and C4
For a moment, let us detour from our journey along New Mexico’s southern
border to consider the state’s historic importance in the production of national security.
Three hundred miles from Lordsburg sits a squat, brown obelisk with a dull brass plaque
which would elicit the most casual of glances in an urban setting, but deep in the New
Mexico desert just such a monument draws thousands of pilgrims twice a year. The
memorial sits at the exact center of four pilings, the remnants of scaffolding erected to
suspend the world’s first nuclear bomb in mid-air before exploding it over the landscape.
Erected twenty years after the explosion, the monument tells very little of the events
which took place here: “Trinity Site where the world’s first nuclear device was exploded

Figure 4.2 Trinity Site, April 3, 2010. Photo by author.
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on July 16, 1945” reads the plaque, with a smaller plate below designating the site a
National Historic Landmark, “possess(ing) national significance in commemorating the
history of the United States of America.” Rather, at the Trinity Site, the story of military
might and scientific capability seems to emerge from the land surrounding the obelisk. A
mile of chain link fence draws a circle in the desert, outlining the “reach” of the nuclear
blast; woody shrubs push on the fence from the outside, but within the circle the land is
flat and bare, as if irrevocably damaged and barren. The iron casing called “Jumbo,”
which was brought to the site to contain the valuable plutonium in the event that the blast
was not successful, sits outside the chain link near the improvised parking area. Jumbo
survived the 1945 test intact, but the top and bottom were lopped off in later military
tests, and the rusty, broken shell now builds the nuclear narrative at the site, its sheared
walls suggesting the force of an explosion which it originally withstood. Even the
homestead where the bomb was assembled two miles from the test site, has fallen into
disrepair, and the collapsed ceilings and crumbling walls of the outbuildings, flagged
with red tape warning visitors to “keep out,” weave the decay of buildings over time and
the hazards of unstable infrastructure into the narrative of danger and risk. Indeed,
because one drives three hours from the nearest city, through an arid landscape with little
infrastructure, where even the cacti seem to be withering in the sun, the last hour on the
military base after clearing a security checkpoint, the dominant message of a visit to
Trinity is one of remoteness and isolation. Standing near that commemorative stone, one
can look over hundreds of miles of land and see few signs of human use or occupation,
evoking perhaps some of the sentiment which inspired the selection of New Mexico as a
the site for the Manhattan Project and Trinity test.
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Twice a year, when the White Sands Missile Range opens its gates to the public,
tourists can walk the land still speckled with the fused sand called Trinitite, and then
commemorate the event with grilled sausages and a tote bag stenciled with a stylized
mushroom cloud, sold by vendors in the parking lot. Mile-long lines of vehicles waiting
to enter the site during its biannual opening indicate the local and national interest in
walking New Mexico’s bombed landscape, and the desire to celebrate, share, and
remember a historic event of global significance. “Locking” the site behind closed gates
for 363 days of the year shrouds this landscape with the cloud of secrecy which
characterizes the national nuclear project, keeping the events which happened here 65
years ago very much a part of the nuclear present and an important piece of the New
Mexico’s nuclear identity. The annual pilgrimages sustain the value of this seemingly
empty and barren desert landscape, inscribing the land with cultural significance, and
masking the biological and environmental impacts of the work done here beyond the
perimeter of the chain link fence.
In April 2010, I toured the Trinity site with a group led by the National Museum
of Nuclear Science, departing Albuquerque before dawn in a caravan of busses packed
with descendants of Manhattan Project workers, current Los Alamos employees, and a
variety of nuclear hobbyists. We spent the morning at the monolith, and then gathered for
a lecture and picnic lunch on the golf course at the New Mexico Institute of Mining and
Technology, “New Mexico Tech.” After lunch, we travelled to the school’s Energetic
Materials Research and Testing Center, where we further commemorated New Mexico’s
explosive past by watching people blow things up. The EMRTC range is located on a
gated road which leads from campus into the foothills west of town. As we entered our
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second restricted area on the tour, the bus navigated hairpin turns climbing through a
landscape littered with the shells of bombed-out cars and exploded bunkers, remnants of
earlier exercises. The road ended at a high point overlooking Socorro to the east and a
firing range to the west. An EMRTC guide stood in the back of a pick-up truck to
introduce the demonstration we were about to see, holding out various bits of tubing and
detonators as he explained why C4 worked well for certain types of explosions and what
exactly constitutes a fertilizer bomb.

Figure 4.3 Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center, Socorro, NM. Photo by author.

After the introduction, we huddled behind a cement barrier, gazing into mirrors to
watch while the crew blasted a grapefruit, wooden stand, and steel plate with increasing
amounts of explosives. Before each round, the guide counted slowly back from five and
the audience took in a breath of anticipation. Following each snap, bang, or boom, the
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group chattered eagerly about the detonation, trying to put into words what they had just
seen and heard. The last and largest explosion drew a collective “ooooo” from the
audience as it pulsed the ground beneath our feet and shattered one of the mirrors above

Figure 4.4 Spectators examine a stand exploded in
EMRTC demonstration, April 3, 2010. Photo by author.

our heads. Huddled behind that wall on a sunny April afternoon, this crowd reenacted in
a small way the experiences of July 16, 1945, when scientists and spectators witnessed
the blast which rang in the atomic age. In this semi-annual remembrance of the Trinity
test, attended by so many people whose lives have been shaped by the local nuclear
complex, not only do spectators walk the perimeter of one of the most famous explosions
in history, but at the EMRTC they participate firsthand in a sensory experience of the
bomb. Though on a much smaller scale, individuals could feel the shaking of the ground,
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see the flashes of light, hear the delayed echoes of sound, and share the collective
experience of hunkering down behind a wall to anticipate the blast.
The raw and reflexive reactions to the explosives demonstration paralleled the
general excitement surrounding the commemoration of the Trinity events, raising the
question of how New Mexico’s explosive past can be relived so effectively in the present.
Perhaps these events promise to make known some part of the local experience which is
carefully guarded and therefore inaccessible to those who wish to understand these
explosive parts of history. Demonstrating the technologies of violence in the mountains
outside Socorro makes the experience of witnessing accessible to modern audiences.
Furthermore, the work of EMRTC to claim expertise in the explosives field, marketing
the center in the public and private sector an serving as a regional center for homeland
security, emphasizing explosives. Also, the practices which inscribe the New Mexican
landscape with the marks of war and terror have continued from the Manhattan Project to
the present. The production of New Mexico as a national sacrifice zone which began with
nuclear testing continues today, as residents of the economically poor and geographically
rural state seek out ways to make the landscape viable. Building upon the nuclear science
work which brought the state into the center of US military might, New Mexicans
continue to work in military development, as well as the broad domestic preparedness
projects, and the desert landscape continues to fulfill a specific role in providing
landscapes for secrecy and testing. As discussed earlier, the particular qualities of the
borderlands and the security practices instituted in the region inscribe New Mexico’s
desert “wasteland” with national purpose, continuing the security projects which rendered
the state a national sacrifice zone. Masco contends that the “nuclear secret remains a
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fetish in the United States (and) continues to colonize everyday life in the name of
counterterrorism.”25 Returning to the bootheel of the state, we can see how the national
security project emerges in a contemporary form with material impact upon the lives of
citizens in borderlands.
Playas: Suburbs and Citizens
When Phelps-Dodge closed down operations in Hidalgo County, the entire town
of Playas was put up for sale. Residents were given the option to stay in their homes or
include them as part of the sale, and with the closure of the smelter and accompanying
job loss, most people moved on. Public services closed down, and Playas seemed on the
verge of becoming a modern-day ghost town. In 2004, with a $5 million grant from the
Department of Homeland Security, New Mexico Tech purchased the entire town of
Playas, planning to develop a terrorism training center affiliated with EMRTC. New
Mexico Senator Pete Domenici lobbied for the purchase and development of this site,
contending that a ready-made town situated in such a remote location would meet the
national security objectives to “dramatically increase the technical capacity of emergency
response organizations to manage incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological,
explosive, and environmental agents…. The Playas purchase would add significantly to
the DHS infrastructure by providing a working town for real world training scenarios….
Our Nation must be able to handle agricultural and biological outbreaks that could
significantly harm our citizens and crate (sic) chaos in our agricultural sector. Playas is
the perfect location to study and train against these problems.”26 Its remote location and
empty suburbs promised the opportunity to rehearse for terrorism events out of public
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view, echoing the sentiment which drew nuclear scientists to a site in the mountains of
northern New Mexico 75 years earlier.
While the project was sold in Washington as meeting a national security training
need, the local discourse focused on the promise of jobs in a struggling economy. At the
ribbon-cutting ceremony in 2004, New Mexico Tech President Daniel H. Lopez said, “I
suspect, once we get going in Playas, the southwest region of New Mexico will have
more economic activity and job opportunities being created for everyone involved than
we can foresee at this time.”27 As with the smelter a generation earlier, this makeover of
Playas was touted as an economic boon for the area, where the demise of the natural
resource could be mitigated by a burgeoning terrorism preparedness industry. Indeed,
New Mexico Senators Domenici and Udall would secure more than $100 million in
federal and state funding to develop the Playas Training Center, which began with
trainings for first responders, then expanded into military operations including the
construction of an “Afghan” village within the compound.28 In 2011, EMRTC announced
its first private contract, promising up to $27.5 million in revenue for NM Tech and the
Playas Training Center.29 Much of this income is invested in the facility itself, either to
building new structures or to the constant upkeep and repair of the existing homes.
Camera systems have been installed throughout the complex to record trainings for later
review; a new airstrip was built with funding from the state, in order to accommodate
large planes bringing trainees to the facility. These building projects send bursts of
business to the community, but the training center is largely a self-contained facility with
trainees living on site and rarely venturing into the county at large.
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The addition of gates and guardhouses further adds to the sense that outsiders are
not welcome in Playas. The town itself is open to the public, though the guardhouse
which sits in the center of the main road into town seems to indicate otherwise. “Tell the
guard you’re coming to bowl,” instructs Anneliese Kvamme, from the public affairs
department, “and you can come right in.” The guard, however, discourages the casual
tourist, politely informing visitors that the site is closed to the public. A sign on a chainlink fence barricading some of the training facilities parodies the popular cliché and
echoes wartime propaganda of earlier eras, “What happens in Playas, stays in Playas.
Remember, information is power.” Though residents boast that the bowling alley serves
the best tacos in three states, such gatekeepers sustain a perception that public use of this
space compromises national security.
About 20 families continue to reside in Playas as employees of the training center.
The center provides two primary jobs to locals: builders and actors. During the day,
actors might role play a suicide bomber cornered in a living room, or a hostage in a standoff with a terrorist cell. At night, the builders come in to replace the shattered windows
and restore the walls torn down during the day’s scenarios. Imagine living in Playas
today: you get up in the morning, bus your children to school 20 miles away, and then
head to work—where you are kidnapped by terrorists and held for ransom with a bomb
strapped to your chest, until the police barge into the room, kicking down doors and
lacing the air with tear gas. Or, you might spend your evening repairing broken doors,
returning them to their hinges so they can be tackled again the following day. Such jobs
exist because government and private entities believe role-playing emergency events in a
place which looks like an American suburb will increase the safety of suburban residents
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throughout the country during times of crisis. The act of rehearsing, however, is itself a
productive act, and the center at Playas exemplifies how simulation brings material
change to the spaces where people live and work in the present moment.
Though the scenarios at Playas are staged and the “terrorists” are actors, they are
also members of a community and dwellers in the landscape. Simulated or not, residents
experience daily the sights and sounds of war, incorporating them into their world as
readily as they greet guards on the entrance road or the daily arrival of helicopter
transports bringing another platoon of trainees. Locals attest that they can hear the
explosions at Playas echoing for 30 miles across the flat desert. Still, they describe the
work being done here as “patriotic” and “important to protect our country,” saying they
are glad to sacrifice their silence, not just for the jobs, but for the security of the nation.30
Thus, New Mexico again becomes the sacrifice zone, perpetually living in the state of
emergency so the nation can imagine how a future crisis might look. The state continues
to be remade by the biosocial experiment to know, anticipate, and prepare for future and
foreign threats. The war acts rehearsed in the deserts of New Mexico sustain a
contemporary crisis, changing the calculation of risk to enable a broad response, focused
on increasing the capacity of the nation to respond to an ever-growing range of threats.
New Mexico: Outcomes
If the Playas Training Center brings few jobs to Playas, then what outcomes arise
from the work being done there? In this concluding section, I interrogate how the use of
scenario enactment in national security practices produces new ways of knowing and
mitigating risk. Today, Playas’ economy depends, not upon the continued presence of
copper in the ground, but in the public perception of risk and support of government
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intervention on behalf of people’s safety and well-being. In the same way it once
depended upon natural resources, the fate of Playas now hinges upon public and private
investment in preparedness training. The rise of terrorism preparedness simulation
programs such as the practices described in this chapter, evidences the active work to
shape the cultural imaginary of risk in contemporary society, and shows that the lives of
citizens in this region are bound to practices to mitigate terrorist threats. The federal
government has invested millions of dollars in southern New Mexico for the work of
imagining vulnerabilities and rehearsing responses to terrorist threat. In so doing, the
political state is shaping the cultural imaginary of terrorist threats. Further, the existence of
a never-ending threat is a potent political tool because it demands the increased presence of
government in order to ensure the security of the population. If the “state of emergency” can be
made into the normal condition of the population, then society can be militarized as never
before.
The current anxiety over terrorist attack recalls the climate of fear experienced by
many Americans during the Cold War. Through propaganda and policy, the United States
produced a fear of nuclearism which demanded a preemptive response to protect citizens
from a perceived future risk.31 Rather than fighting an enemy in combat, military strategy
involved building infrastructure and implementing programs to anticipate an attack and
increase human survival in the homeland. The civil defense programs of the 1950s and
1960s called for individual cities to rehearse their evacuation plans with the citizenry, and
these drills were followed by public discussion of who would have died had the attack
been “real.” Participating in these exercises, down to the basic duck and cover drills
rehearsed by school children, was a patriotic duty, a part of public life during the nuclear
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age. Similarly, a 2005 recruitment poster for the national TOPOFF 3 exercise lauded
community volunteers who would role-play victims of biological attack as “the most
important people participating in our exercise.” Sign-up materials promised “an
interesting and enjoyable evening and as a result, our community will be better prepared
to face real challenges in the future,” language which echoes call for participation in the
civil defense programs of a generation ago. Masco calls the reenactment a “formidable
public ritual—a core act of governance, technoscientific practice, and democratic
participation … a civic obligation to collectively imagine, and at times theatrically enact
through ‘civil defense,’ the physical destruction of the nation-state.”32 Not only did these
scenarios imagine a post-nuclear world, but they showed just how the state would emerge
from the apocalypse and the specific practices people would have to undertake to survive.
Public rehearsal of the crisis response continues in the 21st century as a state-building
strategy and performance of citizenship.
Staging a preparedness exercise brings an imagined future event into a time and
space where individuals can rehearse their responses. Andrew Lakoff argues that in order
to achieve “preparedness,” the uncertain threat must be brought into “a space of present
intervention.”33 While the Cold War had a clear enemy in the Soviet Union and the
weapon was presumably nuclear, in contemporary crises neither the enemy nor the
weapon is so readily identified. National security demands new spaces and places where
threats can be managed and mitigated, and the creation of facilities like the Playas Training
Center channels national security funds into the construction and maintenance of a new security
infrastructure. The influx of capital fractures old systems of science and governance,
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reconstituting them in ways that work for the crisis and sustain the belief that human
intervention can deter the event.
Tracing the genealogy of simulation from civil defense programs through natural
disaster planning during the 1960s and 1970s to the present day, Stephen Collier draws
attention to the ways that enactment restructures the mechanisms of knowledge
production. In cases such as terrorism or natural disasters, statistical models are
insufficient to calculate risk, causing societies to turn to simulations to generate the logics
of response. The knowledge produced by such scenarios describes particular social
vulnerabilities emerging from “the uncertain interaction of potential catastrophes with the
existing elements of collective life,” which forms the basis of new forms of political
citizenship.34 The value of the Playas site is repeatedly ascribed to its authentic spaces as
a “real” town, just as scenario enactments are valued for evoking an authentic response
from the real-time interactions of role-playing participants. Rather than calculating
statistical probability based upon historical events, these live enactments seek to assess
the vulnerabilities which might emerge from the interactions of individuals and groups
during a state of emergency.
Collier’s analysis shows how the contested allocation of federal monies based
upon terrorism risk models links enactment to budgetary rationalization, showing the
emerging role of simulations in the national security apparatus. He proposes enactment as
a mechanism for governing the catastrophic elements which Ulrich Beck, in his muchdebated thesis Risk Society deemed to be ungovernable; Collier predicts that enactment,
like more traditional statistical calculations of risk, will eventually expand to include
more general societal functions. The establishment of centers for enactment shows the
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stabilization of dedicated mechanisms for producing this particular type of knowledge of
collective life. Success in Playas has led to proposals to build similar training facilities in
Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the proliferation of terrorism preparedness exercises
from Congress to community meetings and classrooms shows the social acceptance of
scenario enactment as a means of producing useful knowledge for a political response to
terrorism.
Recognizing scenario enactments as producers of security knowledge draws
attention to the fact that all enactments are not produced equally. Staging a full-scale
exercise is costly, with the bill for 2009’s National Level Exercise exceeding $12 million.
Thus, scenarios tend to operate in the realm of worst-case scenarios, or, as in the
agroterrorism exercises discussed above, attempt to handle multiple threats
simultaneously. De Goede theorizes that premediation, or the mapping of futures by the
culture industries, deliberately employs the imagination of the outside realm of possibility
in order to fantasize the control and management of the future. “This does not mean that
disastrous imagined futures will inevitably play out, but it does mean that the imagination
of some scenarios over others, the visualization of some futures and not others, entails
profoundly political work that enables and constrains political decision-making in the
present.”35 The calculation and motivation which informs scenario enactment has
political roots and political outcomes. Decisions about which disasters to stage and which
threats to enact will have consequences in people’s daily lives, and further work to shape
the preparedness infrastructure. In a radio interview in March 2011, a FEMA official
confounded the boundaries of imagination and calculation, explaining that agency is
building an infrastructure to target a broad, theorized event first: “It's not so much a vivid
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imagination, as we look at a lot of our historical events, and we put it in the context of
what would it look like today? And then we take some of the theoretical things, such as
what happens if a terrorist attack occurs? What we learn is you cannot plan to what you're
capable of doing. You have to plan against the events that could happen and build
systems that start with that and can scale down; versus that you are going to scale up
from small disasters and be successful in a catastrophic event.”36 Fugate’s remarks
exemplify Lakoff’s argument that political calculations grounded in scenario enactment
produce an expansive response concerned with building a preparedness system which can
respond to an ever-growing range of threats. Fugate proposes that emergency planning
must begin with the imagined event rather than the existing systems, rationalizing both
the practices which calculate “the events that could happen” and a broad emergency
response plan which presumes large-scale disasters before small ones.
In addition to defining the threat, scenario enactments work to assure the
population of the state’s ability to respond to an incident. Dictson and Witte’s work with
local agricultural agents establishes a proximate authority over biological incidents, and
the simulation events aim to showcase strengths of the responders as well as identifying
vulnerabilities. Erickson and Barratt propose that scenario enactments function
simultaneously as terrorism deterrents, information warfare, and tools to manage public
perception.37 This argument hearkens James der Derian’s studies of war games and
virtual warfare, the “virtual continuation of war by other means,” where the media and
technologies of contemporary warfare sustain the military-industrial complex at its
core.38 The simulation of a terrorist attack confounds the realities of warfare in such a
way that enactment becomes a technology which extends warfare into the domestic
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arena, bringing the sights, sounds, and smells of a terrorist event into people’s homes and
communities.
Consequently, scenario enactments have brought a never-ending state of war to
New Mexico, as well as other American spaces. In his book Nuclear Borderlands, Joseph
Masco showed how the work of the nuclear bomb, originating in this state, produced new
forms of national governance which relied upon the perpetual state of war. Furthermore,
“hypersecurity has become a dominant mode of governmentality after 9/11, a series of
linked discourses and official practices that work through the mobilization of a named or
unnamed, but always totalizing, threat.”39 The modern preparedness industry which
includes terrorism training facilities, border fences, and agricultural inspection facilities,
relies upon the sustained perception of that threat which, if not totalizing, is deeply
personal and targeted. Indeed, terrorism effectively fuels the security state because the
many unnamed threats of the War on Terror can potentially be linked to any individual or
community. The National Asset Database, which registers potential terrorist targets, was
ridiculed in the media in 2006, for identifying local festivals, petting zoos, and ice cream
parlors as potential terrorist targets, but the catalog of nearly 80,000 sites shows the
flexibility of terrorism discourses in connecting the terrorist threat to every citizen and
every community in the nation.40 New Mexico’s situation as a border state and resulting
economic challenges have driven the state’s involvement in national security practices.
National funding for local scenario enactment gives further evidence for the growing
acceptance of simulation practices within the security apparatus (consider, for example,
the Cities Readiness Initiative exercises in Albuquerque, discussed in the following
chapter.) Furthermore, in a place where the regulation of bodies across the border and the
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handling of nuclear materials are already scrutinized with aggressive watchfulness, there
is precedent for the militarization of the border food system or the wholesale turnover of
a community to the nation’s defense complex. This study of the New Mexico borderlands
shows how the infrastructure of the border is integrated into the national security
apparatus, stabilizing security practices at the local level and integrating them into the
local economy. As it was historically, the desert southwest continues to be a laboratory
for new kinds of violence. By continually remaking this space as a wasteland and
national sacrifice zone, the nation ensures that the deep pockets of its defense agencies
can shape the collective life of border residents who work to make their lifestyles viable
in this harsh landscape.
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Chapter 5
Rehearsing for the Plague: Citizens, Security and Simulation

Photographer Nina Berman’s exhibit, “Homeland,” a survey of post-9/11
America, includes an image of a volunteer in 2003’s Top Officials (TOPOFF) security
exercise. The woman’s crisp white hair is perfectly set and framed by a brilliant blue sky
rising from trim suburban lawns. Her gold earrings match the monogrammed rims of her
eyeglasses, which encircle smiling eyes. Though a surgical mask hides the smile itself,
the portrait clearly shows the pleasure this sixty-something citizen feels to be role-playing
an attack of pneumonic plague in her neighborhood. On this day, the civically-minded
suburban white-hairs one would expect to see at the polling booths on Election Day were
all dressed up to perform their civic duty by passing out “pills” from white tents set up
around the neighborhood. Berman recalls that during TOPOFF people really seemed to
be enjoying themselves: “They had all the elements of theater there—pillows to make
you ‘pregnant,’ fake blood, biscuits you chew and spit out like vomit—and they were
pretty determined in their objective to make it seem real.”1 In the simulation, theatrical
effects were used to transform healthy bodies into bodies under attack, while props like a
surgical mask prescribed a care-giving role to other members of the community. In acting
out a terrorist attack, these citizens shared the experience of victim-hood, and while the
attack was simulated, the social effects were not, producing a type of community around
the idea of vulnerability to biological attack.
In this paper, I consider what work is done by people rehearsing biosecurity,
particularly through the formation of a “security community,” in which citizens are bound
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together, not just by common biological risk, but by access to care during times of crisis, as
well as the ability and authority to provide care during the emergency. In particular, I argue that
the dual acts of planning and performing are prescribing a distinct role for government in caring
for a population, and not just during times of crisis. Publicly rehearsing the caring practices of
government through bioterror simulation has consequences, not only in shaping the perception
of the bioterror threat, but also in materially and ideologically organizing the community
around the idea of mitigating biological risk.
As a planning practice, visualizing and simulating how disaster might impact a
community has long shaped the arrangement of cities and the structure of buildings. During the
Cold War, modeling and simulating nuclear attack led to proposals for planned communities
built to minimize the potential for a nuclear bomb to interfere with urban living.2 Moreover,
civil defense exercises turned the city into a “laboratory of conduct,” where qualities of
citizenship could be spatialized through urban design and stereotyped groups of citizens could
rehearse geographically prescribed responses.3 Further, Masco and Oakes argue that Cold
War civil defense required that citizens contemplate their own demise and the end of the
nation-state in order to “emotionally manage” the population, transforming terror into fear, and
producing a population which would work to ensure its own survival.4 Whether nuclear or
“natural,” the never-ending threat is a potent political tool because it demands the increased
presence of government in order to ensure the security of the population. If the “state of
emergency” can be made into the normal condition of the population, the community can be
militarized as never before.
In order for citizens to do their work to ready themselves for the catastrophe, the
uncertain future threat must be brought into a space where it can be acted upon in the present.
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Large-scale simulations create the crisis in the present moment, not only staging a rehearsal, but
teaching participants what their roles should be during the imagined future event. These
simulations have consequence, for they will shape how future incidents are understood and
managed.5 Furthermore, scenarios change the calculation of risk, for they produce expertise
grounded in “imaginative enactment” rather than statistics and probability.6 As Collier has
argued, these enactments are producing new knowledge about our ways of living in society,
using an imagined future instead of a calculated past to determine what threatens our social
being and how.7 The information gleaned from a scenario might be used in the same way as
knowledge produced through the analysis of past events, rationalizing legislation or
determining funding allocations. Unlike the insurance of risk produced through the careful
study of the past, however, simulation trends towards an expansive response, one focused on
increasing the capacity of the nation to respond to an ever-growing range of threats. Simulation
thereby becomes a mechanism for managing the unthinkable.
Because biological agents act upon individual bodies differently than chemical or
nuclear weapons, planning the emergency response to a bioterrorist attack draws
particular attention to the networks that constitute community. Unlike “duck and cover”
or “shelter in place” guidelines which focus upon shielding the body during an attack of
limited duration, the response to a biological event takes place over time as bodies are
protected against disease by access to medical treatment. Bioterrorism preparedness plans
largely focus upon medical infrastructure and access to bodies in order to provide
medical care. Through rehearsal, planners seek to identify barriers that inhibit the flow of
pharmaceuticals into the population, interactions that increase the transmission of disease,
and weaknesses within the existing health infrastructure which would become critical if
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the system were stressed by the rapid onset of disease within the population. Further,
because the bioterror attack may not be accompanied by explosions or other indicators of
a violent event, there may be no immediate change of behavior at the onset of the event.
Thus, the everyday interactions that define the community—the movements and meetings
of individuals—must be evaluated in terms of the crisis. Not only does the scenario have
the potential to identify certain behaviors as damaging to people’s ability to survive an
attack, as might be the case in a nuclear simulation, but the bioterror rehearsal seeks to
pinpoint certain actions which constitute the event itself, revealing behaviors that spread
disease and showing how citizens essentially become the weapon through those actions.
Preparedness practices rationalized through bioterrorism simulation have a particular
capacity to advocate changes in the daily activities that constitute community, for these
are the acts that transmit disease.
Bioterrorism preparedness practices are notable for their diversity in scale and focus, as
well as for involving a range of individuals from scientists to postal workers. Bioterrorism
simulation takes place from the national to the local levels of government, from “fullscale” to “tabletop” exercises. Tabletop events are so named because they play out as a
group of decision makers gathers around a table to decide how to respond to a scenario
planned by scientists and modeled by computer. At the national level, Dark Winter (held
in 2001) and Atlantic Storm (2005) are notable examples, involving a range of officials
from retired Prime Ministers to former members of Congress. Modeling a smallpox
outbreak upon a naturally occurring event in Yugoslavia, the Dark Winter exercise
predicted a rapid, spiraling spread of smallpox, eventually leading to more than 16,000
simulated cases in 25 states. Though the tabletop exercise was put on by
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nongovernmental organizations, the outcomes influenced several policy decisions,
particularly following the terrorist events in the U.S. later that year.8
Full-scale events include a range of participants and responders in a real-time
reaction to an event. Typically these scenarios focus on “response and recovery,”
measuring how people respond to the attack and how capable the emergency response
infrastructure is in dealing with the casualties. At the national level, the “Top Officials”
(TOPOFF) series of terrorism preparedness exercises began with a simulated biological
attack in 2000, seventeen months before anthrax filtered into the U.S. postal system.
Mandated by Congress in the late 1990s, TOPOFF scenarios are staged every other year
in multiple sites, with the objective to engage decision makers at all levels of government
and from the private sector in a large-scale exercise. Unique components of TOPOFF
include the simultaneous enactment of multiple attacks on a national or international
scale and the use of a Virtual News Network with an interactive website to involve media
professionals and address the ways information will be communicated to the public.
TOPOFF 4, held in 2007, involved more than 15,000 participants from three international
governments, and included citizen participants role-playing victims and local emergency
responders reacting in real time as the event unfolded. TOPOFF 5, now called National
Level Exercise 09, focused on preventing a terrorist attack and had no visible public
component, though the exercise involved policymakers ranging from President Obama to
DHS workers in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
With funding from the federal level, many local governments are now developing
bioterrorism preparedness plans and including full- or partial-scale exercises. For
example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention received Congressional
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allocations for bioterrorism preparedness, which the agency is distributing to local
communities through programs like the Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI). The CRI
identifies 72 critical urban areas based upon population and geographical location, and
funds their development of a bioterrorism preparedness plan. Cities receiving CRI
funding are required to develop a plan to distribute countermeasures to their population
within 48 hours of a bioterrorist event, completing a chain of health care which begins
with the federal reserves of antibiotics and ends with the individual citizen. While the
CRI is first and foremost a means to apportion federal funding for bioterrorism
preparedness at the local level, the program also works to ensure that local entities have
compatible preparedness plans and have developed protocols and infrastructure to access
federal resources, particularly the national pharmaceutical reserve, the Strategic National
Stockpile (SNS). Rather than forcing a preparedness plan developed at the national level
upon individual communities, this funding strategy enables cities to develop plans that
work within the existing local infrastructure, address the particular needs of the
community, and rehearse the response locally. On the other hand, with its focus on SNS
resources, CRI planning firmly links local bioterrorism preparedness to the national
stockpile of medical care, requiring cities to develop plans to access the federal stores
rather than developing and maintaining a local reserve of pharmaceuticals. For the
remainder of this paper, I will examine work being done in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
to prepare for a bioterrorist event. In particular, I consider how the mechanisms of
governance over a deliberately conceived community are impacted by bioterrorism
planning. I will show how Albuquerque’s work with the CRI is defining the community
around access to care during a time of crisis, and how the rehearsal and simulation of
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these events stands to impact the mechanisms of government during a perpetual state of
emergency.
When the state of New Mexico received federal funds to develop a bioterrorism
preparedness plan as part of the CRI, the state government turned the funding and the
responsibility for planning over to the city of Albuquerque, which is the largest city in the
state: half of New Mexico’s one million residents reside in the Albuquerque metropolitan
area. According to the city’s emergency director, the first task in developing the
bioterrorism response plan was to identify the population to include in the plan and
thereby the decision-makers to involve in the planning.³ Though the Office of Emergency
Management (OEM) is part of the city government, the metropolitan area includes
unincorporated county areas, one other city, an Air Force base, a university, and six
native pueblos. Because Albuquerque City has the funding to develop the plan and will
have control over the SNS pharmaceuticals, in order to access care these entities must
participate in the city-led planning and rehearsal. For the duration of the imagined future
event, “Albuquerque” must become a security community, an alliance defined not by
who was victimized by the attack, but by who has access to the medical care which will
counter the biological attack and protect citizens’ bodies.
Producing a single community in crisis, however, is not a simple task. Indeed, the
OEM has authority to plan for the city itself, but must persuade other stakeholders to
voluntarily participate. While some of these entities refuse to participate by simply not
returning phone calls, others produce more complicated narratives. The governor of one
pueblo rejected the principle of preparedness, explaining his pueblo’s nonparticipation
due to a cultural practice to avoid talking about bad things rooted in the belief that
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articulating calamity invites it to happen. The population of Kirtland Air Force base must
be included due to their proximity to the city, yet its residents are governed by military
rank and rule. The early drafts of the preparedness plan designated a warehouse on the
base as one of three secondary distribution sites, a decision supported by a Kirtland
representative who was soon after transferred. His successor believed that were a terrorist
attack to take place, the base would be put under lock-down, and the chances of driving
truckloads of pharma onto the base for distribution would be very small. While this
individual lacked authority to authorize the original plan, he could offer no alternative
that would provide medication for residents of the base—and yet could not opt out of the
CRI plan and assume responsibility for the population’s care, raising a question about
whether the crisis would integrate residents of the base into the local security community
or whether the military community would be cared for separately. Thus, as emergency
planners imagine a future biological event, they challenge the demarcations of
urban/rural, military/civilian, indigenous/colonizer which divide the systems of
government within the metropolitan area, creating a new space where a single authority
assumes responsibility to care for all who have been determined to reside within the
bounds of the security community.
During the imagined crisis, a primary mechanism of care will be distributing
doses of pharmaceuticals to individual citizens. Albuquerque planners are preparing for
an attack that involves the widespread and rapid introduction of a microbe into the
population, requiring the immediate dispersal of medication to restore health to a
majority of the population. The pharmaceuticals themselves are stored and managed at
the national level, through the Strategic National Stockpile, which claims it can deliver
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15 semi-trucks full of medical supplies to any location in the contiguous 48 states within
12 hours. Local governments are therefore not responsible for obtaining, producing, or
storing a physical product, but for creating a mechanism to efficiently and effectively
connect people with the product. Biosecurity can be characterized as “regulating
circulations,” enabling “good” things like pharmaceuticals to flow freely through the
population while inhibiting “bad” things like viruses.9 The challenge, of course, is that
the interactions which facilitate the positive flow of care are also likely to encourage
person-to-person contact which may increase disease transmission. Similarly, biosecurity
may not be achieved through quarantine or isolation because the government must be
able to exercise care for the population during the crisis. Effective governance during a
bioterror event will contain the disease without interrupting the economic and social
exchanges which define the community. Rather than dramatically shifting social
functions at the onset of a crisis, biosecurity can more effectively be achieved by
ensuring that the “normal” state of the community is one where viruses and disease have
limited circulation. Bioterrorism preparedness is particularly effective in normalizing the
state of emergency because the silent, slow introduction of disease into the environment
requires that the community constantly behave as if a deadly microbe were already
present.
Bioterrorism preparedness plans also transform existing circulations into
mechanisms of distributing care during crisis. In Albuquerque, the primary access to the
population will come through the US Postal Service. In the event that an antidote must be
delivered to every member of the population, postal workers will load trucks with the
pharmaceuticals and, with an accompanying armed guard, walk their regular routes,
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dropping drugs in every household mailbox. During the state of emergency, an existing
community system takes on a new role in accessing citizens in order to provide care. In
discussions over the plan, the safety of the postal workers came under question,
suggesting the need to pair the delivery personnel with security forces, thereby
militarizing the postal system during the crisis. The knowledge and systems of the US
Postal Service, already in place for conducting daily mail-delivery business, will be
enhance by the training of security personnel in order to ensure the safe delivery of the
antidote. Significantly, planners do not anticipate a “run” on the SNS supplies, planning
instead to so thoroughly saturate the community with free supplies which target specific,
timely needs that the medicine would have no market value and could not be hoarded,
stolen, or resold for profit. By using an organization already in the delivery business,
which has an established pattern for physically accessing houses, the preparedness plan
initially conceives of the community as people dwelling in households which receive
mail.
The second mechanism of distribution seeks out groups of people who are part of
the community but might be omitted from the postal lists, such residents of nursing
homes or prisons, people who might not be at their homes, such as hospital patients, and
transitory members of the community, such as people staying in hotels. Planners are
attempting to identify such groups prior to an event in order to determine how many
doses to allocate and deliver to those sites which are not individual homes on the postal
routes. Finally, residents who might be missed by these first two phases can seek the
medication from temporary centers, such as the one staffed by the TOPOFF volunteer in
Berman’s photograph. These distribution centers provide a way for citizens to become
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agents in seeking their own care, presuming that all individuals will be aware of the event
and able to assess their medical needs, traveling to a predetermined site where the
government will provide care during the crisis.
These final phases recognize the security community as a collection of vulnerable
bodies produced by events happening within a certain time and space. These individuals
may not be connected to the place by permanent residency, but are part of the vulnerable
community because they were in that space during the attack. In the planning process,
then, policymakers must recognize “community” as an ever-changing entity which
becomes fixed by the event. Notably, this security plan presumes the use of a biological
agent that is not contagious and therefore the parameters of community are set at the
moment of attack, by those who were potentially exposed to the microbe. Planning for an
attack involving a contagious organism like smallpox must consider community as a
group of people who might potentially be exposed to a particular organism, caring for
bodies that are both infected and potentially infected. While centuries of hurricanes,
earthquakes, and acts of war have forged a relationship between community, care, and
crisis, the variables of contagion and transmission which accompany a disease event
create new ways of managing the population to protect individual bodies.
Disease is a bearer of deviance, rendering some members of a population less
healthy than others, but if the risk of disease can be calculated, then mechanisms of
security can be put in place to regulate disease within a population. In his 1977-78
lectures, Security, Territory, Population, Michel Foucault theorized a population as a
collection of living beings defined by their biological and pathological characteristics and
subject to common mechanisms of governing. People’s relationship to disease changes
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with the ability to conceive of a population, for a level of disease might be tolerated
within the population which cannot be accepted individually. Thus, mechanisms of
security can be used to work against deviant cases of disease in order to maintain a
“normal” condition of the population. The population, however, encompasses both those
who are ill and those who are not, subjecting healthy bodies to the techniques of
governing the sick for the promise of security for the whole. Because liberal subjects
have the right and responsibility to govern their social interactions in order to ensure the
security of the population, the mechanisms of security extend deeply into the many social
conditions which produce disease risk. The biopreparedness plans undertaken by the city
of Albuquerque exemplify how identifying and delineating the population enables the
calculation of risk and determines the acts of governance which will care for the
population when disease is introduced. Here, the common biological characteristic that
defines the population is a shared vulnerability to disease, and the state is attempting to
predetermine the extent of its care by identifying who shares that vulnerability. This case
exemplifies how far the mechanisms of disease control might extend into the population,
for the population is healthy in the present moment, but every individual is inscribed with
the potential to become diseased. Furthermore, because disease is borne by living entities,
it is also characterized by moments of sudden expansion and growth, which will continue
unless checked by environmental or human-imposed controls, a moment Foucault labels
“the crisis.”10 Each body within the population—even the presently healthy ones—
contains within it the potential to create the crisis, requiring that the calculation of risk
account for healthy bodies because they are vulnerable to disease and that acts to mitigate
risk focus upon all members of the population who bear vulnerability. The state of
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emergency is thereby sustained when disease is not present, for a disease event might
erupt at any moment and the healthy population bears within it the potential to become
ill. Biosecurity can thereby be achieved by preparing for that moment of crisis, planning a
response which will maintain the health of the population by containing the disease and
preventing those moments of sudden expansion and growth.
One of the aims of scenario enactment is to identify vulnerabilities, not within
individual bodies, but within the planned response to a catastrophic event, seeking the
weak spots within the security apparatus and improving the ability to provide care during
crisis. Staging a preparedness exercise also brings the imagined future event into a time
and space where individuals can rehearse their responses. To test the components of its
bioterrorism preparedness plan, the city of Albuquerque has hired a contractor to design a
scenario involving an aerosolized anthrax attack. In three simulations, planners will test
three phases of the emergency response, to be followed by a fourth, full-scale exercise
which will try the plan from beginning to end. The cast includes the public generally, but
particularly the individuals who will manage the community during the event. The
Department of Homeland Security advocates rehearsal as a time to practice
communication between the diverse government agencies which will respond to terrorist
events, characterizing the crisis as an event that cannot be managed by a single agency,
when the collaboration of many entities will transform the means of governing the
population.11 The scenario imagines a future where security cannot be achieved without
the consolidation of government around the singular goal of providing care, perhaps even
through the militarized authority brought by armed guards walking with postal workers.
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While nationwide scenarios may involve thousands of volunteers role-playing
victims and responders, on a small-scale much of the social effect of these scenarios
comes by bringing representatives for all the stakeholders and caregivers into a common
present location. At the July rehearsal in Albuquerque, the room was filled with
uniformed police officers, city employees wearing polo shirts, representatives from
Kirtland Air Force Base in military fatigues, and representatives from CDC dressed in
business attire. After signing in and filling out identifying nametags, the group sat down
to review how the day’s events would unfold, being oriented to the various rooms which
represented the remote distribution centers where the individuals would be staged during
a bioterrorist event. To further set the stage, the contractor played an audio recording
simulating a news broadcast, describing the “attack” and the public panic which
characterized the present moment. The director then reviewed the steps that had been
taken during Phase One, and the group dispersed to their assigned “locations,” where
they were connected to each other by phone and email, but could not physically see the
participants who were supposedly working at a site on the other side of the city.
Presumably, actions taken during a rehearsal are somehow more authentic and
therefore more useful in preparing for the event, identifying the weaknesses in the
mechanisms of crisis governing. Significantly, the recognition that the simulation is still a
simulation, does not fade during the exercise. Because there was no emergency,
participants glossed over or walked around difficulties that might have been more
significant in “the field,” such as transport time or not having accurate numbers on hand,
while throwing glitches at each other on the spur of the moment, as if to create, and then
neatly resolve, their own worst-case scenario: “Hey, let’s give them a gas leak over in
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building three.” Ironically, the cost of full-scale exercises is often rationalized as
providing more authentic data than a computer-modeled exercise because it involves
human actors whose responses are less predictable and therefore more in line with human
behavior.12 No amount of fake blood, however, can replicate the urgency that
accompanies crisis, suggesting that these exercises are not valued because they provide
new expertise on human behavior, but because they rehearse forms of governing that are
deemed to be important to managing a population perpetually in crisis.
The important work being done here is not authentically simulating the emotion
of a crisis, but rather the creation of community around the idea of crisis. The committees
formed, the infrastructure built, and the policies drafted are created in anticipation of a
future event, but they exist in the present moment. The simulation works to assess
resources, designate authority, allocate spaces, and build networks—acts which rearrange
the means of governing around crisis management. Furthermore, in order to keep that
uncertain threat in “a space of present intervention,” the simulation must be repeated,
reminding all actors of their roles during the imagined crisis. The scenario in
Albuquerque and the work of the Cities Readiness Initiative is producing a new way of
governing the health of the population, rehearsing a chain of care which links citizens to
the federal government through the networks that distribute terrorism countermeasures.
Public health has traditionally been managed at the local level, in county clinics and
community health departments, but through bioterrorism preparedness planning, the
national government is assuming a new role in providing medical care to the population.
The CRI requires that cities prove their compatibility with national programs in order to
access the pharmaceuticals which are reserved at the national level. Through rehearsal,
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local governments are trying out a new role of facilitating federal care during times of
crisis.
The militarization of caregiving practices confounds the specter of war with lifegiving acts of health, providing citizens assurances that their life is secure and offering a
way of living within the state of emergency. Erickson and Barrett describe preparedness
exercises as “explicitly designed forms of information warfare and perception
management,” aimed at displaying the state’s preparedness in order to assure its citizens
and deter its enemies.13 Whether or not the deterrence objectives are achieved, simulation
plays an important role in producing the images and narratives of security which signify
preparedness, and teaching individuals how to act during these times of crisis. People
learn to recognize, within their community, face masks and white tents and postal
workers traveling with police officers as indicators of a bioterrorist event. The work of
developing and rehearsing bioterrorism preparedness plans reminds individuals that the
community is at risk of bioterrorist attack, establishing watchfulness and readiness as
qualities of good citizenship which must be sustained at all times. Good governance, on
the other hand, comes through the timely distribution of life-saving medical care after the
event. Not only does the simulation affirm that the community is vulnerable, but it
enables the community to display its “biosecurity” as practice in the present moment.
Finally, people find value in seeing themselves as a target—they enjoy the
simulation because it affirms that they are at risk, for “someone” out there is threatened
by their community and might seek to do them harm. Simulation reminds citizens that the
federal government values cities like Albuquerque enough to grant money to prepare and
protect its citizens, and values the health of the nation enough to stage biannual TOPOFF
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exercises at $12 to $16 million dollars apiece. Such expenditures are rationalized by the
claim that money spent for bioterrorism preparedness will also benefit the community
during times of peace.
In 2009, people around the world rehearsed a response to a major biological event
through the social control of the H1N1 virus. While reminders to wash hands and stay
home from school abound, emergency responders seized the H1N1 event as another way
to test their bioterrorism preparedness plans. At the Phase 2 simulation in Albuquerque,
participants commented that they would have the opportunity for a “real-life” test of this
scenario when New Mexico received the swine flu vaccine. In addition to following
traditional measures for annual flu vaccination, Albuquerque plans to set up the same
remote “drive-through” stations it would use to hand out medication in a bioterrorist
event, thereby testing the city’s capability to recruit medical personnel, staff the tents,
manage crowds, and record information about flu shot recipients. Bioterrorism
preparedness work has created the infrastructure to undertake such a distribution, and the
decision to use it for H1N1 is rationalized for the purpose of assessing the effectiveness
of the mechanism.
In considering the consequences of bioterrorism simulation, it is important to
recognize that bioterrorism preparedness is changing the structures of our health system,
and changing the ways that the state cares for the population during the never-ending
state of emergency. In treating H1N1, an emergency response will be used for a nonemergency event, using simulation protocols to distribute a “real” health product for the
sake of testing the infrastructure, further blurring the bounds between simulation and
event. Undoubtedly, the means of distribution of H1N1 vaccine will contribute to public
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perception of risk and thereby public participation in vaccination programs. When the
mechanisms of bioterrorism response are used for routine health care, the simulation
becomes the event, and the community is no longer putting on a mask for a day of roleplaying, but participating in the rehearsal in order to receive care. When an individual’s
access to a life-saving vaccine requires participation in a community preparedness drill,
the stakes of bioterrorism scenarios raise even higher. Simulation is no longer the stage,
but these forms have blurred until all citizens are continuously rehearsing the state of
emergency, transforming a future event into a way of living in the present.
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Conclusions: Infectious! Stay Away

What makes disease visible in society? Coughing? Pockmarks? Facial masks?
How do people negotiate a world fraught with unseen disease risk? If disease risk were
rendered explicitly upon bodies, how would human social relations change? In 2008, the
Science Gallery at Trinity College in Dublin used blinking badges and GPS technology to
study how disease transmits through social groups on a micro-level and how people’s
behaviors change when “disease” is made visible. Part science museum, art gallery, and
working laboratory, “Infectious! Stay Away” made people subjects in a social experiment
of contagion, to study transmission of infection on the small scale (as opposed to the
global maps of infections which chart the movement of disease by populations.) In the
experiment at Trinity College, disease was always present, always virulent, and always
transmissible, eliminating the possibility that social contact would not transmit disease by
defining proximity as the only condition for infection.
A plastic tunnel which seemed to have been swiped from the set of Outbreak led
visitors into the exhibit, where they received a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
device to hang around their necks. The RFID tags were programmed to “pick up”
infection by proximity to other infected tags. Thus, a healthy individual’s tag pulsed with
a steady green light, but when an “infected” tag/body passed close by, the RFID picked
up the “disease” and began to blink red. Throughout the exhibit, which showcased a wall
of smooched-on Petri dishes illuminating unique “Kiss Cultures” and a darkened audio
room exploring the question of whether laughter is contagious, flat-panel monitors
tracked the movements of infected “bodies,” red dots bumping into green and turning
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them red as the infection spread. By correlating moving dots with moving feet, attentive
participants could watch infected bodies approach and duck out of the way. Some red
dots immediately scrambled towards decontamination rooms on the second floor, while
others seemed to zip through the crowd like Pac-Man pursuing endless strings of green
dots to swallow. Not unlike characters in a video game, each body moved through the
contained space with a self-ascribed mission to catch or be caught. By rendering disease
status visible through blinking tags, participants were empowered to act and react
according to a known risk of contamination.
As the public moved through the dim exhibits, scientists at a remote location
surveilled the site, looking for patterns and downloading millions of data points from the
RFIDs to use for modeling epidemics at the most intimate, person-to-person level.
Through their GPS-keyed tags, Infectious visitors enrolled in a social experiment,
becoming subjects in a survey of the movement of disease.1 After wandering through the
halls for half an hour or so, I began to sense the layers of power which can be accessed
when bodies are stripped to bare life, read merely as vectors for disease. As a subject in
this experiment of contagion, my very body—its movements, its preferences, its
vulnerability—was reduced to a dot on a screen, a signal sent through the air to be
analyzed in relation to a million other signals. By honing in on my disease practices
alone, the experiment stripped from my body all the other qualities which constituted my
social existence: what I was saying to my green-dot friends, how we reacted when we
saw a nearby dot turn to red, or how we strategized to protect our collective health as we
moved through the exhibit. I was a dot on a screen indicating a higher risk of disease in a
particular geographical area, like the dots on the big panel at the CDC marking hepatitis
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cases. I was a role-player in a simulation of an outbreak, providing data which might
change the ways people prepare for epidemics on the small scale. And I was an individual
within a community of people, policing my own behavior because I could see it on the
screen and therefore felt responsible for protecting my own health. In those moments
when I became infected, I felt the loss of control over my own body, unable to protect
myself and still participate as I wanted in this society, namely exploring the exhibit with
my friends. In the data set, I simply changed from green to red. Infection disrupted my
life, but was simply another risk to calculate for the scientists and for the strangers who
shared my space.
My experiences at the Infectious exhibit contained about the same level of
emotional and physical intensity as a video game, but the encounter mirrored the larger
social consequences of biological risk explicated throughout this dissertation. There are
countless entities in modern society which watch, assess, test, calculate, and explain the
human subject in terms of its disease-health and vulnerability. Many of these calculations
are dichotomous—healthy/unhealthy, infection/uninfected, vaccinated/unvaccinated—
offering useful quantifications for health practice, but limiting the ability to account for
numerous expressions of disease which define social relations, including the potential to
carry disease unknowingly or adopting behaviors to modify the expression of disease. On
the other hand, the invisibility of disease makes it particularly effective as a security
threat, for it multiplies vulnerability by minimizing the option of social avoidance. In
other words, while I could avoid a red dot at the Infectious exhibit, I cannot avoid a
smallpox carrier moving through public spaces unless the pox marks appear to make the
disease visible. As such, the bodies within my proximate environment cannot be
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eliminated as disease threats because their disease status is invisible and unknown,
infusing healthy bodies with the endless potential for disease risk.
Visible or not, contagion shapes human interactions on many scales. The
invisibility of the disease threat gives it power in systems of governance, for a hundred
places might be vulnerable where only one space is impacted, rationalizing expansive
government practices. Human behaviors shift in the face of known threats, presenting
difficulties for security practices which work to normalize populations. When contagion
is unknown, all subjects experience shared vulnerability which enables the possibility of
ever-more and ever-greater threats to be commonly experienced by many subjects. With
familiar, emerging, technological, and synthetic germs simmering in a bottomless pot of
bacterial soup, the bioterror state can effectively uphold the endless need for national,
local, and individual biosecurity.
This project to excavate the underpinnings of biological terrorism presumes that
an existent bioterror threat is incidental to the establishment of the security state. Indeed
the systems of security are better sustained by an ever-present threat than by a single
catastrophic event, for they work to convince populations to continuously strive for a
state of preparedness. The ideological power of bioterrorism, produced by vivid cultural
memories of disease, draws strength from the many daily acts of life, science, and politics
which affirm human vulnerability to disease. Furthermore, our imaginings of the threat,
whether on the Hollywood screen, in a simulation exercise, or calculated by science,
readily stand in for lived experience, and are typically bigger and farther-reaching than
the quotidian experience of bioterror acts.
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The case studies presented here explore how bioterrorism touches down in
people’s lives in unexpected ways. In examining the similar ways the bioterror threat is
manifest in wide-ranging geographies, three key outcomes of the bioterror crisis emerge.
First, bioterrorism remakes nature as a prominent threat of the modern age, particularly
through the blending of nature and technology through science practice. The cultural
histories of germs have produced powerful ideologies of contagion and control, which
have been reinvigorated by the genomic ways of knowing life. The case of smallpox, for
example, showed how the belief that the most virulent disease of human history could be
contained by a program of social control emerged from new knowledge of germs and
vaccination. In the modern age, that belief is expressed anew through the large-scale
stockpiles kept by the national government as the primary countermeasure for small-pox
attack. The revitalization of the smallpox virus through advances in science and
technology therefore demands a parallel expansion of the mechanisms of control.
Similarly, the risk created by the globalization of science and the transportation of
microbes from their “natural” environments mobilizes the microbial threat and expands
the field of risk to global proportions. Finally, the perception that under the new biology,
terrorists have ready access to dangerous pathogens and easily-developed knowledge of
how to use them creates a politics of nature where microbes can be harnessed to increase
their harm. Thus, a secondary narrative of “nature under control” creates a basis for
bioterrorism in the belief that individuals can readily manipulate microbes to create more
virulent, directed, or insidious effects. Citizens demand that the state demonstrate how
microbial risk is being controlled, as seen during the protest in Hamilton where residents
pleaded with Rocky Mountain Laboratories to use the EIS protocol to show them that the
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agency recognized their biological interest in the lab’s security and had developed plans
to mitigate that risk. Such political acts define the terms of biosecurity, requiring
outcomes that can be seen and measured by citizens. In so doing, they express the new
parameters of fear in the contemporary moment, borrowing from the lexicon of disease
which has characterized public health and biological science for many years.
Second, as conceptions of microbial risk change our ways of knowing nature and
the quality of life itself, the terms of biological citizenship are renegotiated. When
biological risks abound, citizenship becomes rooted in the basics of human survival and
the protection of “bare life.” In turn, the care practices of government shift away from
more intimate concerns of health and well-being in favor of protecting the population
holistically. This shift is manifest, for example, in the state health apparatus, as the influx
of funding for bioterrorism preparedness changes the involvement of government in
citizens’ health. A health system attending to the healthy, but vulnerable, population
manages for the enduring life of the citizens, rather than the present well-being of
individuals. For example, building Biosafety Level-4 laboratories to increase national
security through the study of dangerous pathogens shows the calculation of the greater
good over the well-being of those who live in proximity to the labs themselves. The
repurposing of health care technologies and the development of new federal research
priorities around bioterrorism further demonstrate how national attention to and funding
allocations for biosecurity motivate different types of research and dual-purposing of
health care technologies. This influx of funding is changing the spaces of public health
and science in the modern age. BSL4 laboratories, terrorism training centers, fenced
borderlands, post offices, and incident command centers have emerged as the spaces

265
where bioterrorism will be managed; these spaces change the ways people live, how they
work, and how they interact with each other, and sustain the idea that with enough
funding and citizen participation, bioterror threats can be mitigated. This research shows
that despite considerable federal funding and national support for biosecurity practices,
these sites and their work are contested. They challenge citizens to evaluate the multiple
biological threats in their immediate and distant environments and situate their own lives
in relation to the national security complex. Thus, the material outcomes of biosecurity
practices challenge groups and individuals to act on behalf of their collective well-being,
bringing debates over the character of biological security into the public discourse and
opening new possibilities for biological citizenship.
As the government expands programs of biosecurity, whether stockpiling
vaccines for the nation or staging full-scale simulations of terrorism events, it is
important to remember that citizens sacrifice for the continuation of the national security
state, including the decline of one civic program in favor of another, or even the
individual decision to take a live virus into one’s body for the sake of the collective
health. Demands for vaccination, rationalized for some “greater good,” ask individuals to
manage their own bodies, not just for individual survival, but to create a massive
immunity which will protect the population holistically. Furthermore, citizens may be
asked to assume certain behaviors, perhaps as small as hand-washing, in order to counter
the risk they present to the population as carriers of human disease. The paradox of
humanity, as Feldman and Ticktin argue, is that the belief that human life under threat
demands increased government attention, but at the same time humanity poses a
tremendous threat which much be contained through governance. The human body
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cannot escape the attention of the security state, for these new government practices
target the very institutions in which people live. Narratives of contagion emerging from
cultural histories of disease imagine human bodies as simultaneous victims and vectors of
deadly diseases, conflating and confusing the care and security functions of
governments.2
Third, these cases expose how systems of governance operating in the modern age
are grounded in a “permanent war posture.”3 Sophisticated real-time disease surveillance
technologies, command centers for disease control, impenetrable fortresses for scientific
study, and centers dedicated to rehearsing war events are material outcomes of
bioterrorism preparedness practices in the last decade. These spaces show the expansion
of the military complex into obscure spaces, where they draw power from their economic
centrality to remote populations or their bird’s-eye view of the nation as a whole. If the
new state forms of the modern age rely upon the never-ending threat as the basis for
government expansion, these spaces work simultaneously to sustain the existence of the
threat itself. Whether there exists a threat or not, bioterrorism has changed the town of
Playas, the agricultural flows through the US borderlands, the laboratories of the CDC,
and the economy of Hamilton. The creations of numerous such sites within the last
decade, despite no new occurrences of bioterrorist attack, affirms that biosecurity is
rooted in ideologies emerging from deep-seated beliefs about nature and the role of
government in relation to its citizens. Staging simulations of bioterrorist events in new
spaces and in familiar ones further ingrains the meanings and uses of such sites with the
purpose of biosecurity. Thus, not only does simulation demonstrate citizens’
responsibilities for biosecurity, but it shows how the places which have been built to
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secure bodies and protect national health will be used during a crisis. As a security
practice, simulation imagines future events, but the important work of determining
appropriate citizen behaviors and conditioning populations to respond is done in the
present moment, with material changes to existing forms of governance. Not only does
simulation produce a cohesive understanding of biological risk, but it imagines new ways
of managing populations to mitigate future harm. In the absence of a biological event,
biosecurity manifests in the material forms of preparedness which show how people act
on behalf of their personal and collective health.
The particular qualities of bioterrorism, rooted in unpredictable natures and
invisible movements of living bodies through time and space, work effectively to sustain
a perpetual state of exception, where the most intimate practices of citizens can be
accessed through the production of a crisis. As I experienced walking through the
Infectious exhibit, the biological is social, and when disease is understood in terms of
individual biological risk, people modify behaviors, thereby opening opportunities for the
state to delineate desired behaviors for the survival of populations. The danger, however,
lies in the potential for the state to take action without a threat and the outcomes such a
mobilization has in citizens’ current lives. Biosecurity practices must be taken seriously
in the present moment, because the work to build national bioterrorism defenses has
notable immediate consequences.
After an afternoon at “Infectious! Stay Away,” a space inscribed in every way
with contagion, it seems possible to imagine a world where social living is dedicated to
the sole task of containment. The liberal society is unable to resist prioritizing physical
security and as a consequence all “public life is organized around survival.”4 When social
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systems measure accomplishment in the terms of survival alone, there are no longer
spaces to engage important debates over equality, justice and opportunity. Bare life is a
powerful entity, but leaves little room for uncertainty. The narratives presented in this
dissertation, however, show potential for localized responses to state policies, though the
challenges of realizing them in the current political state are self-sustaining. If totalizing
threats like terrorism can be complicated by new narratives of biology, science, and
simulation, then citizens may find ways to access understandings of life which are neither
bare nor fearful.
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